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This dissertation empirically tests the role that the Los Angeles County 
Federation of Labor has played in increasing voter turnout through targeted political 
mobilization efforts in local elections over a number of years.  The literature suggests 
that the labor organization, often in conjunction with local community groups, is 
capable of upping turnout for particular candidates in key elections, and as such is a 
significant force in local politics.  However, no empirical work has yet been performed 
to test this assertion.  In measuring labor’s influence on turnout in Los Angeles, the 
dissertation relies on the political science literature to develop a model for determining 
vote behavior, and contextualizes the empirical study in terms of labor’s historical role 
in politics on a national level, and the rise of labor as a political entity in Los Angeles.  
Quantitative analysis is performed on a data set of over 188,000 individuals in South 
Los Angeles, some of whom were contacted by labor and community groups during 
the course of five elections from 2002 to 2004.  The first series of models test labor’s 
influence as a singular entity in three elections, while the second models incorporate 
all contacting groups and elections.  The results suggest that the County Federation, 
both alone and in conjunction with community groups, has been successful in its 
efforts to increase turnout, thus validating the accorded praise.  The specific findings 
often support the political science literature on vote-getting efforts, with some key 
distinctions, most notably when distinguishing between mobilization types. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
The core question of this dissertation appears initially to be quite simple: what 
influences voter turnout?  Becoming more specific, within the wide range of factors 
that may provide an answer, what role, if any, do labor groups play in harnessing the 
vote?  Adding focus, have labor groups significantly influenced voter turnout levels in 
Los Angeles over the course of several recent elections?  Although the question of 
voter turnout determinants appears relatively straightforward at first, each additional 
layer of focus adds significant levels of complexity.  This dissertation contributes to 
three general strands of literature: effects on vote turnout; the general role of labor in 
politics; and the effects of the local union movement on the political structure of the 
city of Los Angeles.   
Presently, working to mobilize voters under the umbrella of the Los Angeles 
County Federation of Labor (called the County Federation or simply the Federation in 
this dissertation1) -- the local political arm of the AFL-CIO, with 800,000 members 
and 345 affiliates -- the Los Angeles union movement is celebrated both locally and 
nationally as perhaps the most influential political element in the city, if not beyond.  
Throughout the labor community as a whole, the common perception is that, although 
(or perhaps because) Los Angeles existed as a stronghold of non-union activity during 
unions’ density ascension (and subsequent decline), it is an impressive fact that 
organized labor in Los Angeles has managed to create for itself a powerful structure 
for harnessing political votes through targeted mobilization drives. 
 Although it may be a commonplace belief that Los Angeles lies at the center 
of a new labor movement, this dissertation examines whether the pervasive sense of 
success translates empirically into quantitative proof that union efforts have, in fact, 
                                                 
1
 This name is often shortened to “County Fed” by those within and close to the organization.  
However, I maintain that calling the organization by this nickname connotes a level of intimacy with 
the labor group that may imply a sense of bias.  As such, the nickname is not used in this work. 
  2 
made a difference in key political arenas.  There is a widely held perception shared by 
the labor community, some within the business community, public officials, the 
media, and academics that unions are a force to be reckoned with and a substantial 
factor in state and local politics.  More specifically, it is generally accepted that the 
County Federation of Labor is able to mobilize eligible voters to cast ballots on 
election day. As such, some candidates are compelled to actively seek the labor 
organization’s endorsement in order to wage a successful campaign.  However, the 
assertion that unions can turn out the vote in Los Angeles has not been well 
documented empirically. To do so requires a positive answer to a critical question: do 
potential voters targeted by this group actually cast ballots, independent of the known 
determinants of voter turnout? 
This dissertation directly answers that question, by analyzing a data set 
comprising all the registered voters in the broad geographic area known as South Los 
Angeles as of fall 2004.  This data set provides the basis for an analysis of voting 
behavior at the local, micro level.  The data track the voting records of individual 
registered voters in South Los Angeles, with the key independent variable being 
contact by the County Federation.  The vote turnout levels of contacted individuals 
can be compared to the non-contacted group while controlling for a number of other 
population characteristics, to garner a sense of the effects of contact alone on turnout.  
The hypothesis developed out of this data set is that those individuals contacted by the 
labor organization are more likely to turn out to the polls than those not contacted. 
It must be noted that the data set available for this dissertation is extremely 
rare.  Previous work that measured vote turnout levels (a literature which is covered in 
detail during early chapters) has been heavily influenced by two approaches: early 
projects relied on survey data, and more recent studies have used third-party vote 
tabulation systems, which allow for a more objective measurement of turnout by 
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avoiding the exaggerations found in self-reporting; the dissertation falls in line with 
this recent approach to measuring turnout.  However, unlike any previous data, the 
cases available provide information in unparalleled detail over a number of years.  For 
instance, the data account for the vote propensity (or prior voting history) of each 
individual in the population when testing the effects of contact.  A previous study (see 
Zullo 2004), which can be considered probably the most refined analysis of a union-
led mobilization campaign, could not account for this critical variable.  This 
dissertation is able to control for “frequent,” “occasional” and “never” vote 
propensities when analyzing the influence of contact on turnout.  The data also allows 
for subdivision into contact type, to answer whether phone calls or door-to-door walks 
work better (forming a testable sub-hypothesis).  Equally unusual is that the data 
provides information for over 180,000 individuals in one geographic location; the 
sheer magnitude of the data allows for unique accuracy in testing the factors that lead 
to turnout.  
The methodology to be used in this dissertation is predicated on a standard 
political science explanation of turnout, often termed the psychological theory of 
voting behavior.  The framework for this work was most clearly conceived by political 
scientists at the University of Michigan, who developed a model known as the “funnel 
of causality” in their work The American Voter (1960); political scientists have since 
refined this framework in a number of ways to form the overall model used in this 
dissertation.  Within this political science model of voter behavior, the dissertation 
asks what role, if any, union contact plays in influencing turnout rates, while holding 
constant as many factors known to effect vote behavior as possible.   
However, in order to focus on the empirical analysis, it is critical to 
contextualize the work by understanding the historical role labor has played in U.S. 
politics, and also the specific Los Angeles labor circumstances in which the study 
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occurs.  It has been thoroughly established that the American labor movement has 
played a role, however large or small, in U.S. politics for over a century, from the 
early pluralism of Samuel Gompers to recent million-dollar Democratic candidate 
endorsements and mobilization drives.  Though labor’s role in the political structure 
has changed vastly, it has remained a strong contributor to the development of 
American politics.  The union movement relies on this political structure to act as a 
far-reaching and enormously influential body; the political structure enacts laws and 
enforces decisions that will either increase or decrease the economic power achievable 
by union organizations.  Labor battles for political influence over factors that shape its 
economic welfare – for instance, without the passage of the National Labor Relations 
Act, or the subsequent Taft-Hartley Act, the environment in which unions negotiate 
for economic advantages would be undeniably different.   
One might say that the political and economic accomplishments of unions are 
symbiotic; without the strength of one, the other becomes marginalized.  For this 
reason, the American union movement distributes millions of dollars into political 
funds each year, with the express intent of increasing labor’s presence in politics.  
Unions look for labor-friendly individuals at all levels of government, candidates 
whom they can support with designated resources.  Many times labor assists favorable 
candidates monetarily; some of the time, a union’s endorsement leads to intensive 
mobilization drives in an effort to harness the vote for a key individual.   
Los Angeles is the focus of this dissertation because the city, once a 
notoriously anti-union town, has in recent years grown into a great hope for the 
revitalization of organized labor in the United States.  In writing about Los Angeles 
labor’s rise from obscurity to its role as bright spot for a struggling union movement, 
some authors have focused on the broad economic gains unions have made over the 
past several years.  Others have focused on key campaigns that have galvanized the 
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local labor movement, such as Justice for Janitors.  Still others have focused their 
attention on the political aspirations of the city’s unions.  The changing demographics 
of the region as a whole and specifically the upper echelons of the local labor 
movement in the 1980s brought new, progressive approaches to organizing efforts. 
Several union leaders forged alliances with the Latino community and focused 
recruitment efforts on this new cadre of workers.   
Politically, the County Federation of Labor moved away from its tradition of 
insider politics and followed larger citywide trends in union leadership changes when 
electing Miguel Contreras as its secretary-treasurer in 1995.  Contreras, a Latino, is 
largely credited with the transformation of the County Federation from an organization 
known only for its largesse and the weight of its checkbook into a political machine 
capable of pooling vast resources into targeted mobilization campaigns.2  The current 
mission statement of the County Federation reads, “We want to promote a voice for 
workers through active participation in the political process, to elect pro-union and 
pro-worker officials, and to advance public policies that support workers and their 
families.”3 
 Turning to the structure of the dissertation, this chapter provides a broad 
introduction to the topic of this work, discusses the issue at hand and the questions 
posed in the thesis, and explains the subject’s relevance as a meaningful area of study.  
It also gives brief overviews of the subsequent chapters. 
 Chapter Two embeds the dissertation in the political science literature on 
voting in general and mobilization efforts in particular.  It traces the rise of the 
psychological and economic theories of voting behavior.  My model for overall voting 
influences and behaviors is discussed at length in this chapter in a slightly modified 
                                                 
2
 For an overview of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor’s rise to prominence in the Los 
Angeles political community, see Frank and Wong (2004). 
3
 This quote comes from the Federation’s website, www.launionaflcio.org. 
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fashion.  A second theoretical literature noted in this chapter discusses voting forces 
from a more economic perspective.  Many political scientists argue that voting is an 
irrational behavior and, as such, the act of voting entails a paradox.  They see 
mobilization efforts as tools employed to overcome this paradox, arguing that 
mobilization increases the benefits and reduces the costs associated with voting.  
These authors argue that mobilization campaigns can be used as a form of social 
pressure, wherein an individual will cast his or her ballot in order to be accepted by the 
group.  Recent studies are highlighted in this chapter, all of which have looked at 
mobilization efforts by using verifiable public records to eliminate response bias. 
 Chapter Three provides an overview of the labor movement’s role in politics 
over the course of more than a hundred years.  It offers an explanation for the lack of a 
Labor Party in the United States and notes the various methods the union movement 
has chosen to exert power in the political arena.  The chapter discusses labor’s 
alignment with the Civil Rights movement, its internal political wrangling, and the 
subsequent decline in union influence on national-level politics beginning in the mid-
twentieth century.  It ends by addressing the political components of the recent AFL-
CIO split, and their possible repercussions for future political efforts, and offers the 
suggestion that the Los Angeles labor movement’s political efforts could possibly be 
seen as a microcosm of the recent success in national-level union mobilization efforts. 
 Chapter Four offers a detailed account of the rise of the County Federation of 
Labor in Los Angeles.  It maintains that the Federation gained strength out of the 
changing local demographic circumstances in the late twentieth century, and became a 
major player in local politics in the years after Miguel Contreras was elected as its 
leader.  It provides detailed summaries of several political campaigns critical to the 
Federation over the past six years.  In addition, it looks beyond the Contreras legacy to 
the ill-fated leadership of Martin Ludlow, and turns to the relative stabilization of the 
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Federation following the ascension of Maria Elena Durazo.  It ends by admitting that 
the narrative account of the Federation’s rise to prominence lacks any objective 
verification, and that an empirical test of the Federation’s political efforts can assess 
whether these claims of success are accurate. 
 In Chapter Five, an analysis of the County Federation’s effects on three local 
elections is performed.  The data (and their limitations) are explained in detail, 
including the dependent variable (turnout), the key independent variables (contact – 
any type, personal visit only, live phone call only, and just Latinos), and several 
control variables.  Contact is the key independent variable in that it represents the 
mobilization of a potential voter by the Federation, which can be tested alongside 
changes in the dependent variable (turnout).  The chapter first runs percentage point 
differences in turnout between non-contacted and contacted individuals to garner a 
sense of the general voting trends associated with contact.  Noting that percentage 
increase differences cannot offer a causal relationship between contact and turnout, 
this work turns to logistic regressions to gauge the precise difference in turnout 
likelihood attributable to contact alone, while controlling for several factors known 
from the political science literature to be influential on voting behavior.   
 Chapter Six broadens the data analysis to include both labor groups acting 
alone and unions working in conjunction with other mobilizing organizations, and 
looks at all five elections included in the data set.  This broadening is theoretically 
necessary for several reasons: for one, it allows for a deeper understanding of the labor 
movement’s influence by expanding the study to include statewide elections rather 
than just local races.  Additionally, the expansion allows for a thorough testing of new 
hypotheses, which were not possible to study in the previous chapter.  These new 
hypotheses include questions regarding the effects of election priority, which is 
measured by the total number of contacts in an election, the number of groups 
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included, and the importance placed on the election by the County Federation.   This 
chapter also tests the effects of larger aggregate numbers of mobilizations per election, 
comparing the results of the three elections studied in the previous chapter (looking at 
the Federation alone) with the results when all the other groups are incorporated.  
Finally, this chapter analyzes the significance of multiple contacts on turnout in a 
single election, using the State Assembly 47 race as its setting.  The expansion of the 
data allows for the dissertation to return to the concept of vote-getting as social 
pressure, and offers an opportunity to draw some conclusions regarding this theory. 
 Chapter Seven assesses the implications of the data analysis and offers a 
conclusion in terms of the influence of the mobilization efforts on voter turnout.  The 
limitations of the data are reiterated, and possibilities for future improvement of the 
research are offered.  This chapter offers a discussion of the contributions that the 
dissertation has made to each of the three literature streams, and the methodological 
contribution of the statistical techniques used.  The work’s key expansion on political 
science theory is highlighted, particularly in the way that the study differs from current 
mobilization work.  The chapter also provides a normative explanation for the results, 
in an effort to discuss outcomes that may at first appear to be incongruent with the 
original hypotheses or expectations.   
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE DETERMINENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT 
The fundamental question of this chapter is, quite simply, what causes a voter 
to turn out at the polls?  Why do individuals choose to vote, and what circumstances 
contribute to their decision?  This question is critical because any test attempting to 
measure the success of voter mobilization must understand why individuals vote in the 
first place – what drives them to cast ballots at the polls, and what role do mobilization 
efforts play in influencing this?  To fully understand turnout, one must look at why 
voting occurs across a broad range of individuals, many of whom should not meet the 
standard dispositional requirements to vote. 
 Many of the theories championed by political scientists concern voting on a 
national level.  In most cases, presidential elections serve as the units of observation.  
Further, some theories focus not solely on the act of turning out, but also (sometime 
peripherally and other times fundamentally) on the issue of candidate choice.  
However, it is important to understand that, though the level of analysis may be 
different, the framework for and underlying value of the theories put forth in this 
chapter can be applied to all elections, from the local to the national level.    
 
The Psychological Theory of Voting: A Basis for the Model 
 Although political scientists have looked at the turnout question in a number of 
ways, perhaps the most useful template for explaining voter turnout can be derived 
from those who see voting as the product of a number of psychological and 
environmental interactions.  This psychological theory of voting behavior has been 
most clearly conceptualized by using a model known as the “funnel of causality.”  
This conceptual framework, developed by political scientists Angus Campbell, Philip 
E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes at the University of Michigan 
and expanded upon in The American Voter (1960), was used initially to explain voter 
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preferences at the polls.  However, the framework can be used to successfully account 
for turnout as well.  As the authors themselves note at the outset of the work, “We 
want to predict whether a given individual is going to vote, and which candidate he 
will choose” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 19).  It is with this 
outcome in mind that the authors set about creating their model of the causes of voter 
behavior.   
The hypothesis proposed by the authors of The American Voter is as follows: 
 
Our hypothesis is that the partisan choice the individual voter makes depends 
in an immediate sense on the strength and direction of the elements comprising 
a field of psychological forces, where these elements are interpreted as 
attitudes toward the perceived objects of national politics….  By using our 
theory and the observations it implies we are able to describe with much 
greater confidence the influence of these factors on a given election outcome 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 9). 
 
 Essentially, the authors theorized that a “multitude of determinants converges 
to produce the final behavior;” in their case, “final behavior” means the act of voting 
as well as the choice of candidate (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 19).   
 The first mention of the “funnel of causality” as a method of representing this 
larger theory regarding psychological and environmental interactions defines the 
concept concisely.  The authors state:  
 
We wish to account for a single behavior at a fixed point in time.  But it is 
behavior that stems from a multitude of prior factors.  We can visualize the 
chain of events with which we wish to deal as contained in a funnel of 
causality (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 24). 
 
Following its inception in 1960, this psychological or social psychological 
theory of voting behavior has not been challenged in any fundamental way by the 
political science literature.  It appears that political scientists generally accept that 
voting behavior relies on a chain of interacting psychological events cognized by the 
  11 
individual voter – although economists sometimes disagree, arguing that voting is 
nothing more than a rational choice based on cost/benefit analyses.  However, in 
general, political scientists have only refined and expanded on the original theory, 
rather than establishing any wholly new theory for voting behavior.  The clearest 
criticism of the authors’ work involved their emphasis on party affiliation in the 
original model, rather than the model itself; in a similar manner, the refinements to the 
model by political scientists over the years have dealt more with understanding which 
particular factors interact in the minds of potential voters to create those likely or 
unlikely to vote. 
A modified version of the funnel of causality, congruent with modern political 
science understandings of vote behavior determinants, will be used in this study.  This 
model establishes two conditions that must be accounted for when looking at any 
influences on vote behavior: irrelevant factors (termed “exogenous” in the original 
literature) and pertinent conditions (known originally as “relevant”).  One must 
immediately eliminate irrelevant factors from consideration when looking for effects 
on turnout.  As stated in the original work, these factors “include all those conditions 
that are so remote in nature from the content interest of the investigator that their 
inclusion in a system of variables…would be undesirable” (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960: 25-26).  For instance, the authors cite a case in which a 
potential voter suffers a flat tire on the way to the polls; he has failed to vote, but not 
for lack of motivation to turn out.  There is no need to read anything into this person’s 
failure to vote; factors along the lines of accidents or mishaps that intrude on the act of 
voting need not be considered within the funnel.  It is important to remember, 
however, that “the distinction between [irrelevant] factors and [pertinent] conditions is 
quite relative” and may be calculated dependent on the subject matter of the research 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 26). 
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Further, the authors distinguish between personal and external conditions.  
Personal conditions are “those events or states within the funnel of which the 
individual is aware,” while external conditions “warrant a place in the funnel because 
they are causally significant for later behavior, yet which currently lie beyond the 
awareness of the actor” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 27).  External 
elements may be considered irrelevant in that one wants to test factors that are 
perceived and recognized by the subject; yet some external conditions crystallize in 
the mind of the voter and become personal, and therefore cannot be dismissed if one 
seeks to fully understand the relevance of these conditions.  For instance, an individual 
at some point is unaware of the existence of a political candidate.  While the events 
occurring for and surrounding the candidate-to-be are external to the subject, they will 
have a significant role to play once the individual becomes aware of the candidate’s 
existence (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 27). 
Finally, the authors make a distinction between political and non-political 
conditions.  It is, for all intents and purposes, impossible to determine precisely what 
factors are “political” ones and what are “non-political;” again, the researcher must 
use his or her discretion in determining political factors.  This discretion must be 
informed by the particular circumstances surrounding the election and the assumptions 
that the researcher makes regarding the interaction between these circumstances and 
the studied individuals.  Some issues may become political, while others might be 
deemed political by one individual and non-political by another.  A factory shutdown, 
a question of same-sex marriage, or any number of issues can be seen as political or 
non-political.  However, the authors note: 
 
If the object or event is not cognized at all (an external condition), then no such 
determination can be made.  But as soon as a condition is made personal, then 
determination of its political or non-political status can rest upon the 
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individual’s particular perceptions (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960: 29). 
 
Deciding which factors are political becomes crucial when understanding why 
an individual turns out.  As the authors maintain, “Relevant measurements just prior to 
the act” of turnout, “will be almost completely political.”  Further, “at a greater 
distance we will have to consider a larger proportion of other social and economic 
factors, unless we eliminate them…at the outset” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960: 29).  Through our understanding of the conditions necessary to 
conceptualize the funnel, we should be aware that “as events approach the narrow end 
of the funnel, they are more completely [pertinent], personal, and political” (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 29).  Having ruled out irrelevant factors, one can 
now look at the composition of the funnel and establish the key influences across time 
on voter turnout. 
I will modify the funnel of causality to establish a clearer conceptualization 
and motivation of a voting model.  One of my key points is to consider three elements 
which interact to create a conceptualization of the funnel; these include short-term 
stimuli, immediate triggers, and long-term dispositions. 
 
Short-Term Stimuli 
 There are an infinite amount of factors in the universe that may be considered 
“stimuli” in a person’s decision to vote or not vote.  Potentially anything in the world 
can be a stimulus that may cause a person to say “yes” or “no” to voting.  However, 
many of these stimuli pass through the universe unseen by a potential voter.  To 
connect the idea of stimuli to the original funnel of causality literature, a stimulus does 
not move into the funnel if it is not pertinent, personal, and political to a potential 
voter.  Anything that falls outside these three categories simply floats by the funnel 
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without ever entering it.  It is critical to understand that not all stimuli will enter the 
funnel for potential voters – stimuli, if left on their own without any interactive 
elements, will have no effect on voting. 
 Stimuli are considered “short-term” because their effects, while critical, 
generally last no longer than the election in which they are found.  A stimulus can 
enter the psyche of a person quickly and exert influence instantaneously, but usually 
will not resonate for more than a brief period of time.  As such, stimuli should be 
considered highly malleable, and in many ways unpredictable over the long-term.  
 As mentioned, short-term stimuli can include just about anything that may 
become pertinent to a potential voter.  Typical short-term stimuli found in elections 
consist of the personal characteristics of the candidate (which can involve a number of 
traits that may also be considered stimuli, such as ethnic background, religion, and 
gender of the candidate), and the circumstances surrounding the election (which can 
include anything from the expected closeness of the race to issues that arise during the 
course of a campaign – for instance, whether there is a war during the election period).  
Again, short-term stimuli can be virtually anything that may at some point play a role 
in an election, though most of these stimuli go unnoticed to an individual voter.  
 
Immediate Triggers 
How then do short-term stimuli move out of their meandering existence and 
into a meaningful interaction in the funnel of a potential voter?  They need a catalyst, 
which arrives in the form of immediate triggers.  These immediate triggers capture 
certain stimuli and push them into the funnel, requiring potential voters to cognize 
these short-term stimuli and decide what effect they will have on voting.      
Returning to the literature, the authors developing this funnel of causality 
theory maintain that immediate triggers (known as “influences” originally) for voter 
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behavior cause stimuli to become entirely pertinent, personal, and political.  These 
triggers act as catalysts for stimuli the moment they cause a stimulus to strike a chord 
with a potential voter as meaningful.   
For instance, one might consider the characteristics of the specific candidate.  
For the given campaign in which the candidate is running, a potential voter is not 
likely to be concerned with any non-political stimuli (as determined by the voter 
himself) surrounding the candidate.  If a subject does not consider the religion of the 
candidate to be a politically meaningful stimulus, he or she should not be affected if a 
candidate is, say, a non-Christian.  The same logic follows for any number of stimuli 
that may or may not be political, such as the ethnicity and gender of the candidate.  
These personal characteristics only play a role as meaningful stimuli on vote turnout 
when they become pertinent, personal, and political to the individual voters. 
As discussed, the way short-term stimuli such as personal characteristics of a 
candidate are made pertinent, personal, and political is by the usage of immediate 
triggers.  Taking the example of personal characteristics, consider that a candidate 
may engage in heavy advertisement of certain beliefs or traits in order to make them 
pertinent, personal, and political to voters.  In doing so, the advertising campaign 
becomes an immediate trigger for the stimuli – say a candidate believes that he can 
garner support from the working-class.  He may run an ad campaign highlighting the 
fact that his father was a blue-collar dock worker.  This stimulus of working-class 
background would have floated past the funnel with no meaning until the candidate 
ran the advertisement (an immediate trigger), which then cognized the issue for 
potential voters, pushing it into the funnel of causality. 
Though stimuli gain significance to the individual when they are made 
pertinent, personal, and political to voters by immediate triggers, not all triggers work 
for all potential voters.  An advertising campaign used to highlight personal 
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characteristics of a candidate will not resonate with an individual voter who does not 
own a television, for example.  If a subject intends to vote but is unable to due to a 
mishap on the day of the election, his being aware of the closeness of the race does not 
play a role in that voting outcome. 
Along these theoretical limes, a critical immediate trigger is mobilization by 
political groups, which will be discussed at great length in subsequent sections.  
Briefly put, mobilization acts as a major immediate trigger by cognizing certain key 
stimuli that candidates believe will resonate with potential voters.  By mobilizing 
voters across certain platforms, a party can highlight the stimuli that it considers 
meaningful to the voters, and will allow other, less critical stimuli, to float by the 
funnel of causality, thus going untouched for a given election.  Mobilization is more 
personal than an advertising campaign, which allows for a more refined and assertive 
message, one that can be altered depending on the mobilized group.  This makes it a 
fundamental trigger for any campaign, as the message hits harder than other triggers 
might. 
 Assuming the immediate triggers are successful in placing some stimuli within 
the funnel, the stimuli may play a significant role in determining whether a person will 
turn out for a given election.  The stimuli are identifiable for a single given election, 
and may change from one campaign cycle to another.  For instance, a candidate may 
be considered extremely charismatic in one election, and proceed to lose his or her 
luster over the years.  Equally, the triggers may change depending on the election.  
Candidates may spend more or less during different election cycles, and mobilization 
efforts may target certain groups in one cycle and completely different sectors of 
society in another.  Stimuli influence the election in which they occur, but are not 
guaranteed to continue to reverberate throughout subsequent elections.   
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Structural Influences 
 Structural influences play a significant role in affecting immediate triggers.  
One could say that structural influences surround the funnel of causality, existing on 
the same plane as short-term stimuli.  They interact most significantly with the 
immediate triggers (though they also may affect long-term dispositions), and play a 
meaningful if intangible role in voter behavior. 
A structural control can be defined as a human-created barrier to potential 
voters.  These controls present themselves most clearly on a cross-national voting 
level.  In essence, the differences in turnout between the United States and, say, 
Germany, may come in large part from structural controls on voting (Powell 1986; 
Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Franklin 1996; 2004; Hill 2006).  Though 
structural controls can range from formal rules (such as a constitution) to informal 
norms (such as social conventions), there are two examples of structural controls that 
can be seen as critical barriers to voting: registration laws and type of electoral system. 
Registration laws are considered a structural control -- that is, some argue that 
states’ registration laws play a role in dissuading people from voting.  Specifically 
defined, “registration laws are rules that control access to voting process” (Hill 2006: 
26).  They place various requirements on those who wish to vote, dictate when and 
how registration will take place and limit potential voters to those who meet certain 
qualifications.  Notably, they provide a disincentive to vote by increasing the cost of 
voting (which will be discussed in further detail).  The greatest effect of this increased 
cost of voting falls on the young, those of lower socioeconomic status, and people who 
have recently moved (Highton 2004, Hill 2006: 26).   
Registration laws act as hindrances to triggers by making all those affected by 
them irrelevant to the election.  For instance, if a trigger is designed to influence the 
psyche of a Spanish-speaking potential voter, and a voter registration test is given in 
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English only, the structural control has interfered with that trigger’s effect on the 
election, as it removes the possibility for the potential voter to turn out no matter the 
stimuli.  Triggers must be filtered through registration laws in order to affect the 
largest number of people who can actually act on the catalyzed stimuli. 
Equally, many political scientists maintain that the winner-take-all system 
(contrasted with a proportional system) deters people from voting.  Jackman’s work 
indicated that a disproportional (winner-take-all) voting system significantly reduces 
turnout (Jackman 1987).  For example, consider the Electoral College in the United 
States.  If a candidate representing a political party receives 49 percent of the vote in a 
certain state, the candidate’s loss in that state is outright – the candidate could have 
received zero percent of the vote and the outcome would remain the same.  This is 
considered a major deterrent to political participation, as it severely denigrates the 
influence of individual votes.  Consider the 2000 Presidential election.  Al Gore lost to 
George W. Bush in Florida by 537 votes, yet all twenty-five of Florida’s electoral 
votes went to Bush.  Though Bush lost the popular vote, his electoral votes reached 
271, beating Gore by five.  Had Florida used a proportional method of counting votes, 
Gore would have garnered about twelve of the twenty-five electoral votes. 
As structural control sits outside the funnel, it can be considered in many ways 
abstract to the voter.  It cannot be measured in the same way that one can assign 
tangible characteristics to an individual voter – one can identify potential voters as 
mobilized, as old, or as Latino.  One cannot as easily identify an individual voter as 
having struggled to overcome difficult registration laws.  Yet, structural controls 
remain clearly influential on triggers themselves – if a person cannot register to vote, 
the trigger cannot reach him in a meaningful way.  If the winner-take-all system 
sufficiently lowers the efficacy of a number of voters, a mobilization effort may prove 
fruitless, when it may have been successful under a proportional system. 
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These structural controls explain in part why this dissertation, essentially 
offering an explanation of labor mobilization efforts in influencing vote behavior, can 
be analyzed in the U.S. context alone, rather than in comparison with, say, Germany.  
As it is quite difficult to account for the role that structural controls play in influencing 
turnout, any study comparing cross-national vote behaviors must use immense 
caution, unless it has first explicitly accounted for these barriers.  This study has not 
taken account of structural controls, as the locus of the study is not comparative, and 
as such, the barriers to vote turnout are identical for the population at hand.   
 
Long-Term Dispositions 
 The triggering of short-term stimuli will not produce the same results for every 
triggered voter.  Not all potential voters are affected by stimuli in the same way.  
When the stimuli are triggered and pushed into the funnel, waiting for their arrival are 
long-term dispositions of potential voters.  These long-term dispositions give a 
preliminary outlook on whether a person is a likely voter – that is, if left untouched by 
any stimuli for a certain election, a person may be more or less likely to vote 
dependent on his or her disposition.  When the triggered stimuli move into the funnel, 
they interweave themselves with the long-term dispositions and combine, falling 
through the funnel to create “vote threshold” – that is, a point at which the 
combination of long-term dispositions and stimuli causes a person to vote.  In some 
cases, it takes only a small amount of stimuli (or possibly none at all) moving through 
the funnel to reach the vote threshold and cause a person to vote – this person has such 
a high disposition to vote that he does not need much stimuli (other than the election 
itself) in order to reach the vote threshold.  Yet if an individual has significantly lower 
vote dispositions (that is, the person is highly unlikely to vote given long-term 
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attributes), it will take a much greater amount of stimuli added to the long-term 
dispositions to reach the vote threshold. 
 The weight attached to each triggered stimulus varies per individual voter, and 
is contingent on his or her long-term dispositions.  A Latino voter may have a low 
disposition to vote (to be discussed later), but may vastly increase his or her likelihood 
of voting if the individual recognizes that the candidate is Latino as well.  For a high-
disposition voter (say a white male), the ethnicity of a Latino candidate may not push 
the vote likelihood up as much.  Thus, the convergence of triggered short-term stimuli 
and long-term dispositions varies by individual dependent on how valued the stimuli 
are, given the dispositions (which are essentially unmovable for an individual 
election). 
 As an equation, one might model vote turnout in the following way: 
V = f {S1D1 + S2D2 + S3D3 + …SnDn} 
Where V is the possibility of voting, S is the triggered stimulus, and D is the long-term 
disposition.  At some point, the confluence of the stimuli and dispositions may reach 
the vote threshold, at which point a person will choose to vote no matter what other 
stimuli and dispositions exist.  One cannot have a “negative” vote – either one votes or 
one does not vote, but the act of not voting simply means that the addition of all 
dispositions and stimuli was not enough to reach the vote threshold.  Numerically, 
neither dispositions nor stimuli can equal less than zero; thus, one cannot have a 
“negative” disposition, but rather one can be deemed “less positive” or “lower” in 
disposition than others.  
Specific long-term dispositions may be determined by age, ethnicity, education 
level, income level, partisanship, political efficacy, and other demographic and 
personal characteristics that a potential voter may have.  These influences are far less 
malleable than are those found from immediate triggers.  One cannot change 
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ethnicities between campaigns.  While an individual might go to school and get 
another degree, or get a new job with a much higher salary than previously, such 
changes occur over long periods of time if at all, and their effects are not necessarily 
seen from one election to another.  Across multiple election cycles, one might be able 
to find that a shift in economic status eventually leads to a shift in election turnout 
rate, though again, when looking at a single election (or elections spaced closely) these 
elements will not be as clearly malleable as those of the short-term variety. 
 In some cases, the line between triggered short-term stimuli and long-term 
dispositions may become blurred.  For instance, a mobilization campaign is largely 
considered an immediate trigger, designed to target certain potential voters for a single 
given election.  However, the mobilization effort may be so successful that it 
fundamentally alters the way a voter views a certain party or person.  It is in many 
ways the ultimate ambition of those using immediate triggers to fundamentally alter 
voters’ long-term characteristics, integrating the stimuli into a person’s long-term 
disposition and rendering the trigger unnecessary. 
To summarize regarding long-term dispositions, while these characteristics 
will influence turnout levels, they are less malleable than short-term stimuli; that is, 
they provide the waiting entities onto which a short-term stimulus will attach itself and 
exert pressure.  It is critical to note that these dispositions interact with each other to 
create a person’s psychological framework, onto which triggered short-term stimuli 
will latch in a given election.  They should not be considered as independent values or 
entities, but rather as components of a larger psychological makeup of each individual 
voter, which involves combinations of these unique dispositions. 
Perhaps the best way to describe the interactions between long-term 
dispositions comes when one turns to the authors of The New American Voter (a 
follow-up to the original work by two of its authors, published thirty-six years after 
  22 
The American Voter).  On the subject of long-term dispositions, they say the 
following: 
 
[Long-term dispositions] are the result of social and political experiences that 
define social location and cultural values.  The most frequently used 
characteristics of this sort include voters’ race or ethnicity, gender, age (or 
generation), religion, marital status, level of education, employment status, 
family income, social class, union membership, and the region of the country 
in which they live.  Each of these variables represents a highly stable 
characteristic in the sense that voters’ current “positions” on the variable were 
established long before the election, although the political effects of that 
characteristic may not have arisen until the current campaign.  In general, 
highly stable variables of this sort usually become politically relevant when 
they serve as indicators of past political experiences that have left their mark 
on distinctive values or preferences that are then emphasized (or activated) in a 
given election campaign.  Of course, such characteristics may also become 
directly relevant when they are central to specific campaign issues, as with 
religion in 1960 and 1992 or race in 1964 (Miller and Shanks 1996: 8). 
 
 The following are long-term dispositions that should prove most useful in this 
work, and for which there is a significant substantive literature. 
 
Age 
Age is certainly regarded as a significant factor in a voter’s disposition to turn 
out.  The most accepted argument is that age correlates positively and strongly with 
both vote registration and turnout.  According to James W. Lamare, “There is a direct 
association between a person’s age and the likelihood that he or she will register to 
vote.” (Lamare 1994: 60).  In terms of voter turnout as a whole, the literature accepts 
that turnout is lower amongst the young, and largely increases with age, though 
perhaps reaching a plateau and then slightly falling amongst the very old  (e.g. Lipset 
1960: 189; Flanigan and Zingale 1975: 25-27; Milbrath and Goel 1977: 114).  
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) hold, “People aged thirty-seven to sixty-nine are 
one and one-half to two times more likely to vote than the youngest adults,” a notion 
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echoed by other authors (e.g. Converse and Niemi 1971: 461, Milbrath and Goel 1977: 
115-116).   
Looking at voter registration within the state of California itself, the California 
Opinion Index (‘Field Poll’) indicates, “Only one-third of the youngest (age eighteen 
to twenty-four) members of the electorate register.  The number enrolled increases 
steadily in older age groups, reaching a peak of…registered Californians [at] age sixty 
or older” (Lamare 1994: 60). 
Age can be considered a critical long-term disposition given its interactive 
nature with other dispositions.  Older individuals are likely to have a higher income 
than the young, for instance.  They are in many cases the most efficacious group, 
assigning significant value to the vote process and believing that they can influence 
the outcome of the election in a meaningful way.  In answering why age really matters 
in an election, one must look at its interactive qualities – it is a unique determinant of 
other dispositions, in addition to being its own meaningful long-term factor.  This 
dissertation uses a measurement of age in its analysis of voter turnout in Los Angeles. 
 
Socioeconomic Status 
 The available literature on voter behavior indicates that socioeconomic status 
plays a significant role in whether people register and cast ballots in elections.  In 
terms of who registers, Lamare’s California Politics book maintains that, according to 
the California Opinion Index, “Socioeconomics status also affects registration: 
Californians with some college education and with high incomes are much more likely 
to register than those without these resources” (Lamare 1994: 60).  According to 
Verba and Nie, “Citizens of higher social and economic status participate more in 
politics.  This generalization…holds true whether one uses level of education, income, 
or occupation as a measure of social status” (Verba and Nie 1972).  Wolfinger and 
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Rosenstone argue that the literature suggests, “College graduates vote more than high 
school graduates; white collar workers vote more than blue-collar workers; and the 
rich vote more than the poor (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 13).  In terms of 
education, the authors find “a very strong relationship between rates of voting and 
years of education” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 17).  This corresponds well to 
other literature which recognizes education levels as most strongly linked to turnout 
(e.g. Campbell et al. 1960: 476-78; Milbrath 1965: 122-23; Barber 1969: 11-14).  The 
two authors continue, noting, “The literature abounds with data showing that rich 
people vote more” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 20).  However, there is also a 
strong suggestion put forth by Wolfinger and Rosenstone in particular that income 
levels are not meaningful influences on turnout when one controls for other variables 
like education (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  Other authors make different claims 
regarding income, maintaining that affluence plays a key role in turnout and asserting 
that income is more important than education in affecting turnout levels (Bennett and 
Klecka 1970; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, Milbrath and Goel 1997: 97-98).  
 The literature discussed above indicates that the role of socioeconomic status 
cannot be found by taking only one variable, be it income, education, or any other 
single variable.  Indeed, Wolfinger and Rosenstone argue, “The disaggregation of the 
effect of socioeconomic status on turnout reveals that education, income, and 
occupation have different effects on voter turnout” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 
34).  As with much of the literature on the subject, those discussing socioeconomic 
status maintain that combinations of variables should be considered when analyzing 
why a person votes – to take a one-size-fits-all approach to voter turnout would lead to 
highly inaccurate results. 
 The broad category of socioeconomic status provides a critical long-term 
disposition found in potential voters.  Socioeconomic status is highly combinable with 
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certain immediate triggers that may resonate with potential voters.  For instance, those 
with less income will be much more influenced by an advertising campaign that 
highlights a platform of wage hikes and government subsidies.  Alternatively, those in 
a higher income bracket will be receptive to a trigger involving a stance on, say, a 
lowering of luxury taxes.  This trigger may not resonate with those who cannot afford 
the same luxuries. 
 Like age, socioeconomic status is also a key long-term disposition for its 
interactive qualities with other dispositions.  Those with a lower level of education are 
likely to be much less politically efficacious than those with university degrees, for 
instance.  The highly educated are likely to feel that they understand the political 
situation better, and in many cases believe that their vote can make more of a 
difference.  Higher-income voters are also more likely to be older, as discussed 
previously.  There is some interaction between socioeconomic status and ethnicity as 
well, considering that the poor are somewhat more likely to be non-white, especially 
in Los Angeles (which constitutes the geographic setting for this dissertation).  
Unfortunately, this dissertation is unable to fully measure socioeconomic status on its 
own, as no details on economic figures or educational status are provided in this data. 
 
Ethnicity 
 One other major determinant of voter turnout is ethnicity.  Again, there is a 
strong literature within the field of political science pointing to ethnicity as a key 
element of both registration and voter turnout levels.  Lamare argues that, when 
looking at Field Poll information, “Registration has an ethnic factor as well: 65 
percent of non-Latino whites, 58 percent of African Americans, 42 percent of Latinos, 
and 39 percent of Asian Americans eligible to vote are registered” (Lamare 1994: 60).   
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Analyzing turnout specifically, Lamare continues, “Although whites (non-
Latinos) make up about 55 percent of the state’s adult population, they comprise the 
bulk -- some 81 percent -- of the voters.  Conversely, Latinos, African Americans, and 
Asian Americans constitute 45 percent of the state’s population and 31 percent of 
eligible voters, but only 19 percent of its actual voters” (Lamare 1994: 60).  The idea 
that race is associated with turnout fits with other prevalent literature on the topic.  
Teixeira holds, “Another popular theory concerning demographic skews and 
nonvoting posits a large and growing racial gap in voting rates, particularly between 
whites and blacks.  The idea is that turnout decline has been particularly serious 
among minorities” (Teixeira 1992: 71).  Other literature in the field indicates that, 
generally speaking, minorities turn out at a lower rate than whites, though the size of 
an existing racial gap is debatable (e.g. Teixeira 1992: 72; Leighley and Negler 1991: 
13; Presser, Traugott, and Traugott 1990: 16; Cassel 1979).    
Ethnicity plays its own unique role as a long-term disposition, as it provides a 
rallying point around which some immediate triggers may exert influence.  One’s 
ethnicity generally can be used most readily to place an individual within a certain 
social network.  Ethnicity is in many cases the most obvious connection between 
individuals and candidates – one can in many situations identify a candidate as white 
or non-white, and can relate to the candidate’s ethnicity without depending on the 
pressure of an advertisement or mobilization campaign.  Alternatively, mobilization 
efforts and ad campaigns can easily tap into ethnic groups, cognizing for certain ethnic 
cadres the idea that a candidate will enact policies favorable to that group.  Bill 
Clinton playing his saxophone on The Arsenio Hall Show was an effort to use a 
fundamental ethnic trigger, reaching African-Americans across all income lines and 
identifying Clinton as sympathetic to that group.  Likewise, George W. Bush’s 
continuous declining of invitations to speak at NAACP conventions proved to have 
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the opposite immediate effect – across all ages and socioeconomic statuses, African-
Americans received a clear message from the President regarding his ethnic 
sympathies. 
 In sum, many of the long-term demographic dispositions deemed to be critical 
to vote turnout have in some way been identified in the literature available on the 
subject.   This dissertation replicates in its data some of the demographic 
characteristics that should play a role in voter turnout levels.  The results, according to 
Lamare, will likely be the following:  
 
The ranks of nonregistered voters are disproportionately composed of the 
young,…the less affluent, and members of the state’s ethnic communities.  
These patterns, as expected, are reflected in the actual turnout of those eligible.  
In other words, the most participatory members of the electorate are highly 
educated, financially better off, older, non-Latino whites (Lamare 1994: 60). 
 
 It is critical to note that these long-term demographic dispositions do not stand 
alone and cannot be treated as solely influential qualities.  Age matters in that it 
interacts with socioeconomic status and political efficacy.  Income is important as it 
aligns itself with age, education, and ethnicity.  On a fundamental level, all the long-
term dispositions discussed in this chapter interact with one another to create each 
person’s unique identity.  The combination of all these dispositions makes up the 
psychological state of each potential voter, which then interacts with whatever triggers 
are thrown at the person in a given election.  Fortunately, this dissertation is able to 
account for voters’ ethnicities to a large degree. 
 
Partisanship 
 A key long-term factor concerning whether an individual votes lies in his or 
her level of partisanship, which can be defined as a long-term psychological affiliation 
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with a certain political party (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).  The 
authors of The American Voter emphasize the role of party loyalty within their 
hypothesis, arguing that, “[Party identification is] a factor that is normally antecedent 
to [psychological] forces, yet susceptible at times to change by them” (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 9).  In this, the authors suggest that voting 
behavior (which includes the act of turning out) is tied to party identification, but that 
some psychological forces can change party loyalty over time.  It is certain that high 
levels of partisanship are much more likely to increase political participation 
(Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Hill 2006: 16).  An individual who is strongly tied to 
the Democratic Party, for instance, is far more likely to vote than a person with no 
political allegiance. 
 Partisanship is certainly a long-term element in voter turnout.  The very 
definition of partisanship relies on a long-time association with a party.  These 
affiliations do not change by election; while an individual may change party 
preference at some point, it will only occur after a number of elections and a 
significant amount of time.  Over the course of one or two elections, partisanship is 
unlikely to differ.  That said, there are levels of partisanship that one must consider.  
An individual may be strongly or weakly partisan, or somewhere in the middle.  Any 
affiliation at all is likely to increase turnout, but there is a significant association 
between level of partisanship and level of turnout (Abramson and Aldrich 1982).   
 As an interactive disposition, partisanship allies itself with several 
demographic traits.  Strong Republicans are likely to be wealthy and white.  Strong 
Democrats are likely to be found amongst non-whites and the poor.  Partisanship is not 
generally affected by age or by efficacy.  Older voters will turn out more, but not 
necessarily for one party.  Those who believe in their ability to comprehend and 
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influence an election can be members of either party.  This dissertation includes a 
measurement of partisanship in the form of political party affiliation. 
 
Political Efficacy 
 A less clearly-measured element of voter turnout is the notion of political 
efficacy, which can be divided into two subsections – internal efficacy and external 
efficacy.  Internal efficacy can be defined as an individual’s belief that he or she can 
participate competently in an election.  Some prospective voters consider themselves 
unable to effectively understand politics; they may consider it too complicated, or may 
see themselves as not well-informed enough to make an educated decision.  A person 
with low internal efficacy is much less likely to vote than one with high internal 
efficacy (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1991; Craig 1993; Hill 2006). 
 External efficacy can be seen as a person’s belief that the government can 
effectively respond to the needs of the people.  In other words, those with high 
external efficacy believe that the results of an election can significantly shape public 
policy and that, in essence, the electoral system works for the people.  These people 
are, as expected, much more likely to vote than those who feel the government will be 
unresponsive no matter the outcome (Franklin 1996; Franklin and Hirzcy 1998; 
Franklin 2004; Hill 2006: 15).   
 Efficacy should be considered a long-term disposition as, after all, one cannot 
instill faith in one’s government overnight.  The attitudinal change needed to shift 
efficacy takes many elections and years, which may couple the abstract notion of 
efficacy with more long-term influences.  The underlying internal efficacy of a person 
-- that is, one’s confidence in oneself to understand politics -- cannot be shifted on an 
election-by-election basis.  Unfortunately, the psychological trait of political efficacy 
is difficult to quantify, and as such has not been included in the data analysis portion 
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of the dissertation.  Although education and income might be seen as possible proxies 
for efficacy (that is, the more highly educated and wealthy could have more 
confidence regarding politics and could also believe more in the government), no such 
measurements have been recorded in the data. 
 
The Alienated Group 
 There is a group of individuals who must be discussed in order to have a 
thorough conversation about vote turnout: the alienated group.  These people receive 
triggered stimuli and have certain long-term dispositions, yet are so alienated from the 
political process that they refuse to vote regardless of inputs.  In many ways, one could 
consider that their vote threshold is so high that there is no way that any interaction of 
triggers and dispositions will push them to vote.  These people may be disillusioned 
with the political process – they may reject the structure in which they are asked to 
vote (i.e., refusing to buy into the democratic electoral system).  Or, they may 
prioritize their own personal beliefs far above those that come into contact with 
elections (i.e., placing one’s faith in God above all political influence).  These people 
may be triggered and may have dispositions that would suggest a propensity to vote, 
yet they will not turn out due to “alienating factors,” which outweigh all electoral 
efforts.  Like efficacy, the psychological characteristic of alienation is almost 
impossible to quantify, and as such this thesis has not controlled for the alienated 
group in the data. 
 Having summarized the psychological forces that interact to create a potential 
voter, this chapter will turn to a second theory, tangential to that promulgated by the 
University of Michigan scholars.  This approach looks at voting from a cost/benefit 
perspective, and places mobilization efforts within this particular framework for 
voting behavior. 
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The Paradox of Participation 
 When answering questions of voting behavior, some scholars have pointed to a 
unique paradox that exists for voters.  Rather than focusing on the psychological (or 
social-psychological) influences on voting behavior, certain authors (notably Downs 
1957) took an economic approach to political participation.  The initial equation put 
forth by Downs and other authors proposed that the act of voting comes down to a 
simple question of the utility of voting versus the costs of voting.  Utility can be seen 
most broadly as the amount of benefits an individual receives from voting.  Equally, 
the process of voting entails costs.  Prospective voters must spend “time, energy, and 
money rousting themselves to polling places and marking their ballots” (Rosenstone 
and Hanson 1993: 21-22).  A simple formula can express the paradox: 
R = f{(P*B) – C} 
In this formula, R indicates the total utility an individual receives by voting.  B 
represents the benefit an individual will enjoy if his or her preferred candidate wins 
the election instead of the less preferred candidate.  P represents the individual’s 
expectation that his or her vote will make a difference in the given election, and C is 
the cost to the individual of voting (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Hill 
2006: 22).   
The fundamental problem occurs when one considers that one individual’s 
vote is essentially meaningless.  The paradox is explained by the following: 
 
If people are rational, the paradox holds, and if they receive only collective 
benefits, they will not turn out to vote, and for very good reason: The result of 
the election will be the same whether they participate or not.  In any election, 
hundreds or thousands of millions of voters will cast ballots; the chance that a 
single ballot will determine the result is exceedingly small (Rosenstone and 
Hanson 1993: 21). 
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 The fact that an individual vote does not substantially influence the outcome of 
the election has an important effect on utility, rendering meaningless an individual’s 
belief that he or she will receive an individual reward of having solely been 
responsible for electing his or her favored candidate.  In other words, voting 
“consumes resources but achieves no results that would not be achieved otherwise” 
(Rosenstone and Hanson 1993: 22).  According to the equation, then, P equals zero, 
causing P*B to become zero, thus leaving only costs and no benefits to voting. 
 To confront the paradox of turnout, one must consider the contexts in which an 
individual votes.  Utility, or the perceived benefits of voting, has a number of 
components.  One’s feeling of civic pride at having voted can be seen as providing 
utility.  The praise one receives from family members and friends can also provide 
utility.  Benefits are not limited strictly to the feeling that an individual’s vote changed 
or shaped the election; rather, they are abstract, existing on many levels and in a 
variety of ways.  The resolution of this paradox will be discussed further by looking at 
mobilization efforts. 
 
Mobilization Efforts 
 Political parties confront the paradox of participation by mobilizing voters.  
Two seminal works in the study of voter mobilization effects are Who Votes? 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in 
America (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  Rosenstone and Hansen argue that 
mobilization by political parties acts as a way to limit the costs and increase the 
benefits of voting by harnessing a potential voter’s social network (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993: 23-25). 
 Mobilization can be defined as “the process by which candidates, parties, 
activists, and groups induce other people to participate” (Rosenstone and Hansen 
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1993: 25).  To mobilize a potential voter, an actor provides a method of increasing the 
likelihood of somebody’s participation (Tilly 1978: 69).  There are two forms of 
mobilization: direct and indirect.  Direct mobilization efforts occur when a candidate 
or party contacts potential voters personally and encourages the individual to turn out.  
Such direct mobilization tactics can include direct mail, face-to-face interaction, phone 
calls, or televised appeals for support.  Indirect mobilization occurs when a 
candidate’s direct appeal to one person or group has a reverberating effect on another 
person or set of individuals (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 26-27).  At this point, the 
interaction between the directly contacted person and his or her social network comes 
into play. 
 Mobilization of the social network, according to Rosenstone and Hansen, 
serves to solve the paradox of participation by allowing an individual’s friends, 
family, and colleagues to create social expectations for that person. 4  If the act of 
political participation is embedded within these social expectations, a person will turn 
out to vote in order to gain acceptance from the group, which in turn affects the 
benefits (or utility) an individual receives from voting (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 
24).  Additionally, the social network can magnify the significance of voting by 
encouraging each participant within the network to act in concert (Axelrod 1984).  
While an individual vote may not matter, an individual voting as part of a social group 
of 100 or 1,000 can significantly influence politics.  If the conformation to social 
expectations includes voting for a specific candidate (or voting at all), the entire social 
network may partake in the act en masse; a single vote becomes a thousand when it is 
part of the same concert of voices.  It is the mobilizing actor’s role to tap into these 
social networks and weave political participation into the fabric of social expectation.   
                                                 
4
 For more information on the interaction between social networks and political activity, see Rosenstone 
and Hansen (1993: 23-25) and Kenney (1992: 259-67). 
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Recent Mobilization Studies 
  The aforementioned discussion on mobilization of social networks comes from 
a theory largely espoused in Rosenstone and Hansen’s Mobilization, Participation, 
and Democracy in America (1993), which was based on, amongst other works, The 
American Voter and subsequent works.  In turn, several works have recently been 
published based on both Rosenstone and Hansen’s book and Who Votes? by 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone.  These recent studies have both challenged and expanded 
on mobilization theories. 
 Recent mobilization studies have determined that Rosenstone and Hansen’s 
book, while undeniably seminal, is limited in some critical ways.5  In their method of 
analysis, Rosenstone and Hansen used National Election Studies (NES) survey data to 
test their theory.  This presents a problem in that survey respondents may tend to 
overstate their turnout levels when they self-report their results (Green and Gerber 
2005: 7).  More recent studies on voter mobilization have avoided this problem by 
using public records of voter turnout, or by running field experiments whereby clusters 
of subjects are divided into treatment and control groups.  Additionally, recent studies 
have analyzed mobilization efforts from a number of angles, using varying types of 
mobilization efforts and testing different treatment groups.  Some discussion will now 
be given to the current trends in voter mobilization literature. 
 
Partisan vs. Non-partisan Mobilization 
 One can engage in two distinct types of direct mobilization: partisan and non-
partisan.  Partisan mobilization involves targeting individuals and seeking their votes 
for a particular candidate, party, or platform.  Nonpartisan drives seek to turn out the 
                                                 
5
 For a condensed look at twenty-one of the most recent studies on mobilization (specifically door-to-
door canvassing), see Table 1 at the end of this section (reproduced from Bergan, Gerber, Green, and 
Panagopoulos 2004: 768-769). 
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vote, but those contacting voters are not connected with any agenda or ideology.  They 
strive to increase turnout, but their aim does not go deeper than this. 
 Each type of mobilization drive affects its target in a different manner.  On the 
one hand, partisan mobilization drives “may provide a boost to turnout by giving 
citizens something for which to vote” (Nickerson 2005: 11).  A nonpartisan appeal to 
one’s sense of civic duty may not provide the same motivational incentive. 
 Additionally, the brand name of a certain political party may add a touch of 
familiarity to a mobilization effort.  This can have a dual consequence: while 
proponents of the mobilizing party’s virtues may feel strengthened by the get-out-the-
vote campaign, opponents are likely to be driven away by the party identity 
(Nickerson 2005: 11).  A pro-Democrat household will be largely willing to be 
mobilized by a Democratic team; yet, the same family would have no interest in the 
courtship of a Republican vote effort.  In this way, the branding of a mobilization 
drive may be successful in strengthening one’s base, while a nonpartisan effort will 
likely have broader, yet probably less dynamic, effects on turnout. 
 Similarly, these branded partisan campaigns may lead individuals to feel as 
though they are part of some larger movement.  Wearing supportive buttons and 
planting signs in one’s yard give a mobilized voter a sense that he or she is a part of a 
broad coalition in favor of a significant goal.  This psychological benefit is less likely 
to occur in a nonpartisan campaign (Nickerson 2005: 11). 
 On the other hand, nonpartisan vote drives are buoyed by voters’ belief that 
this mobilization type is more altruistic (Nickerson 2005: 11).  Potential voters are 
more cynical about the intentions of a partisan effort, because there is a direct benefit 
to be had by a party mobilizing voters for its cause.  Nonpartisan vote drives center on 
the process of voting itself, not the party or candidate for whom the individual votes; 
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an aura of selflessness permeates a nonpartisan effort, as no ulterior motives are 
evident. 
 Although there are virtues and vices to either type of mobilization drive, there 
is no direct evidence that one works better than another.  Too many variants exist 
across studies to measure the works of researchers on nonpartisan campaigns versus 
those studying partisan mobilization.  It is important to distinguish that results of 
nonpartisan campaigns may not be directly applicable to partisan efforts.  There are 
large differences between the two types, which should not be ignored when analyzing 
the results of partisan or nonpartisan drives.   
 
Mobilization Type 
 Mobilizing parties commonly use three methods to get out their message: door-
to-door walks, phone calls, and direct mailings.  Recent research based on field 
experiments has suggested that nonpartisan face-to-face canvassing works the best at 
mobilizing voters, in some cases increasing turnout by eight to ten percent (Green, 
Gerber and Nickerson 2003).  Nonpartisan direct mail and door hangings have shown 
a small effect (0.5 percent and 0.8 increases, respectively), while nonpartisan phone 
calls were found to show either no effect (if done by a professional) or about a three 
percent increase (if performed by a volunteer) (Gerber and Green 2000, Gerber and 
Green 2001). 
 Nickerson reminds the reader that nonpartisan results do not necessarily apply 
to partisan campaigns, for the aforementioned reasons.  He goes beyond this to argue 
that a researcher ought to test partisan campaigns, as they constitute the more 
prevalent mobilization type (Nickerson 2005: 11).  In a 2002 case, Nickerson finds 
that partisan volunteer phone calls (3.2 percent increase) and door hangers (1.2 percent 
increase) affect vote turnout in a manner that is similar to nonpartisan efforts, thus 
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“suggesting that partisan and nonpartisan campaigns are equally effective” (Nickerson 
2005: 13).  One must note that the comparative nonpartisan study did not mirror the 
methods used by Nickerson’s 2005 effort; while it can be argued that the influence of 
phone calls, direct mailings, and door-to-door efforts seems consistent across multiple 
studies, one should not assume that these results imply that there is definitely no 
difference between nonpartisan and partisan campaigns.  More research into this 
question is needed before one can be safe in that assumption. 
 There have been several recent studies challenging the effects of both partisan 
phone calls and mailings on vote turnout.  Emily Arthur Cardy proffers that partisan 
phone calls and direct mailings are inconsequential to turnout.  Note that previous 
research had found approximately a three percent increase in turnout for phone efforts 
and a 0.5 percent increase for nonpartisan mailings.  Cardy studies these methods of 
vote getting both independently and in conjunction with each other, by using a field 
experiment of a 2002 state gubernatorial primary election.  The author finds that 
“partisan mailings and phone calls, whether used independently or together, have 
neither significant GOTV effects nor persuasion effects” (Cardy 2005: 29).  This work 
suggests, then, that partisan phone calls are a waste of resources, given that they have 
no effect on turnout levels.  It also suggests that combining methods does not change 
the lack of significance found in these methods, sending a clear signal to organizations 
that these types of mobilization efforts do not work. 
 John E. McNulty’s work appears to confirm Cardy’s assertions.  McNulty 
studied both partisan and nonpartisan GOTV drives in San Francisco in 2002 and 
2003.  The drives ranged from strictly nonpartisan to quasi-partisan to extremely 
partisan.  Each of the efforts was found to have no influence on electoral outcomes.  
McNulty maintains, “The preponderance of the evidence, ultimately, implies that 
GOTV phone calls are inefficient at increasing turnout” (McNulty 2005: 57). 
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 However, other recent studies have offered contrary findings.  For instance, 
Ricardo Ramirez found that, in a test of Latinos in 2002, only live phone calls 
produced a statistically significant increase in turnout, while robotic calls and direct 
mail were insignificant (Ramirez 2005: 67).  Interestingly, amongst Latinos in Los 
Angeles County, live phone calls accounted for a 4.95 percent increase in turnout 
(Ramirez 2005: 79).  Note that Latinos have been largely treated as a “neglected” 
demographic – one that is less likely to vote and usually is not mobilized in a given 
election.  However, even this belief has come under question in recent years.  Melissa 
R. Michaelson tested mobilization efforts of Latinos in California and found that they 
“are very receptive to voter mobilization campaigns.  Getting Latinos to the polls does 
not require unusually large budgets or special ‘Latino’ approaches” (Michaelson 2005: 
85). 
 Recent studies have focused on analyzing a combination of factors believed to 
influence turnout.  Elizabeth A. Bennion looked at the combination of mobilization 
and closeness of race to determine whether GOTV drives increased turnout in a hotly 
contested election.  Her study focused on nonpartisan efforts rather than party-based 
mobilization methods, and found that GOTV efforts significantly influenced voting 
amongst the young (aged eighteen to twenty-nine) but showed no behavior change 
amongst older voters (thirty and above).  The authors explained the results in some 
part by arguing that “young people, as new voters, may…be the most affected by the 
message used to mobilized voters” (Bennion 2005: 137). 
 The recent literature on voter mobilization types would suggest, if anything, 
that nobody is quite sure how influential GOTV styles may be.  Gerber and Green, two 
key proponents of the field experiment approach to mobilization analysis, call into 
question many studies due to their small sample sizes (Gerber and Green 2005: 151).   
  39 
 Bergan, Gerber, Green, and Panagopoulos (2005) ran a study of the 
effectiveness of mobilization campaigns on turnout for the 2004 presidential election.  
The authors significantly downplayed the role that mobilization had in increased 
turnout, although they note that “grassroots efforts generated millions of additional 
votes [but] probably account for less than one-third of the observed increase in 
turnout” (Bergan, Gerber, Green, and Panagopoulos 2005: 760).  It is unclear why the 
authors chose to take a position that this increase of millions of votes did not 
demonstrate a significant affect of mobilization on turnout.  In the text, the authors 
establish that, of the 17 million vote increase in 2004 (compared with 2000), about 4 
million of those votes can be accounted for by mobilization drives (Bergan, Gerber, 
Green, and Panagopoulos 2005: 775).  They see this as a demonstration that 
mobilization is not effective, where some may argue that, in fact, this shows a 
significant influence of mobilization on turnout. 
As shown in the preceding paragraphs, some previous research suggests 
significant effects of various GOTV efforts on potential voters, while other authors 
argue that there is little to no effect on turnout.  Further, in some work where there 
appears to be a major effect of GOTV drives on voting, the mobilization efforts are 
given little credit as meaningful to the election.  It is perhaps best to surmise that, 
while the field of voter mobilization is ripe with hypotheses, it is starkly barren of any 
definitive, unanimously accepted theory on which types of mobilization work and 
which do not, or the extent to which mobilization works at all.  Clearly, this is an area 
of study that is both relevant to researchers and rife with unanswered questions.  Table 
1 provides an overview of recent experimental studies on voter turnout; note that most 
of the studies covered highly specific sites and often focused on registered, young and 
minority voters. 
  
Table 1: Meta-analysis of Experimental Studies of Door-to-Door Canvassing (table reproduced from Bergan,   
Gerber, Green, and Panagopoulos 2005: 768-769). 
 
 
Site 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Election 
 
Canvassing 
Group 
 
Target Population 
Voting 
Rate in 
Control 
Group (%) 
% of Treat. 
Group Act. 
Contacted 
 
Bivar. 
Probit 
b 
 
Bivar. 
Probit 
SE 
New Haven 1998 federal midterm academic registered 42 32 0.369 0.109 
Bridgeport 2001 municipal ACORN registered 10 28 0.548 0.265 
Columbus 2001 municipal Youth Vote high youth neighborhood 8 14 0.505 0.533 
Detroit 2001 municipal ACORN registered 43 31 0.212 0.118 
Minneapolis 2001 municipal Youth Vote registered 25 19 0.307 0.282 
Raleigh 2001 municipal prim. Youth Vote registered ~29 ~45 -0.015 0.086 
St. Paul 2001 municipal Youth Vote registered 38 32 0.366 0.169 
Dos Palos 2001 municipal academic registered 22 77 0.113 0.098 
Fresno, 2002 2002 federal midterm academic registered, 18-25 8 45 0.161 0.096 
Denver primary 2002 municipal prim. Youth Vote registered 39 100 0.220 0.107 
Minneapolis prim. 2002 municipal prim. Youth Vote registered 16 100 0.379 0.135 
South Bend 2002 federal midterm Academic registered 38 41 0.100 0.181 
Michigan, 
Democrats 
2002 federal midterm Democrats registered, 18-35 36 9 0.359 0.364 
Newark, May 2002 municipal academic registered 50 6 -0.165 0.742 
Newark, June 2002 municipal campaign registered 18 30 0.080 0.215 
St. Louis 2002 federal midterm Youth Vote registered, 18-25 28 37 -0.018 0.084 
Phoenix 2003 municipal ACORN Latinos who voted in 1+ 
elections 
~7 ~75 0.645 0.125 
Kansas City 2003 municipal ACORN precinct level, voted in 
1+ elections 
29 63 0.318 0.099 
Fresno, 2003, 
partisan 
2003 gubern. recall academic registered, 18-29, strata 15 37 -0.177 0.137 
Fresno, 2002, 
nonpartisan 
2003 gubern. recall academic registered, 18-29, strata 16 33 0.104 0.155 
Note – Random effects estimate across all studies: b = 0.205, SE = 0.045.  Bivariate probit estimates were calculated using the biprobit procedure in Stata 8/SE.  
Bivariate probit coefficients are interpreted in the same manner as probit coefficients and indicate the effect of contract with door-to-door canvassers on the probability 
of turnout.  ACORN = Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
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Summary 
 To understand why people vote, one needs a model founded on a solid base of 
literature.  The modified “funnel of causality” model used in this chapter (founded on 
work performed in The American Voter) relies on immediate triggers that cause short-
term stimuli to become are pertinent, personal, and political to a potential voter and 
interact with an individual’s long-term dispositions.  Immediate triggers (i.e. 
advertising and mobilization efforts) push the short-term stimuli into the funnel, 
cognizing the voter and exerting immediate influence on the voter’s long-term 
dispositions, but do not effectively reverberate across multiple years or elections.  
Affecting these triggers are structural influences, which include registration laws and 
the electoral system.  Long-term dispositions (i.e. age, ethnicity, efficacy, and 
socioeconomic status) provide less malleable but more intrinsic influences on voters – 
while their effects may not be as readily apparent as those of the short-term, they will 
give a fundamental indication of whether an individual is a likely voter or not.  I 
combine each of these factors to form the model used in this dissertation; while not all 
of the long-term dispositions will be covered in the data analysis, a substantial number 
of these characteristics are provided in the data. 
 Finally, one must address why people vote when the costs outweigh the 
benefits.  This “paradox of participation” can be solved by looking at mobilization 
drives.  The literature on mobilization, into which this dissertation will most readily 
fit, is predicated on two seminal works (Rosenstone and Hanson’s Mobilization, 
Participation and Democracy and Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s Who Votes?), both of 
which have come under some recent scrutiny.  Newer authors have established several 
hypotheses for mobilization influences, though their results are distinctly 
uncoordinated and, as with any new approach to a relatively old subject, there is much 
room for work that expands on previous research. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
LABOR’S CHANGING ROLE IN POLITICS 
If one wishes to more clearly understand the role that labor, as a particular 
political entity, plays in affecting vote outcomes at the local level, it is necessary to 
look to the national-level context surrounding these attempts .  Every political effort 
performed at the local level is in some way related to the labor movement’s national-
level position, as either a rebuke, an endorsement, or a show of indifference toward the 
national stance.  This chapter seeks to trace the evolution of the national-level labor 
movement’s role in the United States’ political structure.  It begins with a question of 
why the U.S. union movement differed in its political ideology from its European 
counterpart, explaining this difference through a discussion of class-consciousness and 
the beliefs promulgated by Samuel Gompers at the AFL.  It then looks to explain 
labor’s rise to national-level political power, alignment with the Democratic Party, and 
subsequent decline in influence over the latter half of the twentieth century. 
The role of the labor movement in the political process within the United 
States is vastly different from that of its European counterpart.  Whereas in Europe 
(and elsewhere throughout the world) the individual worker is represented in 
government by the Labor Party (or some other unique “workers’ party), no such 
worker-centric political organization exists at the national level in the United States.  
Rather, U.S. labor unions offer support to whichever political entity (usually the 
Democratic Party) each individual union feels will best represent its interests at any 
given time.  Politicians vie for the support of labor unions large and small, presenting 
platforms that they hope will garner both the vote of the organized workers themselves 
and the financial resources available to the unions.  There is no mandate that all unions 
must back a certain candidate or party.  There is a great deal of literature explaining 
both the reasons behind U.S. labor’s uniquely decentralized role in politics (that is, 
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one not united under a common workers’ party) and the methods that unions use to 
achieve their political objectives. 
 
Labor’s Historical Role in Politics 
Though the United States was home to the first labor parties in the world, 
unions are perceived by most to exist most broadly as units by which workers might 
gain economic advantages (wages and benefits, to name two).  There is a claim that 
the labor movement is “preoccupied with on-the-job benefits” and engages in 
“political nonpartisanship” (Rhemus and McLaughlin 1967: 3).  The basic difference 
between the European model of unionism, in which labor and government are in many 
ways intertwined, and the American model, wherein labor relies on a third party to 
achieve its gains, is one of ideology (or lack thereof).  Where the European model 
relied heavily on the notion of class-consciousness and the usage of unionism as a tool 
by which political ideologies would be advanced, the American system saw political 
involvement as “a tool for the achievement of union ends” (Rhemus and McLaughlin 
1967: 5).  
 
The Insignificance of Class Consciousness 
 Simply stated, the class war that identified Europe as a fragmented society of 
haves and have-nots failed to emerge in the United States.  To quote Rhemus and 
McLaughlin: 
 
American labor is not “working-class conscious”; it is not “proletarian” and 
does not believe in class war.  Some parts of it are…uncompromisingly 
wedded to rugged individualism….  Others want to “reform capitalism.”  If 
there were a standard or typical labor view on the subject, it would probably 
come close to that of George W. Brooks…who says “labor’s objective of 
‘making today better than yesterday’ is predicated on its acceptance of 
capitalism (Rhemus and McLaughlin 1967:6). 
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 This “acceptance of capitalism” as an ideology has historically affected labor’s 
role in the political process.  Rather than aiming to overthrow the ideological bases of 
American economics (epitomized by free-market capitalism), unions have sought to 
make gains within the system.  On the other hand, European workers have been 
historically raised under different social and economic concepts, initially rooted in the 
existence of feudalism.  As feudalism died out, it nevertheless engrained in workers 
the notions of “class consciousness, rigid obedience, and the desire to share in rank 
and privileges” (Steinbach 1953: 8).  Distinction by class in Europe evolved into class 
struggle, which resulted in the formation of various worker parties.  The United States 
was formed without the inheritance of feudalism.  This enabled individual workers to 
concentrate on fighting for economic benefits, without involving themselves directly 
in a political movement (Steinbach 1953: 9).  In essence, European workers sought a 
revolution; American workers wanted to join the middle class. 
 
The Political Objectives of American Unions 
 American labor organizations have often sought to enact political change in the 
form of pressure politics, or attempts to influence public policy, as opposed to direct 
party politics (Rhemus 1967: 11).  Some authors define American union involvement 
in politics as “political unionism,” a notion which argues: 
 
The political approach of American unions…is usually an extension of their  
economic function.  Legislation related to the membership’s interests as 
workers, consumers, or taxpayers will be supported, and candidates who favor 
the type of legislation wanted by the unions will be backed.  Progressive 
legislation – such as aid to education – which has an impact beyond their own 
membership is also generally supported.  With few exceptions, American labor 
leaders have employed the established political channels (Millen 1963: 14). 
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If there were one phrase that might describe the historical development of 
American unions in politics, it may be “anti-Marxist.”  Karl Marx saw political action 
as “the supreme weapon of the working class,” whereby the recognition of class 
consciousness would simultaneously accentuate workers’ political organization: the 
formation of a workers’ party would be the means by which the class struggle would 
be won (Sturmthal 1967: 20).  When defining the term “political activity,” Sturmthal 
maintains, “In American discussions the term more commonly refers to either the 
nominating of candidates for public office or, in a somewhat looser fashion, to the 
attempt to achieve certain objectives by legislation or administrative action” 
(Sturmthal 1967: 29).   
 One aspect of political activity arrived in the form of pressure groups, which, 
for example, pushed for the ten-hour workday in the 1840s and 1850s (Rhemus 1967: 
36).  Generally, these pressure groups would attempt to force politicians from one 
party or another (and sometimes both) to make labor’s concerns part of their 
platforms.  However, this demonstrated an obvious problem for labor pressure groups; 
that is, they relied on political officials to follow through with promises made in their 
efforts to get elected. 
 
The Labor Party Question  
In the early twentieth century, questions arose as to whether a labor party 
ought to be formed in the United States.  Samuel Gompers in 1919 replied to this 
question with a stern rebuttal.  In The American Federalist, Gompers maintained: 
 
The fact is that an independent political labor party becomes either radical, so-
called, or else reactionary, but it is primarily devoted to one thing and that is 
vote-getting.  Every sail is trimmed to the getting of votes.  The question of the 
conditions of Labor, the question of the standards of Labor, the question of the 
struggles and sacrifices of Labor, to bring light into the lives and work of the 
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toilers – all that is subordinated to the one consideration of votes for the party” 
(Gompers 1919). 
 
Gompers noted in his writings that the AFL, seen in his time as a largely 
nonpolitical organization, had pressed for and achieved pro-worker legislation 
throughout its existence.  He argued further that American labor’s interests would be 
best served by using the already established political channels and parties, and that by 
exerting pressure on politicians, demanding that they include labor-friendly 
declarations in their platforms and vote for pro-worker legislation, unions were able to 
use the political process in their favor (Gompers 1919).  The writings of Samuel 
Gompers, some might say, epitomized the idea that labor’s role should be one of 
political pressure, and not party creation.   
More specifically, the AFL during the early twentieth century adhered to a 
mantra of pluralism and voluntarism.  For one, the AFL refused to align itself 
explicitly with one party or another.  For another, Gompers’ aspirations for political 
change were entirely at odds with socialism.  Gompers’ associate Adolph Strasser 
maintained at the time, “We have no ultimate ends, we are going on from day to 
day…We are all practical men” (Karson 1958: 117-118).  The implication was that the 
AFL sought changes in working conditions as necessary – there was no ultimate goal 
of revolution at some distant point.  Not only was the AFL anti-socialist, it generally 
disliked government interference in workers’ lives.  The central tenet of Gompers’ 
voluntarism “was a principled opposition to all compulsion and paternalism…by 
government in economic life” (Greenstone 1965: 25).  It has, however, been argued by 
some (see Greenstone 1977 for instance) that labor’s alignment with the Democratic 
Party in the twentieth century essentially established a de facto U.S. labor party. 
 Though the general sentiment is that American unions have relied in the past 
on politics only as a means by which they can obtain economic advantages, there have 
been periods in which workers’ parties have attempted to gain control of the political 
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process.  The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), for instance, challenged the 
AFL’s relatively nonpolitical position, drawing in prominent Socialists such as Eugene 
V. Debs of the Socialist Party of America and Daniel DeLeon of the Socialist Trade 
and Labor Alliance.  Though the IWW was politically fragmented and indecisive, it 
had a clearly manifested awareness of class consciousness.  The first sentence of the 
preamble to the IWW constitution reads: “The working class and the employing class 
have nothing in common.”  Though the IWW was condemned as “un-American” 
during and after World War I, it nonetheless presented an ideological opponent to the 
more neutral (both politically and socially) AFL (Pelling 1960). 
 Sympathetic to the plight of the IWW, in 1919 the Communist Party of 
America (CPA) came into existence.  The goal of the CPA was to capture the 
American labor movement under one political party.  According to Kampleman, 
“Unions were looked upon as ‘schools of communism’” (Kampleman 1957).  This 
sentiment was echoed by the Soviet Union at the time, wherein it was reported that: 
 
The Bolsheviks from the time of Lenin to the present have never given up hope 
of capturing the trade movement of the United States.  Our Party received 
more assistance, more advice, more decisions on the trade union question than 
on almost any other question.  Lenin was particularly anxious to win over the 
American trade unions.  It was Lenin who conceived the idea that it would be 
possible for the Communists in the United States, by hiding their identity, to 
form an opposition bloc in the trade unions, which would enable them to 
dislodge the reactionary forces in control of the American Federation of Labor 
(Kampleman 1957). 
 
Kampleman notes that in response to these efforts, some Communists 
attempted to penetrate the AFL, no longer overtly promoting revolution and instead 
becoming ordinary trade unionists, forming the Trade Union Educational League 
(TUEL) in 1922.  However, the strategy failed, and TUEL sympathizers were removed 
from union offices or expelled from the AFL (Kampleman 1957).   
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New Deal Politics and Alignment with the Democratic Party 
When the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) splintered out of the 
AFL in 1935, a new political paradigm emerged for organized labor.  While the AFL 
on the whole maintained political neutrality (adhering to Gompers’ principles of 
voluntarism) until 1947, the “radical” CIO mobilized itself politically from the outset.  
In the midst of the Great Depression, with soaring unemployment, the CIO decided 
that Franklin Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection was essential.  In some ways, the union felt 
that it owed its existence to Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, which encouraged union 
organization of mass production industries (Rhemus 1967: 156-157). 
Accordingly, in 1936 the CIO formed Labor’s Non-Partisan League, which 
would become the Political Action Committee (PAC) in 1943.  The main and 
immediate goal of the League was to reelect Roosevelt, by both mobilizing and 
educating the union vote, and by providing substantial amounts of money to the 
President’s campaign.  CIO leader John L. Lewis visited regularly with Roosevelt, 
both to offer his support to labor’s candidate and to push the CIO’s political agenda.  
In 9143, under the supervision of (and largely created by) Sidney Hillman, the PAC 
was established with the purpose of engaging in “nonparty, nonpartisan” politics 
(Scoble 1963: 666).   
 It was not until 1947 that the AFL recanted its position of neutrality and fully 
entered the political process.  Largely as a result of the Taft-Hartley Act (passed 
despite the veto of President Truman), the AFL formed Labor’s League for Political 
Education.  When the AFL and CIO merged in 1955, the Committee on Political 
Education (COPE) was formed.  COPE’s main objective was to get “as many union 
members, their wives and families, and working-class and minority citizens registered 
as possible” (Rhemus 1967: 201).  COPE branched out from the national level down 
to state and local organizations (aligned with Central Labor Councils), each with the 
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explicit goal of voter mobilization.  It was this political arm of the AFL-CIO that 
would lead the charge for political action in the mid-to-late-twentieth century, and 
remains a key player in local and national politics.  Branches of COPE are active and 
influential throughout the country, including in Los Angeles (as part of the Los 
Angeles County Federation of Labor). 
 
Labor as a Special Interest Group 
 Having aligned with the Democratic Party, labor acted most clearly in the form 
of a special interest group.  The seminal work What Do Unions Do? by Freeman and 
Medoff explains: 
 
Like other interest groups, labor organizations operate in the political sphere as 
well as in the economic marketplace, seeking as best they can to obtain 
outcomes beneficial to their members and, in their view, to society as a whole.  
Many believe that unionism is a political powerhouse (Freeman and Medoff 
1984: 191).  
 
 After their alignment with the Democrats following the Taft-Hartly Act, labor 
attempted to exert its influence as a special interest group by pushing for various 
reforms.  George Meaney saw labor as “the finest political organization in the 
country,” and others maintained that unions were “[one of] the most powerful and 
active political forces in the U.S.” (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 191).  Authors at the 
time asserted the relevance of the American labor movement to the political fabric of 
the country, maintaining that the ideals of unions were indelibly interwoven with the 
U.S. political structure.  James B. Carey, then president of the International Union of 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, noted in 1958: 
 
Organized labor could not possibly “stay out of politics” and do one iota of 
good for its members.  Organized labor could not possibly abandon its political 
responsibilities any more than it could abandon its collective bargaining 
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responsibilities.  To abandon one is to abandon the other.  For they are 
indivisible.  Either, without the other, is useless (Carey 1958: 54).  
  
 More mainstream scholars (i.e. less tied to the labor movement) have 
concurred with this sentiment.  Harry Scoble at UCLA offered in 1963, “the most 
fundamental postwar change in the structure and process of political parties has been 
the entrance of organized labor into electoral activity at the precinct level on up” 
(Scoble 1963: 666). 
Yet labor’s role as an interest group was wrought with difficulties after its 
entrance into electoral activity.  One problem, labor leaders argued, was that the odds 
were stacked firmly against them in the political arena.  If labor were to push its 
interests across one party, such ambitions would not go unchallenged by the business 
community and its deep pockets.  Carey noted that for the 1956 election, labor 
“practically unanimously” backed the Democratic candidates across all electoral 
levels, with the AFL-CIO endorsing the Stevenson-Kefauver bid (Carey 1958: 58).  
Looking to harness the vote for its candidates, the national union movement collected 
somewhere between $500,000 and $1.1 million in support of its efforts.  Newspapers 
at the time attacked the trade union movement, condemning “union bosses” for 
hording “big union slush funds” to spend on candidates and push the pro-labor agenda.  
And yet, in the 1956 election, the maximum $1.1 million spent was nothing more than 
a “modest amount.”  Carey underscores this point, arguing that “with all of labor’s 
work and effort, twelve wealthy families spent more money than all that which 
organized labor managed to raise during the entire election campaign,” and noting that 
the “Salute to Ike” fundraising dinners in support of Eisenhower brought in $5 million, 
five times the amount that labor raised for its candidates (Carey 1958: 59). 
 Yet, the public perception that “big labor” was pushing its agenda on 
candidates by lining their pockets with “huge union slush funds” persisted.  
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Newspapers and other mainstream media began arguing that labor’s role as a special 
interest group was a “menace” and “dangerous,” while downplaying (in the eyes of 
some authors) the far greater contributions of the wealthy elites to their candidates 
(Carey 1958: 60).   
 Aside from the “stacked-deck” problem argued by those close to the union 
movement at the time, some maintained that labor faced difficulty in that it could not 
stretch its influence far.  The same union president who suggested an undeniable bond 
between labor and politics proffered, “labor’s activities in the democratic process are 
limited to three major categories—registration, education, and expression of opinion” 
(Carey 1958: 55).  While it can be argued that labor may not have been limited to only 
these categories (which provide a rather simplistic, or at least over-simplified 
declaration of labor’s role in politics following its entrance into electoral politics), it 
does appear that the most easily measurable representations of labor’s political 
effectiveness at the time could be found in a finite number of categories.  Scoble 
notes: 
 
…It is convenient to look at organized labor from the standpoints of the 
following areas of electoral behavior: the national conventions and legislative 
recruitment; the party apparatus itself; and vote mobilization in terms first of 
registration drives, get-out-the-vote drives, and the direction of the vote, and 
then in terms of labor money in elections.  These categories are convenient 
only; it should be clear that they are not mutually exclusive (Scoble 1963: 
667). 
 
 Using Scoble’s choice of measurable categories of labor’s newfound political 
action, there exists a foundation on which to discuss the union movement’s role as a 
partisan special-interest group.  Whether the “stacked-deck” argument applies, labor 
did offer its best effort going forth as an interest group from the moment it entered 
politics as an interest group, and this effort can be discussed using Scoble’s categories. 
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National Conventions and Legislative Recruitment 
 According to Scoble, an individual can fairly assume that any strong interest 
group will be sure to “seat [its] officers-members in the state delegations to the 
national nominating convention of that party with which the overwhelming majority of 
the interest group members identify” (Scoble 1963: 667-668).  While there is 
information suggesting the strength of this measurement of labor’s influence as an 
interest group in the 1948 elections, scant empirical data appears for the proceeding 
elections in 1952, 1956, or 1960.  Thus, Scoble casts aside the role of national 
convention makeup as a measurement of labor’s success as an interest group, in the 
name of poor data gathering by political scientists (Scoble 1963: 668). 
 Legislative recruitment strikes more to the core of what scholars might 
consider labor’s ascension as an interest group.  Labor’s League for Political 
Education was the second hand of the AFL-CIO’s arm in politics, and was patterned 
after COPE.  In 1949, the LLPE decided to give subsidies to labor representatives of 
state legislatures with low salaries (Roche and Stedman, Jr.: 1954: 70).  Scoble saw 
this move as a way for labor to counterbalance the “demographic gerrymander against 
the union vote in all state politics” (Scoble 1963: 668).  One might argue that this was 
an early response by the union movement to the “stacked deck” problem it faced.  Yet 
Scoble notes the shortcomings of using legislative recruitment as a reasonable 
measurement of labor’s interest group effectiveness, in that there is no way to tell how 
successful the LLPE was in its subsidization plan.  The only piece of empirical 
evidence available was that “‘laborers and craftsmen’ constituted 5.5 percent of all 
lower-house members and 2.5 per cent of all state Senate members in 1949” (Scoble 
1963: 669).  Again, as an interest group, labor may well have been successful in both 
the national conventions and in legislative recruitment, but Scoble’s first category 
simply lacks enough data to allow a clear conclusion. 
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The Party Apparatus 
 The idea of labor as the party apparatus revolves around the notion that the 
labor movement, as an interest group, could have become the center out of which 
politics operates.  In other words, Scoble’s categorization of labor as the party 
apparatus asks whether labor could become “the political party at city, county, and/or 
state levels” (Scoble 1963: 669).  This measurement does appear to have some 
tangible validity, in that testing has occurred, especially at the local level.6  In Scoble’s 
time, the available evidence suggested “that organized labor [had] not yet become the 
party apparatus of the community with regard to the community or local politics” 
(Scoble 1063: 670).   
Yet, the notion of labor as the party apparatus exists to this day.  In Los 
Angeles, pro-labor experts claim, rightly or not, that a politician can go nowhere in 
Los Angeles without (a) having been backed by the full endorsement of labor, and/or 
(b) having been born out of the union movement.  The categorization of labor as the 
party apparatus in measuring of its success as an interest group is especially relevant 
given the broad scope of this work; in many ways, answering whether unions have 
been successful in mobilizing Los Angeles voters could also clarify the extent to 
which labor has become the party apparatus in the city. 
 
Vote Mobilization 
 The other particularly relevant measurement of interest group success is the 
viability of labor as a vote-getting mechanism.  Interestingly, Scoble’s identification of 
get-out-the-vote efforts as a measurement of effectiveness came just three years after 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ seminal work on turnout, The American 
                                                 
6
 Local cities include Rockford, Ill. (studied by Hugh A. Bone in American Politics and the Party 
System, p.113); New Haven, Conn. (studied by Robert A. Dahl in Who Governs?, pp. 76 and 253-254); 
and Madison and Kenosha, Wisc. (studied by Harry Scoble, unpublished). 
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Voter.  While it would be a stretch to suggest that Scoble’s decision to include vote-
getting efforts in his categories was influenced by The American Voter, it is safe to 
acknowledge that political science at the time recognized the value of mobilization 
campaigns in elections, and Scoble saw these efforts as a recognizable measurement of 
labor’s success as an interest group. 
 But were they effective?  The results in the 1950s appear to be mixed, and 
again Scoble points out that scant evidence is available to support a firm conclusion.  
In one instance, a PAC at the New Jersey CIO ran a self-appraisal on registration 
efforts and found that the CIO was “more successful in registering its members than 
the general public” (Scoble 1963: 671).  Yet the Connecticut CIO found results 
entirely to the contrary.  As these were the only two studies available for Scoble to 
analyze, the relative dearth of information again led to his maintaining that one simply 
could not say whether labor was a successful interest group using this criterion. 
 Of course, the foundational question of this dissertation relates explicitly to the 
role of unions as agents of political mobilization.  In Los Angeles, the perception has 
been that unions are very much paramount in mobilizing not only their own 
membership, but pockets of the general population as a whole.  Previous to this 
dissertation, very few authors have attempted to discuss the role of unions as 
mobilizing agents; only a few recent studies have looked to address this question. 
 
Financial Involvement 
 The question of unions’ financial muscle as an interest group was offered as an 
argument for the uneven playing field the labor movement faced when it went head-to-
head against business.  Scoble, however, ignored the “stacked deck” theory that unions 
are outspent by businesses in an election, and focused instead on how much the labor 
movement did spend and how easily attainable this information was at the time.  
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Again, it is sufficient to say that no strong conclusion could be made in terms of how 
much labor spent on candidates in the 1950s.  While some authors agreed with the 
notion that labor’s financial involvement constituted only a “modest” sum, Scoble 
maintained that the true significance of labor’s financial contributions to the 
Democratic Party at the time may have been concealed, with the scholar going so far 
as to wonder whether the parties and candidates “prefer not to know too much about 
the entire process of money in elections” (Scoble 1963: 677). 
 What readers do know, based on Scoble’s writings at the time, is that labor 
pushed itself into politics in a number of ways – through legislative recruitment, 
mobilization efforts, financial involvement, and a number of other mechanisms.  What 
an individual cannot tell, and what Scoble appears to disdain about his colleagues’ 
research efforts, is the extent to which unions were successful in their efforts, as no 
data existed to present a comprehensive conclusion on the matter.  In Los Angeles, it 
is known that the County Federation of Labor provided some substantial financial 
muscle for labor-friendly politicians; however, this financial contribution usually 
amounted to the full extent of labor’s contribution to the local political scene.  As 
such, labor was not known as a group capable of mobilizing voters in politics. 
  
Labor’s Goals as an Interest Group 
 A researcher cannot fully ascertain the extent to which the labor movement 
successfully entrenched itself as an interest group following the Taft-Hartley Act.  
Yet, it is possible to establish what, exactly, unions were (and in many cases still are) 
pushing to ensure.  Did (does) labor fight for only its members?  Did (does) it fight for 
a distinct ideology? 
Scholars assert that the labor movement “lobbies on behalf of so-called social 
welfare state programs that benefit union members and the underrepresented and 
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unorganized in society as well” (Rhemus 1984: 41). 7  In essence, the literature has for 
many years suggested that labor, when it acts as an interest group, does not do so to 
the betterment of only union members and the detriment of others.  To jump forward 
in time, consider the efforts of the Los Angeles labor movement in its present form.  
Local labor leaders have fought for legislation mandating a working wage, have 
pushed for the rejection of anti-immigrant political provisions, and have sought to 
keep big-box retailers out of the state of California, to name just a few efforts.  While 
each of these tasks provides certain benefits to union members (higher wages, more 
job security, etc.) there is a tangible effect on a far larger facet of the local community, 
whether union or not.  In a similar example taken from the literature, Rhemus notes: 
“…the state of the economy and the general level of unemployment affect the 
bargaining power of unions, but unemployment hits union members and the 
unorganized equally hard” (Rhemus 1984: 41). 
Rhemus, in fact, broadens the political interests of unions even farther away 
from the labor-exclusive center.  The author argues, “…to a surprising extent, labor 
lobbies in areas that are not of direct concern to union members.  For example, labor is 
perhaps the largest organization supporting civil rights legislation in the United States” 
(Rhemus 1984: 41).  Because of its broad reach, the labor movement can wear many 
hats when it enters the political arena.  This idea of a flexibility of ideologies and 
constituencies (something that Gompers would have likely supported given his 
thoughts on the uniqueness of the American political system) has allowed the labor 
movement to form coalitions across a vast array of interests.8  Of course, an individual 
could well take a less optimistic perspective on labor ideologies and, in a way that is 
                                                 
7
 A similar statement can be found in Gary M. Fink, “The Rejection of Voluntarism,” ILR Review, Jan. 
1973, p. 809. 
8
 For more on this concept, see Gary M. Fink, “The Rejection of Voluntarism,” ILR Review, Jan. 1973, 
p. 809. 
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not mutually exclusive with the preceding thoughts, argue that labor needs coalitions 
simply by the fact that the union movement is not strong enough to exert political 
influence on its own.9  Rhemus does just that with his statement: 
 
Labor always does its best when it is part of a coalition, and in recent years it 
has not found it possible to put together a coalition on issues purely of interest 
to organized labor.  As a consequence, it has been unable for decades to obtain 
repeal of so-called right-to-work legislation…to ensure passage of the common 
sites picketing bill…or to achieve reform of our basic labor laws.  When labor 
has effectively joined forces with other groups, it has been far more successful, 
however (Rhemus 1984: 41). 
 
Historically, the main goal of labor’s political efforts had been the protection 
or establishment of social insurance.  There were specific needs associated with this 
concept of social insurance, which were pushed by labor groups even under the 
laissez-faire attitude necessitated by voluntarism.  According to Fink, “Workmen’s 
compensation was the first social insurance scheme to gain wide acceptance in the 
labor movement” on a national, as well as local, level (Fink 1973: 811).  The national 
labor movement had historically fought for a number of other social insurance 
provisions, as Fink explains: 
 
The labor movement at all levels advocated and supported maximum hour 
legislation for women and children, restrictions from hazardous occupations, 
compulsory school attendance and free textbooks for the public schools… 
Labor at all levels also aggressively supported convict labor reform (Fink 
1973: 814). 
    
 In the mid-twentieth century, labor’s goals became less ideologically broad 
(i.e. to raise wages or lower hours) and more focused.  In large part, this focus was 
forced upon a labor movement whose influence and livelihood were under attack from 
                                                 
9
 Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop argued that, following the failure of labor to ban right-to-work laws 
in the 1964 election (a landslide Democratic victory), “organized labor has not been able to achieve 
important legislative goals unless its objectives have corresponded with the sentiments of the electorate 
or the prevailing convictions in Congress” (Bok and Dunlop 1970: 424, cited in Saltzman 1987: 163).   
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many quarters of American society.  For instance, unions had no choice but to fight 
against right-to-work laws on a number of states’ ballots.  This increasingly issue-
oriented focus caused the labor movement to fight politically with a more communal 
voice than it had during the years of voluntarism, where local labor organizations were 
free to pick up issues imperative to only their own needs.10  Rhemus elaborates: 
 
In state after state, unions had to fight back against the right-to-work 
campaigns permitted by section 14b of the [Taft-Hartley Act].  The right-to-
work advocates often joined forces with those who opposed minimum-wage 
legislation, improvements in unemployment compensation, and in some areas 
the introduction and enactment of civil rights legislation.  These campaigns, as 
much as or more than election campaigns, forced unions to create a substantial 
political machinery and demonstrated the gains to be made from its use 
(Rhemus 1984: 43). 
It was this focused approach that formed the template for union political action 
from the middle of the twentieth century onward.  Gone were the days of rewarding 
labor’s friends and punishing labor’s enemies.  In their place was a clear fight, 
channeled through the Democratic Party in the form of pro-labor candidates and 
campaign contributions, against anti-union interests. 
 More broadly, the attack on unions by the business community with right-to-
work laws and the like had a major influence on the objectives of unions.  In facing a 
fight for its very survival, the labor movement could not afford the luxury of focusing 
on separate political issues, or even politics at all.  The union movement needed 
members, and to obtain these members, it was forced to focus on organizing.  In many 
ways, the labor movement simply ran out of resources to provide on the political front 
when its new objective was geared toward the basic survival of membership. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 See Gary M. Fink, “The Rejection of Voluntarism,” ILR Review, Jan. 1973, p. 809-811. 
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The Decline of Union Political Power 
 Though the attacks on the labor movement after Taft-Hartley helped develop a 
singular political voice for unions, eventually the pressure on unions won out in terms 
of political influence.  The third quarter of the twentieth century was wrought with 
anti-union legislation and a decline of union political power.  Labor analysts dubbed 
the union vote “a myth.”  It may have been that labor, as an interest group, had 
succumbed to the “stacked deck” theory espoused by union president James B. Carey 
in the 1950s.  Or perhaps the mythical labor vote was consequent of the shifting 
objectives of unions, in their new focus on organization and survival rather than 
political power.  A number of factors must be considered in discussing this decline in 
union presence in politics. 
 
A Disconnect Between the Leadership and its Members 
 One of the reasons analysts began to describe the union vote as “mythical” lay 
in the fact that union members, unlike their governing organizations, were not solidly 
loyal to one party.  In the 1950s, two studies were performed to test whether union 
members’ preferences corresponded with their union’s political positions.  Both 
studies tested Detroit’s United Automobile Workers (UAW) members – the UAW was 
viewed as one of the most strongly partisan (pro-Democrat) unions of the time, in 
addition to being one of the most controversial (Sheppard and Masters 1959: 437).  In 
their 1952 test, Kornhauser, Sheppard and Mayer found the following: 
 
The majority of auto workers in the Detroit area (a) vote in agreement with 
union recommendations; (b) express trust in these recommendations; and (c) 
generally approve of labor’s political activities, and desire than labor should 
have greater influence in politics (Kornhauser, Sheppard, and Mayer 1956). 
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 Furthermore, the vast majority of UAW workers in 1953 identified themselves 
as Democratic Party members (Sheppard and Masters 1959: 438).  The second study, 
conducted on the same union membership four years later, found similar results.  As 
Sheppard and Masters maintain, “These data make obvious the close relationship 
existing between the desires of the UAW leadership and the general political behavior 
of the membership” (Sheppard and Masters 1959: 439). 
 Though the literature still suggested a link between union identification and 
voting for the union-backed candidate, by 1980 the labor vote had become 
“nonexistent” (Rhemus 1984: 46).11  It is remarkable to consider that, in the 1980 
presidential election, approximately 45 percent of union members voted for Ronald 
Reagan (Rhemus 1984: 46).  Reagan in turn took a strongly anti-union stance in his 
attitude toward labor relations, most clearly demonstrated during the PATCO strike of 
1981.  Why would almost half the voting union members cast ballots for such a 
vehemently anti-union candidate?  Perhaps the problem was the weakness of the 
Democratic candidate in that election.  Maybe the problem was that the entire 
ideology of the union movement had shifted toward organizing, and that the members 
no longer felt an allegiance to the Democratic Party.  In any event, Reagan’s taking 
almost half the union vote proved that labor unions simply could not manufacture the 
vote for their Democratic candidates.  As Rhemus commented, “There can be little 
doubt that organized labor’s power to protect and enhance its interests through the 
political process reached low tide with President Reagan’s election” (Rhemus 1984: 
                                                 
11
 For information on the link between union identification and union-endorsed voting, see Charles 
Rhemus, “Labor and Politics in the 1980s,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 473, May 1984, pp. 40-51; also see Arthur C. Wolfe, “Trends in Labor Union Voting 
Behavior,” Industrial Relations, Oct. 1969; Robert Axelrod, “Where the Votes Come From,” American 
Political Science Review, March 1972. 
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41).  By the mid-1980s, studies suggested that only half the union members thought 
that their organization was correct in its political activities.12 
 
The Political Choices of Unions 
 Beyond a simple alignment with the ideals of the Democratic Party, the labor 
movement proved incredibly divisive (both within itself and to the external public) on 
which issues it would support politically.  Internally, labor was often split in its 
political ideologies between the leadership and its members, lending considerable 
support to the idea that there was a disconnect between the two groups.  During the 
Vietnam War, the official stance of the AFL-CIO pledged full support for the U.S. 
invasion.  As Battista maintains: 
 
Through each phase and every escalation of the war the Federation supported 
the objectives and policies of successive administrations; even the Nixon 
Administration’s widely censured invasion of Cambodia and resumption of 
bombing against North Vietnam in the spring of 1970 received the full support 
of [the] AFL-CIO (Battista 1991: 175, citing Foner 1971: 20 and 88, and 
Zieger 1986: 171-172). 
 
 However, the union membership did not maintain such unwavering support for 
the U.S. foreign policies of the 1960s.  For the vast majority of the decade, opposition 
to the war could be found at the lower levels of the union movement.  In the late 
1960s, this alternate stance spread to the higher union positions, and several labor 
committees arose to provide an opinion contrary to the official labor stance.  Yet, the 
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 See Charles Rhemus, “Labor and Politics in the 1980s,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 473, May 1984, pp. 40-51; Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the 
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AFL-CIO never changed its position of indelible support, causing a substantial and 
bitter division amongst organized labor (Battista 1991: 176). 
 A similar situation arose regarding U.S. labor’s foreign policy choices in the 
1980s.  When Reagan chose to intervene in Central America, the AFL-CIO not only 
supported his policies, but its Department of International Affairs and American 
Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) received State Department funding to 
“destabilize leftist and promote rightist labor movements in the region” (Batista 1991: 
177, citing Barry and Preusch 1986).  Yet, as with Vietnam, opposition to the AFL-
CIO stance arose in the form of rank-and-file members, local and statewide 
committees, and some international union leaders.  The National Labor Committee, 
comprised of several international union presidents, in the mid-1980s worked to 
counter Reagan’s efforts in Central America through protests, resolutions, and 
legislative lobbying.  At the 1987 AFL-CIO convention, the Committee successfully 
produced a vote against Reagan’s aid to Nicaraguan contras; yet once again, the issue 
sharply (and publicly) divided the labor movement. 
 Some political decisions of the labor movement were more divisive externally 
than internally.  As Coleman notes, “Since the early 1960s organized labor has 
behaved much like a social movement: pressing for a higher standard of living and 
better working conditions for less fortunate segments of our society such as blacks and 
the urban poor” (Coleman 1988: 687).  As discussed previously, the labor movement 
found substantial success when it worked as part of a coalition.  Many of these 
coalitions, however, revolved around politically divisive social issues, the most 
notable of which was the civil rights movement in the 1960s. 
 According to Coleman, “Perhaps more than any other established political 
interest, organized labor embraced the civil rights cause, advancing racial equality in 
both the workplace and through congressional legislation” (Coleman 1988: 696).  The 
  63 
UAW (whose pro-Democratic and controversial political positions have been 
discussed) led the labor charge that lobbied President Kennedy and the Congress to 
support voting and other civil rights (Comier and Eaton 1970).  Through conferences 
and newsletters, the labor movement attempted to broadly educate its mostly-white 
membership on the pervasiveness of racial injustice (Coleman 1988: 696).  Unions 
encouraged and participated in several sit-ins and marches on behalf of the civil rights 
movement.13 
 While the AFL-CIO tenuously supported these civil rights efforts, the national 
federation firmly sought to reduce poverty in the U.S. during this period, as 
emphasized in its War on Poverty efforts.  The AFL-CIO sought to draft legislation 
and lobby Congress for support on bills that supported the War on Poverty agenda.  
Coleman holds, “The AFL-CIO legislation concentrated on four policy areas: 
compensatory education, job training for the disadvantaged, urban renewal, and 
subsidized central city employment” (Coleman 1988: 697).  While the federation may 
not have fully endorsed the civil rights movement, it was strongly promoting its own 
socially progressive agenda, further coupling the labor movement with social 
movement politics. 
 Yet, choosing a politically progressive stance comes not without its risks – 
social movement politics are inherently polarizing, in that they seek to reform the 
status quo and challenge the current situation, whatever that may be.  Few events have 
been as polarizing in American history as the civil rights movement in the 1960s.  The 
union movement’s support of civil rights ran in direct confrontation to the “southern” 
Democratic ideologies of the time, which were rooted in zealous support for 
segregation, so much so that southern Democrats and non-southern Republicans 
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 A discussion of these protest efforts can be found in Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 
1981. 
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formed coalitions in order to block the passage of progressive civil rights legislation.14  
The split in the Democratic Party between the north (promoting civil rights) and the 
south (promoting segregation) was especially problematic for organized labor, as its 
choice to align with the civil rights movement alienated the union movement from a 
significant portion of the Democratic Party.  This alienation served to contribute to an 
already-difficult situation for unions in the south, where right-to-work laws were 
already prevalent following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.  The choice to 
endorse civil rights put the union movement and the southern Democrats at serious 
political odds. 
  
The General Decline of Unions 
It is also worth considering that the union vote fragmented and declined as a 
mirror of the trends in unionism as a whole during this period.  With the decline in 
unionism came the decline in labor’s political significance.  The union push for reform 
was offered by a considerably weaker voice in 1980 than that of 1952.  As Rhemus 
argues, “Overall, it is certainly true that labor’s contribution to a successful 
Democratic coalition in winning elections has declined because of organized labor’s 
reduced percentage of the work force” (Rhemus 1984: 47).  This belief is supported by 
other scholarly work performed at the time.15   
Certainly, it is fair to make the case that labor’s political prowess faltered as a 
result of its declining power in all areas of influence.  It makes logical sense that, as 
membership numbers fell in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (and continue to fall in the 
twenty-first century), political power would follow suit; why would a politician 
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prioritize the needs of unions over other needs, when the labor movement is less 
significant as a whole year by year?  With density numbers dropping precipitously in 
the last twenty years, the motivation to adhere to labor’s political demands became 
less strong.  Couple this falling density with the fact that the membership did not 
appear to be following the recommendations of its union leaders – when forty-five 
percent of union members vote for a vehemently anti-labor presidential candidate, the 
already-diminishing potential vote-gain from a union endorsement becomes even 
smaller. 
A reader would be remiss, however, to cite the drop in density as the sole cause 
for union decline over the past thirty years.  Though the number of union members has 
fallen substantially, there is scant empirical evidence to suggest that falling density 
was the reason behind the labor movement’s lack of power under the Reagan, Bush, 
and Clinton administrations.  It is likely that, while density levels may have played a 
role in the political decline, there are other factors that were just as critical.  There are, 
in fact, several other arguments as to why labor’s political power declined.16   
As noted, labor’s role in politics, which had been growing ever smaller 
beginning in the 1970s, bottomed out by the time Reagan was elected.  To reach more 
broadly beyond the falling density argument, a common suggestion across the 
literature is that the main reason unions have been unable to get out the vote as 
substantially as in the past lies in the individual freedoms of both the unions as a 
whole and their individual members.  Authors have been quick to argue against the 
perception that the backing of labor would guarantee a huge chunk of votes for a 
                                                 
16
 For a theory that party reform caused the decline in union power, see Byron Shafer, Quiet Revolution: 
The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics, 1983 and Bifurcated 
Politics: Evolution and Reform of the National Party Convention, 1988, by the same author; Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, “Representation in the American National Conventions: The Case of 1972,” British 
Journal of Political Science, July 1975, pp. 265-322; Thomas Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality, 
1984, pp. 49-57.  For a theory that internal fracturing caused the decline in union power, see Taylor E. 
Dark, “Organized Labor and Party Reform: A Reassesment,” Polity, Summer 1996, pp. 497-520. 
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Democratic candidate, offering a much less certain outcome of union endorsements.  
Masters notes, “union organizations and their members occupy varying positions on a 
continuum of political opinion and activity, and…as a result the AFL-CIO cannot 
guarantee a substantial bloc of votes for candidates in national campaigns (Masters 
1962: 252).  In similar vein, Rhemus holds: 
 
No political analyst has contended in recent times that the labor vote has the 
characteristics of a ‘machine vote,’ that is, that labor is able to produce large 
blocks of votes by a simple endorsement or swing those votes back and forth 
between two major political parties.  Union members, like most Americans, 
when asked will state, ‘No one tells me how to vote’ (Rhemus 1984: 46). 
Whether an inevitable byproduct of individual political freedoms, or the result 
of a number of specific problems the labor movement endured over the late-twentieth 
century, there can be no doubt that the once-powerful union vote held little sway in 
national politics in recent times. 
 
Politics and the AFL-CIO divorce 
The last quarter of the twentieth century provided little the way of substantial 
political gains for organized labor.  At the national level, millions of dollars were 
contributed to a Democratic candidate, with little payoff in terms of worker protection 
and influence on the vote.  In the 1988 presidential election, labor went to bat for 
Dukakis, although only just.  Approximately a third of labor delegates at the 1988 
Democratic convention backed Jesse Jackson, and no national-level endorsement was 
made until after the primary (Battista 1991: 196).  Regardless, as with the 1984 
backing of Walter Mondale, labor’s push for politics was viewed as a loss.  Even 
following Bill Clinton’s 1992 electoral victory (viewed initially as a success on behalf 
of the U.S. worker), labor’s political presence continued to wane. 
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 It wasn’t until the Republicans took Congress in 1994 that labor went on a 
notable offensive against its political foes.  Jacobson writes: 
 
The Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 provoked a swift defensive 
response from organized labor.  Stung by a precipitous loss of influence, 
coming on top of years of waning political clout, and threatened by the 
Republican agenda for labor as well as for working people more generally, the 
AFL-CIO began a campaign to retake the House (Jacobson 1999: 185). 
 
The following year, the AFL-CIO completed its own reshuffling (or, one might 
say, an internal revolution), having elected John Sweeney as a new type of leader.  
Sweeney promised changes in the monolithic structure of the organization, a full-on 
assault against anti-labor politicians, and massive recruitment and mobilization drives, 
all of which fell under the umbrella of a “new voice for American labor.”  It was with 
this in mind that the new AFL-CIO chief pledged to raise $35 million to run TV and 
radio ads against Republicans in their House districts, though this figure ended up at 
closer to $20 million (Jacobson 1999: 185).  Though the campaign was significantly 
effective against some Republicans (mainly freshmen), it is debatable whether the vast 
sums spent on the “voter education” program of 1996 was worthwhile, as the more 
senior Republicans held their positions and the campaign could not deliver the House 
for the Democrats (Jacobson 1999: 193-194). 
The labor movement faced mixed results in the 2000 presidential election.  
Organized labor backed Al Gore against George W. Bush, and again poured 
substantial resources into GOTV efforts for the former Vice President.  Though Gore 
ended up winning the popular vote, he famously lost the Electoral College vote, and 
thus, the presidency.  However, labor scored major victories by playing a pivotal role 
in mobilization efforts in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and several other critical states, 
and twenty-six percent of voters came out of union households (Greenhouse 2004).  
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 In the 2004 presidential election, the labor movement chose to back John 
Kerry.  The union had initially supported fiery Vermont Congressman Howard Dean, 
but reneged on its endorsement when it was clear that Dean would not prevail in the 
Democratic primary.  Sweeney declared, ''This is probably one of the most important 
political campaigns that the labor movement has ever been involved in” (Greenhouse 
2004).  Kerry wound up losing to incumbent George W. Bush (whose anti-union 
animus was well known), in what was a demoralizing defeat for organized labor.  A 
disillusioned national-level union movement had been facing deep criticism from 
within by key union leaders.  These union heads (Bruce Raynor at UNITE, Andrew 
Stern at SEIU, and others) opined that the labor movement was siphoning money into 
a national-level political machine that had failed to live up to its end of the bargain.  
The argument was that labor, as a matter of policy, ought to shift its focus from 
pumping money into the Democratic Party to instead pushing for higher union 
densities and gains in organizing members.  Following the poor 2004 outcome 
(although the mobilization efforts by the labor movement were once again 
commendable), labor’s internal revolt over political contributions (amongst a 
multitude of other issues), became a major talking point in terms of the future of the 
labor movement.  The culmination of this bickering came at the AFL-CIO convention 
in 2005, when the SEIU, Teamsters, and UFCW disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO 
(Raynor’s UNITE-HERE organization would follow a few days later, and three others 
would join them).  The groups’ new federation, called Change To Win, proffered the 
“organizing model” of unionism, maintaining that grassroots mobilization of members 
would lead to higher density, which would lead to political leverage.  Though they did 
not argue for the elimination of all political ties, there was a clear de-emphasis on the 
“bureaucracies” of the AFL-CIO.17 
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 The in-fighting which led to the split, and the arguments for and against political contributions, are 
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Many feared that the national-level split would cause significant political 
fallout both in Washington and at other levels.  Local labor movements expressed a 
strong desire to maintain their political unity, as in some cases the traditional AFL-
CIO bond had provided great success in the local political arena.18  There were 
concerns that labor’s divided house would simply expedite the decrease in political 
(and overall union) power, given that the labor movement was fragmented and would 
not fight under one name.  Some feared that the two federations would begin 
competing for membership, looking to ‘steal’ each other’s union bases.  Currently, 
these fears have not come to pass.  However, the recentness of the situation means that 
there has been only a small amount of research done into the consequences of the split, 
political or otherwise.   
Certainly, labor should be encouraged by the current political situation – in 
2006, the first election since the split, Congress swung entirely to the Democratic side, 
which can be considered a remarkable achievement.  Yet it is not clear what role, if 
any, labor played in bringing about this Congressional shift.  It is well-known that the 
American electorate ousted the Republican Congress to send a clear message 
regarding the Bush Administration’s failure in Iraq.  It is not so clear to what extent 
the national-level labor movement helped to achieve this outcome, as there has been 
no empirical work performed which raises such a question (again, this may be due to 
the recentness of the event itself).   
The fact that major mobilization efforts were put forth by the labor movement 
in 2006, and that union members voted in substantial numbers during the election, 
                                                                                                                                            
well-documented in a number of sources.  The best accounts can be found in newspapers at the time, 
especially the writings of Steven Greenhouse at The New York Times.  For just one such reference to the 
political side of the split, see Thomas B. Edsall, “Two Top Unions Split from AFL-CIO,” The 
Washington Post, July 26, 2005. 
18
 For a detailed look into the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor’s reaction to the national-level 
split, see the chapter on Los Angeles union efforts in this work. 
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might indicate that labor’s political presence is currently on the rise.  Also, the lengths 
to which current politicians have gone to court the labor vote (especially during the 
2008 primaries) indicates that politicians are certainly not writing off the national-
level labor movement’s current role in politics, and quite likely see the labor 
movement as a voting block worth wooing.  The recent efforts to push the Employee 
Free Choice Act through Congress, though ultimately unsuccessful, demonstrate that 
political figures are paying close attention to the interests of the labor movement.   
However, it is fundamental to understand that correlation in no way represents 
causation – simply claiming that the labor movement is a national-level political force 
because union members voted in 2006, or because politicians were nearly able to pass 
one pro-worker piece of legislation (compared, for instance, to the multitude of pro-
business legislative efforts that have successfully obtained Congressional approval) 
offers an optimism with which this dissertation is not yet willing to concur.  As with 
the question of local political success (detailed explicitly in the following chapter), it 
would be incorrect to suggest that there is a causal relationship between a near-victory 
in legislation or strong union membership turnout and a revitalized political presence 
for unions without empirical proof. 
The scarcity of research on labor’s recent political efforts can be found not 
only when discussing the effects of the national-level labor split and the 2006 
Congressional elections.  In 1991, Battista noted, “The paucity of research on the 
politics of organized labor in the United States has been noted by a growing number of 
political scientists and industrial relations specialists (Battista 1991: 173).  Coleman 
expands: 
 
Despite American labor’s societal significance, union politics does not 
command the scholarly attention it once did, in large part because most of the 
postwar literature has concluded that American trade unions behave much like 
other pressure groups.  Comparativists have little difficulty demonstrating that 
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U.S. unions lack the class orientation of their European counterparts….  
American unions have never mounted a serious effort to organize a political 
movement aimed at challenging management’s right to control capital.  At the 
same time, political behaviorists cite union electoral and lobbying activities to 
argue persuasively that organized labor pursues narrowly defined political 
goals, the principal purpose of which is to extract rank and file benefits from 
government, benefits otherwise unattainable through collective bargaining 
(Coleman 1988: 687). 
 
 It is thus not particularly surprising that there is a relative shortage of literature 
regarding the immediate effects of the national-level labor split on the political 
presence of the union movement.  On the other hand, Coleman appears to be 
suggesting that this paucity of research stems from the fact that, essentially, everything 
that needs to be known about labor’s role in politics is already known.  On this point, 
Coleman is incorrect, especially given the quite reasonable assumption that the AFL-
CIO split will lead to significant changes in the future role that labor unions play in the 
political process.  Additionally, one must consider the number of articles that have 
been published since Coleman’s work in 1988 that have provided new and interesting 
contributions to the literature on labor’s role in politics. 
 
Summary 
Samuel Gompers’ original vision of the AFL’s political role was one of 
flexibility and voluntarism – a system by which the labor movement could adapt to the 
uniqueness of the American political system, while wielding the power to reward its 
friends and punish its enemies.  This approach came in stark contrast to that of the 
more radical sects of the American labor movement, who would push for an 
integration of labor behind a worker-friendly ideology.   
It was not until the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal of the 
1930s that labor laid itself in the bed of the Democrats.  When the Taft-Hartley Act 
was passed in 1947, labor vigorously asserted itself as a key special interest group, 
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recognizing the importance of battling anti-union legislation, which came most 
notably in the form of right-to-work laws.  The political power of unions waned with 
the movement itself, though not necessarily as a product of this decreasing density.  
Unions became less and less likely to churn out the vote for Democratic candidates, 
with the low-point occurring in the 1980 election as almost half the union membership 
countrywide voted for Ronald Reagan.  It was a case of more of the same for much of 
the final years of the twentieth century, with union membership falling and political 
action remaining largely ineffective, the union vote dubbed “nonexistent” by labor 
observers (although unions did claim success in helping elect Bill Clinton, though his 
political policies could not be described as overtly pro-union by any means).  In recent 
years, the 2005 split in the labor movement threatened to hurt labor’s political efforts, 
especially in terms of mobilization.  However, it is unclear whether labor has faced 
any political damage as a result; it could be argued that, following the 2006 
Congressional elections and the efforts to support the Employee Free Choice Act, as 
well as the courting of the labor vote by Presidential candidates in 2008, that the labor 
movement is considered a political player once again.  Yet the sense of optimism 
regarding mobilization lacks any empirical proof that would connect labor’s political 
role to mobilization success in 2006 independent of other major vote factors; the 
optimism regarding legislation lacks particular foundation given that the Employee 
Free Choice Act has not yet been approved (though this may change in coming years).  
Finally, it might be argued that the courting of the labor vote in 2008 is not dissimilar 
from the wooing of workers in other recent elections, wherein politicians subsequently 
reneged on their promises and enacted anti-worker legislation. 
 Yet, if there is one bright spot for the future of the labor movement’s political 
efforts, it can be found at the local level, specifically in Los Angeles.  No city has 
more closely followed the national-level political trends historically than the City of 
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Angels.  However, within the past decade, the Los Angeles labor movement has 
become, some argue, the center of political activity for the city. 
 This political revitalization of Los Angeles begs the question: can a similar 
event occur at the national level?  Some might argue that this revitalization has already 
occurred, in a manner mirroring the local level success of L.A.  Yet before a 
connection can be made between labor’s rise to prominence in Los Angeles and the 
possibility of a similar trend at the national-level, it is important to consider that a 
number of interactions between leadership changes, demographic shifts, and events 
particular only to Los Angeles occurred to create this local-level political 
revitalization.  This specific context will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY FEDERATION OF LABOR 
The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor is regarded by many close to the 
union movement as perhaps most powerful political force in the city, if not beyond 
(e.g. Rodriguez 1998; Milkman 2002: 123, 2006: 131-133; Milkman and Wong 2002; 
Cooper 2003; Frank and Wong 2004: 158; Meyerson 2003; 2005a; 2005b; 2006; 
Zahniser 2006a; Matthews 2007).  One author has called the Federation, “…just about 
the most effective get-out-the-vote operation in the land on behalf of progressive 
candidates and causes, and, yes, lesser-evil Democrats” (Meyerson 2005c) and “the 
best left-of-center political operation in the country” (Meyerson 2005d).  The 
Federation holds such prominence that one politician quit his post after just two years 
to lead the organization, having been elected (some say) on the back of its 
endorsement in the first place.  Over the past several years, the Federation has 
garnered unchallenged notoriety as an entity capable of mobilizing masses of potential 
voters to increase turnout for endorsed candidates.    
However, the political prominence enjoyed by the Los Angeles labor 
movement is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Until the end of the twentieth century, 
the County Federation was anything but a political force.  How did this shift happen?  
This work answers the question by tracing the contextual history of the Los Angeles 
labor movement, the County Federation alone, and the city itself, to offer a narrative 
explanation for the perceived electoral success enjoyed by the organization.  The main 
argument of this work is that the rise of the Federation must not be discussed as an 
event independent of the shifting demographics of Los Angeles during the 1980s, nor 
can it be meaningfully considered without noting the changing union leadership trends 
occurring within the city in the late twentieth century (for instance, the ascension of 
progressive Latino organizers to the upper echelons of the local labor movement).  
This work looks to explain the Federation’s role in local politics by first offering a 
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brief account of the organization’s historical role in politics, then tracing the complex 
events which led to the perception of Federation dominance in local politics, and 
finally by noting the recent leadership changes of the labor group.  While much has 
been written regarding the Los Angeles labor movement’s success in general, there are 
only scattered analyses of the local union movement’s shifting role in politics.  This 
work intends to wed the previous literature on the subject with a critique of the more 
recent political events involving Los Angeles unions.  
 
An Inglorious Past 
 Twentieth-century unionism in Los Angeles began, quite literally, with a bang.  
On October 1, 1910, in the midst of a strike by metal trades workers, the building of 
The Los Angeles Times was dynamited and caught fire, causing at least twenty deaths.  
Two union members, James and John McNamara, were implicated in the bombing.  
Harrison Gray Otis, former Union Army Lieutenant and staunch Republican, owned 
the paper and through it had expressed a vehemently anti-union viewpoint.  The 
bombing of the building caused uproar both in Los Angeles and amongst labor unions, 
who believed the two men were framed.  As the evidence mounted, however, famed 
attorney Charles Darrow, hired by Samuel Gompers to defend the McNamara 
brothers, convinced the defendants to plead guilty and avoid execution.  One could say 
that unionism in early-twentieth-century Los Angeles was doomed the second the 
McNamara brothers entered their guilty pleas. 
For many years following the 1910 bombing, Los Angeles unions were 
considered both politically and organizationally anonymous.19  Ruth Milkman, 
director of the UCLA Institute for Labor and Employment and professor of sociology 
                                                 
19
 A detailed narrative account of Los Angeles’ early- to mid-twentieth-century labor history can be 
found in Ruth Milkman’s L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor Movement, 
chapter 1 and 2, specifically  p. 26-40 and 92-97. 
  76 
at UCLA, explains, “For most of the twentieth century, L.A. had a reputation as a 
‘company town,’ where the powers that be were intransigently anti-union” (Milkman 
2003: 104, Milkman 2006: 26).  At one point Los Angeles did have a relatively strong 
manufacturing base, though this collapsed over the years and left only low-wage, non-
union industries such as food-processing and garments.  Los Angeles had played host 
to a number of Fortune 500 companies, but the “oligarchy of the downtown business 
interests” became heavily involved in mergers and closures, leaving for the most part 
only entertainment conglomerates and land developers (Frank and Wong 2004: 155). 
In the political arena as well, Los Angeles unions found scant success for most 
of the twentieth century.  Perhaps consequently, there has been very little written in 
terms of the historical context surrounding Los Angeles unions’ political aspirations.  
Any related literature (e.g. Greenstone 1977; Frank and Wong 2004; Milkman 2006) 
has focused on this aspect of Los Angeles labor only peripherally.  As such, this work 
has pieced together a discussion of much of the early political involvement of Los 
Angeles unions from only a handful of sources.   
The literature cited above maintains that the Los Angeles labor movement, 
more than other large cities, historically embodied the pluralistic, somewhat apolitical 
stance of the AFL-CIO, taking the role of influence, instead of dominance or activism 
in the local political arena.  Disorganization played a critical role in the development 
of labor in Los Angeles politics.  Due to the social fluidity of massive immigration, 
there was no entrenched, stable local working-class population that could be harnessed 
by either the union movement itself or a single political party.  The more politically-
oriented CIO had little power amongst unions in the city – consider that no CIO 
official held a full-time policy-making position in any of the city’s central bodies in 
1962. 
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Following the trends of their broader ideologies at the time, if unions were 
involved in politics it was generally out of strict self-interest.  For instance, unions 
provided money, campaign workers, and other resources to back liberal school-board 
members in 1955 and 1957, and again in 1965.  However, one of the main reasons for 
their support was the fact that union leaders were concerned that conservatives would 
take an anti-union stance and affect the school system’s personnel policies.  The 
literature (e.g. Greenstone 1977) has called these policies of political involvement for 
only the sake of self-interest “limited-goal pluralism.” 
Limited-goal pluralism continued throughout the 1960s for L.A. unions.  
Though in 1959 the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor had been established 
after the merge of six local AFL central labor councils, there was little change in the 
policies of union separation.  For example, in 1961, the Los Angeles Committee on 
Political Education (or COPE) endorsed Norris Poulson for mayor, a conservative 
former congressman.  Labor had sided against Poulson in 1953 when he ran 
successfully for mayor, because he had opposed public housing and backed the Taft-
Hartley veto override.  The L.A. COPE decided to back him in 1961 because support 
by the press, politicians, and business leaders made him an almost certain winner.  
However, unionists had no interest in supporting a man they had opposed only eight 
years earlier; one COPE leader maintained, “We had the wrong horse and couldn’t sell 
him to our members.”  Poulson ended up losing to Sam Yorty by a sizeable margin.  
When in 1958 the Los Angeles labor movement permanently aligned itself with the 
Democratic Party over right-to-work referendums amongst other issues, the trend of 
choosing politics of union self-interest over politics for the collective good of labor 
persisted.   
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When state assembly speaker Jesse Unruh, the dominant Democrat in southern 
California, attempted to unite labor’s position in Los Angeles politics in the 1960s, it 
was an unequivocal failure.  In the words of Greenstone: 
 
Despite Unruh’s tactical brilliance and unequalled influence in the California 
legislature, he could neither impose unity on a divided labor movement nor 
offset its gratitude to his political opponents who operated as independent 
political entrepreneurs (Greenstone 1977: 164). 
 
In 1964, Los Angeles unions endorsed Alan Cranston’s bid for the Senate 
rather than the candidate backed by Unruh, Pierre Salinger.  In deciding to go against 
Unruh, who sought badly to unify the labor movement around his chosen candidates, 
the labor movement established a firm tradition of standing alongside incumbent 
politicians friendly to its efforts.  Labor’s challenges to Unruh demonstrated that the 
local union movement would behave independently in the political arena whenever 
individual gains were on offer, again congruent with its broader ideologies of political 
self-interest.  
 Los Angeles labor’s first foray into progressive politics came in 1969, when 
the County Federation endorsed Tom Bradley’s (eventually unsuccessful) mayoral 
campaign.  However, after Bradley won in 1973, the County Federation chose to take 
up a position of insider politics, opting for a behind-the-scenes approach to garner 
political influence.  While the method could be seen as generally successful (labor 
exerted political power in several development deals), the insider role meant that labor 
remained tied to its role of mere influence, and had no established political 
mobilization capacity (Frank and Wong 2004).  Similar to the overall structure of the 
local unions at the time, labor’s role in local politics lacked real authority or 
independence; this situation would change only following a confluence of factors in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
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A Redefining of the Political Landscape 
 Los Angeles’ shifting demographics in the late twentieth century were 
mirrored by the change occurring in the local labor movement.  In the realm of local 
politics and in key positions within the locals, the ‘old guard’ of largely middle-class, 
largely non-Latino white, and largely traditionalist leaders gave way to a group of 
generally Latino organizers who had risen through the ranks of their respective 
unions.20  Experts close to the local labor movement suggest that these new leaders 
had a much more progressive outlook on the labor movement, and garnered the 
respect and support of their constituents due to their already strong ethnic and cultural 
ties with the local union members, who could better relate to their leadership.21  At 
HERE Local 11, for instance, Maria Elena Durazo, a Latina who had risen out of the 
rank-in-file worker population, was elected president and substantially reformed the 
union’s ideology and focus. 
Durazo and other progressive leaders began contacting potential voters in 
accordance with Marshall Ganz’s occasional voter theory of mobilization (Frank and 
Wong 2004).  This theory suggested that mobilizing parties were best served by 
focusing on voters with intermittent turnout histories, as this group would be the most 
receptive to a vote-getting attempt.  The theory runs contrary to some political science 
work, which suggests that mobilization groups should target likely voters in that that 
these voters need only be persuaded regarding candidate choice, rather than needing 
persuasion to vote at all.  However, the occasional voter theory does make sense when 
                                                 
20
 For further information on the leadership changes that occurred in Los Angeles unions during the 
mid-1980s, see Ruth Milkman’s L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor 
Movement, chapter 3, specifically p. 114-118. 
21
 Opinions attributed to those “close to the labor movement” or to “labor experts” come from several 
sources, notably interviews with: County Federation staff and community-based mobilizing strategists; 
Larry Frank and Ruth Milkman; Melanie Hallahan at the California Labor Federation; an SEIU 
representative; and Nancy Cleeland at the Los Angeles Times.  In addition, these opinions have been 
espoused in print, namely in the works of Harold Meyerson, Larry Frank and Kent Wong, and Ruth 
Milkman, and in several newspaper articles. 
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a mobilization group is looking to expand its base of likely voters, or if the act of 
turning out to vote is highly correlated with the selection of the endorsed candidate (in 
other words, the candidate choice becomes implicit in the voting act). Ganz, an ex-
board member of the United Farmworkers’ Union (UFW), had applied this theory to 
successful mobilization campaigns in the early 1980s in Southern California, and 
worked closely with Durazo and others in the 1988 Campaign for Participation and 
Democracy (Frank and Wong 2004). 
Persistent with the occasional voter model, unions began pushing for electoral 
candidates friendly to their cause.  Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, labor 
backed several politicians and performed mobilization drives in major elections – 
additionally, following its support of rallies in opposition to Proposition 187, labor 
allied itself with the Latino community.22  Labor-friendly academics and journalists 
assert that this inclusion of Latinos in the political process, interwoven with Hispanic-
led union campaigns, set the stage for the decade of political action that occurred in 
the 1990s and continues in 2005.  Harold Meyerson (2003) maintained, “Unions have 
become the primary vehicles through which immigrant communities are socialized 
into American politics.  Nowhere has this process gone further or faster than in Los 
Angeles.”  
 
Miguel Contreras and the Labor-Latino Alliance 
Any elucidation of labor’s role in Los Angeles politics must consider the 
influence of Miguel Contreras.  Contreras came from the UFW to organize HERE 
Local 11 alongside Maria Elena Durazo in the 1980s when the hotel union fell into 
                                                 
22
 Proposition 187 was a generally anti-immigrant piece of legislation put forth by California governor 
Pete Wilson in 1994.  The labor movement helped organize rallies against the legislation; over 100,000 
demonstrators, mostly Latinos, marched on City Hall with the help of labor and other groups (Frank and 
Wong 2004). 
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receivership.  Contreras brought with him not only a fresh approach to union 
organizing, but also his confederates at the UFW, who, along with Durazo, created a 
paradigm of strong Latino-based influence at the top, as well as new and innovative 
strategies for success.  Their efforts, along with others, provided for political victories 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Contreras accepted a position as the head of the Los Angeles County 
Federation of Labor in 1995, where he remained until his sudden death in May 2005.  
Though Miguel Contreras left behind an organization nationally acclaimed for its 
success in the political and social arenas, and a legacy of triumph both within the local 
labor movement and on a national level, the County Federation was a shadow of its 
current self when he took over.  Marc Cooper explains: 
 
When he took over the County Fed from his previous post in the Hotel 
Workers union in the mid-’90s, L.A. labor was flat on its fanny. Since then its 
membership has zoomed sixfold to more than 800,000. Some of the largest 
successful organizing drives in recent history have been concluded under his 
watch: Thousands of low-wage home health-care workers and mostly 
immigrant janitors have been brought under the union umbrella. On the 
political front…labor has become the ground infantry (and often the behind-
the-scenes bank) for a benchful of often very progressive…Democratic elected 
officials (Cooper 2005).   
 
Contreras latched onto the Latino backlash to Proposition 187 in order to kick-
start the County Federation in the mid-1990s.  In the midst of the Proposition 187 
outrage, Contreras began supporting pro-labor, pro-immigrant politicians in local and 
statewide precincts.  Contreras himself stated: 
 
When we helped new Latino citizens with voter participation, we realized that 
working on immigration issues was the best way to build relationships with the 
Latino community.  So we spent a lot of time and financial resources in 
making that bridge in Los Angeles.  We cultivated the new immigrant Latino 
vote, and today the labor-Latino alliance in Los Angeles is a very powerful 
mechanism (Milkman and Wong 2002: 56). 
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Concerning Contreras’s ability to garner support, through the County 
Federation, for labor-friendly politicians, Milkman and Wong hold: 
 
Under Miguel’s leadership, the L.A. County Fed has also been a major force in 
city politics, mobilizing voters, among them the burgeoning ranks of the city’s 
Latino citizens, at the polls as well as on the picket lines.  Most of the 
candidates whom the Fed has supported in recent years in races for local, 
statewide, and even national office have been successfully elected (Milkman 
and Wong 2002: 52). 
 
In 1996, the County Federation supported six candidates in state legislature 
races, backed by $160,000 from union campaign contributions.  Five of the six won 
their races.  Further, in head-to-head battles with Republican mayor Richard Riordan, 
labor-backed candidates won the majority of seats to the city charter reform 
commission.  Contreras and the County Federation also backed former SEIU official 
Gil Cedillo in his successful efforts to gain a seat on the state assembly.  In 1998, the 
Federation waged and all-out battle to defeat Proposition 226, which would have 
would have banned the collection of union dues for political means without individual 
member authorizations.  During the 2000 election, Contreras and the Federation 
targeted several seats, most notably backing Hilda Solis over Marty Martinez, a pro-
labor Democrat.  Solis was deemed more of a ‘labor warrior’ (Contreras distinguished 
between ‘labor warriors’ and ‘labor statesmen’ in his categorization of political 
officials) than Martinez, and, with the Federation’s support, Solis defeated the 
Congressman in the Democratic Primary.   
 
The 2001 Mayoral Race 
During the 2001 mayoral race in Los Angeles, both the winner (James Hahn) 
and his opponent (Antonio Villaraigosa) supported the local union movement, though 
the latter was considered more of a ‘labor warrior’ than the former, especially 
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considering that Villaraigosa had risen from the ranks of the United Teachers Los 
Angeles union (UTLA) and was closely tied to Maria Elena Durazo, Miguel 
Contreras, and others influential within the labor movement.  Villaraigosa was 
strongly supported by the County Federation and had an opportunity to become the 
first Latino mayor in 129 years.  Though he lost (by fewer than 40,000 votes), the 
candidates enjoyed the highest Latino voter turnout ever in the city.  According to 
Antonio Gonzalez of the Southwest Voter Registration Project, “About 20.5 percent of 
all registered voters are Latino, and 22.8 percent of all votes cast were by Latinos.  It’s 
a very important figure” (Lopez 2001).  Other statistics support Gonzalez’s optimism: 
in the mayoral election, the Los Angeles Times reported that Latinos accounted for 22 
percent of the voter turnout (confirming Gonzalez’ number), compared with 15 
percent in 1997 and 10 percent in 1993.  Matea Gold, writer for the Los Angeles 
Times, maintained, “Villaraigosa’s loss…overshadowed clear signs that the long-
delayed political power of Latino voters continues to expand” (Gold 2001).  The 
implication appeared to be that, while Latinos remained a minority of voters in city 
and state elections, their voice was ever-growing and continued to gain strength, with 
Villaraigosa’s 2001 loss firmly entrenching Latinos as a key demographic in the 
political arena of the city. 
One of the most pivotal events in the success of Los Angeles labor 
movement’s mobilization efforts commenced in 1994 when OLAW, or the 
Organization of Los Angeles Workers, was created.  This group was organized as a 
coordination effort between leaders of SEIU Local 1877, the Justice for Janitors 
campaign, HERE Local 11, SEIU 434B, and Union of Needletrades, Textiles, and 
Industrial Employees (UNITE); its essential goal was to build and maintain Latino-
based precinct organization in local politics.  Union leaders and employers would 
agree to a ‘loss-time’ stipulation; workers would be paid for days that they did not 
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work at their day jobs.  This allowed coalition workers to concentrate their efforts on 
making OLAW a success and organizing their local precincts, without having to worry 
about losing wages.  OLAW workers could invest full-time into their precincts, which 
led them to become extremely familiar with the local politicians and their supporters. 
During Villaraigosa’s 2001 mayoral campaign, OLAW targeted 75,000 Latino 
voters with inconsistent voting records and hoped to get 50,000 to the polls; Maria 
Elena Durazo claimed that the precincts targeted by OLAW “were voting at twice the 
rate of past elections” (Tobar, Cleeland, and McDonnell 2001).  Again this can be 
related to the belief that the success of Latinos in politics, the shifting demographics of 
the city, and the changing leadership trends of the labor movement cannot be taken 
separately – union leaders were working to put pro-labor politicians into power, and 
many of these politicians had either come from a union background or had strong 
labor sympathies; the vast majority were Latino and would be elected by the 
seemingly active, relatively new immigrant community in Los Angeles. 
In the 2001 mayoral race, aside from his playing what Villaraigosa’s 
supporters claimed was dirty politics,23 James Hahn won the election largely due to 
unwavering support for another minority group – African-Americans in South Los 
Angeles (formerly known as South Central).  The black community felt allegiance to 
Hahn because of the role his father, Kenneth Hahn, played in the 1960s.  Kenneth 
Hahn sat on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors for forty years (1952-1992) 
and his ardent support of civil rights brought him (and subsequently his son) great 
respect from the black community, especially in South Los Angeles.  Though the area 
of South L.A. has become less homogeneously African-American (changing 
demographics have meant that Latinos now make up a substantial portion of voters in 
                                                 
23
 Villaraigosa’s supporters claim that Hahn played to the racial tensions of the city in his campaign by 
associating Villaraigosa with the grainy image of a crack pipe in an advertisement run close to the day 
of the election. 
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the area), Villaraigosa could not make strong inroads with voters in the region in 2001, 
which may have cost him the election. 
After his 2001 mayoral loss, Villaraigosa remained a strong force in local Los 
Angeles politics.  In March 2003, the former mayoral candidate won election to the 
City Council in District 14.  Local labor experts maintain that this victory was strongly 
influenced by the help of County Federation support in increasing the vote of Latinos 
and other minority groups.  Villaraigosa’s mayoral candidacy in 2001 and his City 
Council victory two years later convinced many experts and local media (e.g. Cooper 
2003) that the labor movement had established itself as a major player in the local 
political arena.  It was also intimated at the time that Villaraigosa would run again for 
higher office, thus setting the stage for his 2005 mayoral candidacy. 
 
The 2005 Mayoral Race 
 Miguel Contreras died of a heart attack just days before the 2005 mayoral 
election was to take place in Los Angeles.  To say that the labor movement faced a 
dilemma in the mayoral race could be an understatement.  Los Angeles labor leaders, 
and Contreras in particular, faced a situation that in many ways mirrored the rift that 
would eventually undo the national-level AFL-CIO that same summer.  In the 2001 
campaign, the County Federation had strongly backed Villaraigosa, as discussed 
earlier.  Hahn, the winner, had been generally good to labor in the intervening four-
year period, holding firm on his promises to provide unions with generous city 
contracts.  Hahn’s favors came at a price, however – the beneficiary union leaders 
were expected to offer reciprocal endorsements for the politician when it came time 
for re-election.  Meanwhile, the County Federation had maintained its alliance with 
Villaraigosa, backing him in the aforementioned 2003 City Council run. 
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 When Villaraigosa announced his intention to run again for mayor, the 
Federation faced an unusual dilemma.  Would they endorse the candidate they 
considered one of their own, a ‘labor warrior’ whom they had championed in years 
prior? Or, would they return to their historical roots and back the incumbent, a 
Democrat and ‘labor statesman’ who had garnered support from the more traditional 
blue-collar unions by offering them favorable city contracts? 
 One of the biggest concerns of the County Federation, and some might say the 
crucial battle the candidates faced for the Federation’s support, occurred when plans 
were announced to potentially expand Los Angeles International Airport (commonly 
known as LAX).  Villaraigosa was opposed to the expansion effort, arguing that the 
international hub was already overcrowded, and that development funds should be put 
into enhancing the regional airports surrounding LAX, such as Long Beach and 
Ontario.  Hahn was strongly in favor of the LAX expansion, and promised to provide 
union construction jobs for the effort. 
 The LAX debate effectively split Los Angeles labor in two; the progressive, 
service-based unions supported Villaraigosa, while the traditional, blue-collar 
representatives (such as construction and building trades) pushed for Hahn.  The 
incumbent needed a two-thirds majority to garner full support of the County 
Federation, and Hahn achieved his goal by promising union jobs at the to-be-expanded 
airport.   
 When the dust settled, the County Federation threw its weighty endorsement 
behind Hahn, the candidate they had fought ferociously four years earlier.  
Villaraigosa was left without labor’s financial backing, a not-insignificant funding 
source.  Yet all was not well in the local labor camp – the 28,000 member teachers’ 
union, out of which Villaraigosa had risen, remained firmly allied with the challenger.  
Progressive media members were angered by the decision, and branded Contreras’ 
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move nonsensical at best.  Community organizations, with whom labor had forged a 
successful partnership in the preceding campaigns, stuck with their guns and backed 
Villaraigosa.  Los Angeles labor had created for itself an incredibly difficult situation. 
 In the days directly preceding his death, Contreras faced serious challenges 
from both sides of labor’s fence.  On the one hand, he was seen as having 
compromised his powerful federation in favor of a few breadcrumbs thrown out by the 
incumbent.  On the other hand, rumors persisted that, though labor had backed Hahn 
in name, the County Federation was very much sitting out the mayoral campaign in 
terms of mobilization efforts.  Labor experts maintained that the mobilizing agents 
who had worked so fiercely to support Villaraigosa in 2001 were nowhere to be seen 
for Hahn in 2005.  Some even went so far as to suggest that many of the local labor 
leaders, who had ostensibly backed Hahn under the auspices of the County Federation 
endorsement, were in fact pushing for Villaraigosa.  Harold Meyerson (2005b) 
provides a summation of the events that transpired in the days before Contreras’ death: 
 
Sure, the County Fed and most of its member unions endorsed Jim Hahn, but 
activists from such key locals as Local 11 of the Hotel Employees waged an 
unofficial but very effective get-out-the-vote campaign among 80,000 
sometime voters in the Latino community — and not to the advantage of Jim 
Hahn. County Fed leader Miguel Contreras…understood that the campaign the 
Fed had waged for Villaraigosa four years ago resounded still, that there was 
no way the labor vote would go to Hahn…which was fine with Miguel, who 
remained a Villaraigosa buddy and backer. One mutual friend told me at 
Villaraigosa’s election-night celebration that in their last conversation before 
he died, Miguel had asked him, ‘When’s the earliest on election night that I 
can come over to Antonio’s party? 10:30?’ (Meyerson 2005b). 
 
 Local 11 of the Hotel Employees was not the only organization running 
mobilization drives for Villaraigosa.  Anthony Thigpenn, a South Los Angeles 
community activist who had aligned his progressive organizations with the Federation 
in prior local races, left his position to become a field mobilization organizer for 
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Villaraigosa.  With Thigpenn’s help, and with Hahn having incurred the ire of black 
voters by firing the African-American police chief, Bernard Parks, the challenger was 
able to garner a significant share of black voters in South Los Angeles.  His 17-point 
victory over the incumbent on election day owed in no small part to the work of 
Thigpenn, the opposition mobilization efforts by HERE Local 11 and UTLA leaders, 
and perhaps most tellingly, the apparent inaction of the County Federation following 
its endorsement of Hahn, seen in some quarters as an implicit backing of Villaraigosa 
in all but the official endorsement. 
 
The Post-Contreras Years 
 When Miguel Contreras suffered a heart attack and was ushered to Centinela 
Freeman Memorial Hospital on May 6, 2005, the waiting room swelled with grieving 
politicians and labor leaders.24  As the number of mourners increased, a series of 
meeting-rooms were opened to contain the overflow of grieving acquaintances.  As 
then-mayor James Hahn, recently endorsed by the Federation, sat with the number of 
other politicians paying their respects, three individuals were ushered into a private 
conference room, away from the other mourners: these VIPs would shape Los Angeles 
labor from that moment on.  The three individuals were Antonio Villaraigosa (then 
just days away from becoming the new mayor), Contreras’ wife Maria Elena Durazo 
(then head of HERE Local 11) and a man named Martin Ludlow. 
 
Martin Ludlow 
At the time, Ludlow was two years removed from a successful City Council 
election, into which the Federation (allied with Anthony Thigpenn’s community 
                                                 
24
 Much of the discussion of the post-Contreras years comes from articles written by David Zahniser 
(2006), Harold Meyerson (2005d; 2006) and Ruth Milkman (2006), and from interviews with County 
Federation staff and labor mobilization strategists. 
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organizations and others) poured massive resources and run a successful mobilization 
campaign on his behalf.  Having served as the political director for the County 
Federation prior to his running for office, Ludlow was the prime choice to take over 
the leadership of labor’s powerful federation.  Immediately following Contreras’ 
death, Ludlow’s name appeared on the short-list of candidates for the secretary-
treasurer position.  It was expected that Ludlow would be elected to the position 
unanimously, but in the wake of a national-level split at the AFL-CIO, two candidates 
challenged Ludlow for the position.  Eventually the two withdrew their applications 
for the position, and Ludlow was named Contreras’ successor on July 10, 2005. 
The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor that Ludlow inherited was far 
different from that which Contreras took over in the mid-1990s.  In nine years, 
Contreras had turned the County Federation from an organization immersed in insider 
politics into one of the most powerful political machines in Los Angeles.  The media 
(e.g. Zahniser 2006a) had begun to describe Contreras as a ‘king-maker,’ whose ring 
demanded to be kissed in order for an individual to garner any political power.  Yet 
the local labor federation was in an immense state of flux – the County Federation 
had, much like in the 1960s, ‘backed the wrong horse’ in the latest (2005) election 
with its endorsement of Hahn, which was a move that threatened to divide the local 
movement at its core and had offered a rare return to the traditional historical politics 
of self-interest and incumbency support.  On the national level, the AFL-CIO was 
embroiled in an ugly divorce, and there was major uncertainty as to how the local 
federations would handle the split. 
Immediately following the national-level AFL-CIO split (occurring just after 
the contentious local mayoral race), Ludlow remained adamant that his federation 
would not split apart.  To his credit, Ludlow managed to help talk the national-level 
representatives into finding a way to allow their local federations remain intact, even 
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though the national federation had been split in two (Meyerson 2006).  With a 
renewed sense of security for his union, Ludlow chose to go head-to-head with the 
Arnold Schwarzenegger over his 2005 special election reforms.  Labor organizations 
across the state geared up to fight Proposition 75, which, like Proposition 226 before 
it, would prohibit public employee unions from collecting dues from their members 
for political contributions without prior consent from each individual.  This 
proposition was seen by many at the time as a clear battle over the future of political 
action for unions in California.  Unions across the state poured over $100 million into 
stopping the proposition, and sent 4,000 walkers on an Election Day get-out-the-vote 
campaign in Los Angeles County alone. 
Two previous special elections had occurred in California over the preceding 
thirty years, in 1979 and 1993.  In both of these, turnout had been approximately 37 
percent.  The goal of the union movement in California was to boost turnout to 40 
percent – at this percentage, union consultants believed that enough votes would come 
in to overturn Proposition 75.  When all the votes were counted, the final statewide 
turnout number was 47.3 percent.  Proposition 75 had been voted down, with a final 
tally of 46.4 percent ‘yes’ to 53.6 percent ‘no.’  The 7.2 percent margin was higher 
than that of the ‘no’ vote on a largely identical referendum sent forth in 1998, which 
was voted down by a margin of 6.6 percent.  It has been argued (e.g. Meyerson 2005e) 
that Ludlow’s organization played a critical role in harnessing the vote in Los Angeles 
County, which outvoted wealthier (and whiter) Orange County by 3 percent in the 
election.  
The dust had barely settled on the unequivocal success that had been the 
November 2005 special election when Ludlow’s promising career came to an abrupt 
halt.  In February 2006, Martin Ludlow was accused of corruption stemming from his 
2003 City Council election campaign.  The accusations were that Ludlow diverted 
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union funds and workers from the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
Local 99 (which represents public school workers) into his political campaign during 
the 2003 primary election.  As part of a major corruption investigation into the 
practices of SEIU Local 99, Ludlow was found to have misused union resources, and 
chose to resign his post at the County Federation.  Only eight months after taking over 
for the deceased Miguel Contreras, Martin Ludlow, viewed once as the next great 
Federation leader, was left disgraced and jobless. 
 
Maria Elena Durazo 
 Into the void left by the newly-departed Ludlow stepped the other person in 
that small conference room the night of Contreras’ death: Maria Elena Durazo.  
Contreras’ widow could have taken the secretary-treasurer job immediately following 
her husband’s death, but chose to remain in her post as the head of HERE Local 11.  
John Wilhelm, the national leader of UNITE-HERE, was considering challenging 
John Sweeney for AFL-CIO presidency, and, had he been successful, Durazo would 
possibly have taken over his position.  With the national-level turmoil that ensued over 
the following months, the opportunity never arose for Durazo to take on Wilhelm’s 
role.  After Ludlow’s unexpected departure from the County Federation, the time was 
right for Durazo, and she accepted the position her husband had once held.  The 
interaction between herself, Ludlow, and Villaraigosa should not be underestimated – 
Ludlow and Durazo both held extremely close ties to Villaraigosa. 
 Thus far, Durazo’s reign has been relatively successful.  She has restored 
labor’s positive public image in Los Angeles following Ludlow’s departure.  Amongst 
city voters, authors (e.g. Matthews 2007) note the distinctive brand advantage labor 
has gained over the local Los Angeles business community.  In fact, it has been found 
that unions in Los Angeles enjoy more public support at the moment than most other 
  92 
areas of the state and country – in one poll, 55 percent of Los Angeles city voters 
agreed with the idea that unions were the driving force behind middle-class interests in 
the U.S.  Durazo has also been a key player in a citywide effort to fight a referendum 
that would block expansion of a living wage ordinance to hotel workers at Los 
Angeles International Airport.  Working closely with the mayor, Durazo has focused 
her efforts on challenging ‘corporate greed,’ and on maintaining the economic 
interests of union members through pressuring local politicians.   
Further, the County Federation has continued to remain an immensely 
powerful political force in the eyes of many.  As the Los Angeles Times noted in early 
2008, “the labor movement nationally is struggling to maintain membership, but 
experts say Los Angeles has been a bulwark, with strong union ties to elected officials 
including Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa” (White 2008).  With no state or federal 
elections planned in 2007, Durazo and the Federation used the year to send across a 
pre-emptive message to voters for 2008, so that the mobilization efforts of potential 
voters in 2008 will resonate more strongly.  In all, 2007 was a relatively quiet year for 
the Federation and Durazo, which came most likely as a welcome relief for the labor 
organization considering the tumult it has endured over the previous few years. 
 
Conclusion 
 This work sought to explain the political prominence enjoyed by the Los 
Angeles County Federation of Labor by tracing its historical role in the political arena, 
and by tying its success to the changing demographics of the city as a whole, and 
connecting it with the shift in leadership in the local union movement in the 1908s and 
1990s.  To recap, the Los Angeles labor movement had been politically splintered and 
individualistic for most of the twentieth century, exerting influence but not dominance 
on local politics.  Following significant leadership changes for unions in the 1980s 
  93 
(mirroring the increased Latino presence in the city as a whole), the political activism 
of labor grew stronger.  But it was not until the late 1990s and, most tellingly, the 
twenty-first century, when it can be argued that labor became a major player in local 
politics. 
 The political shift gathered momentum with the election of Miguel Contreras 
as the secretary-treasurer of the Los Angles County Federation of Labor.  His nine-
year reign led to numerous electoral victories for progressive Latinos (amongst 
others), again consequent of the shifting dynamic of both the local union leadership 
and the city as a whole.  Though there were some instances of failure during his 
tenure, Contreras found more success in nine years than labor had enjoyed throughout 
the preceding century – the culmination of these successes occurred when progressive 
Latino unionist Antonio Villaraigosa was elected mayor in 2005. 
 Emblematic of the difficulties faced by labor even as its influence rose, 
Villaraigosa’s election was considered technically as a loss for the local labor 
movement, which had fragmented and backed the incumbent, James Hahn.  Though 
‘labor warrior’ Villaragosa had won the election, the union movement had just days 
earlier suffered a major blow, with Contreras’ death from heart failure.  Into his shoes 
would step Martin Ludlow (who would resign eight months later amid corruption 
charges) and Contreras’ widow, Maria Elena Durazo.  Durazo had been a key player 
in the original ascension of progressive union leadership in Los Angeles, where in the 
mid-1980s the ‘old guard’ of white, traditionalist union leaders had been replaced by 
progressive, mostly Latino, minorities.  Durazo, along with other leaders (such as 
Contreras and Villaraigosa) had helped reshape the local labor movement into a 
progressive organizing force.  Durazo now sits at the helm of one of the most powerful 
political organizations in the country, which was born in the most unlikely of places, 
on the back of a confluence of factors. 
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 It is critical to consider that the story of Los Angeles unions’ rise to local 
political prominence lacks any empirical justification.  There is seemingly no opinion 
that counters these labor optimists; the business community in Los Angeles was for 
many years silent on the matter, and anti-union politicians spoke only of the dangers 
of a too-powerful labor movement, associating unions with corrupt “bosses.”  
Recently, businesses have appeared to accept that the County Federation is a political 
powerhouse; some mainstream sources, such as the Los Angeles Times, also seem to 
accept labor’s strong role in politics, publishing articles tacitly endorsing suggestions 
that the union movement is free to push for its own political reforms.  Yet the question 
remains: do these non-labor sources accept that unions are politically powerful based 
on their own informed opinions, or based on a perception asserted by the labor 
movement which has permeated into the mainstream and opposition?  Consider that 
most of the first-hand literature offered as evidence for labor’s success has come either 
from academics closely tied to the movement, or from progressive journalists (as cited 
throughout this work), subsequently followed by echoes from other sources.  Not only 
is an empirical test of labor’s effects on local politics ideal in order to validate the 
praise accorded to the Federation, but it is necessary if the local labor movement 
wishes to be deemed a major force in the political arena without any consideration of 
bias. 
 It is also important to ask whether the perception of labor’s political influence 
in Los Angeles is a beneficial.  Those in favor of a strong labor movement would 
argue that the perceived power of the County Federation to influence local politics 
benefits the labor movement in particular and workers as a whole.  Consider for a 
moment, however, a competing argument: labor’s power in local politics, in theory (if 
not yet positive proof), provided the impetus for Martin Ludlow to run for office, and 
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then to step down after just two years to run the Federation.  There have been 
suggestions that Ludlow did not serve his constituents well; Zahniser maintains: 
 
To many of his peers at City Hall, Ludlow had shown little interest in the 
drudgery that comes with representing the 10th District, from responding to 
constituent phone calls to addressing the avalanche of mundane requests like 
removal of an illegally dumped couch. Staff turnover in his office was not 
uncommon. Just scheduling a meeting was an uphill climb. On some days, 
callers had trouble getting a live person to pick up the phone (Zahniser 2006b). 
 
 Ludlow, as discussed, was subsequently indicted for diverting union resources 
to political efforts, in some ways conforming to the stereotypical association between 
the labor movement and corruption.  It is not the aim of this dissertation to answer 
whether a politically powerful labor movement helps or hurts either the city or unions 
in general.  It is most important to recognize that the labor movement is perceived to 
fundamentally influence turnout levels and vote outcomes in political races.  The 
following chapter will empirically test whether this perception is accurate. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERATION EFFORTS 
 This dissertation attempts to fill the quantitative gap that currently exists in any 
discussion of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor’s rise to prominence in the 
local political arena.  This chapter turns to an explanation of the data to be used in the 
quantitative analysis, and determines the correct methodology that must be identified 
to achieve valid results. 
 
The Placement of This Study in the Union Mobilization Literature 
 Much has been written in terms of the contributory factors to voting behavior; 
the literature overview in Chapter 2 highlighted the psychological approach taken by 
scholars at the University of Michigan, and delved into the cognitive- and economic-
oriented refinements developed by other scholars.  While the dissertation has thus far 
traced both the general political science literature on the subject and the contextual 
history of the County Federation in politics, it has yet to offer a specific literature 
review addressing the particular role of union-led political mobilization efforts.  
In earlier attempts to analyze quantitatively the role of unions in politics, some 
political scientists and labor researchers (e.g. Uhlaner 1989; Verba, Scholzman and 
Brady 1995; Radcliff and Davis 2000) have maintained that union membership may 
influence vote likelihood, especially if the individual is an active participant in the 
labor organization.  Addressing the issue of response bias in surveys of union political 
efforts,  Delaney, Masters, and Schowchau (1988) demonstrated markedly different 
results when measuring the effects of union status on turnout, dependent on the data 
source (either survey-based answers or responses garnered through public records).   
There is some theoretical basis for union-led mobilization campaigns; of 
particular interest is the “occasional voter” theory, developed by Marshall Ganz and 
discussed in the previous chapter.  However, the theory lacks a true evidentiary basis, 
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and its proponents rely on unscientific assumptions of causality between mobilization 
of occasional voters and electoral victories.      
 There have been very few studies that have looked empirically at the role of 
union mobilization efforts on turnout, with much of the mobilization literature either 
ignoring or marginalizing the role of union efforts (Radcliff and Davis 2000).  
Recently there has been a small and growing body of work that has aimed to fill this 
void in the literature.  Radcliff and Davis (2000) compared state-by-state union density 
levels with turnout, though the national-level scope of the analysis ignores the 
localized nature of mobilization efforts, failing to consider a substantial aspect of vote-
getting attempts by U.S. unions. 
Zullo (2004) measured the effectiveness of a union mobilization drive on 
grocery workers in Wisconsin in 2000 using a combination of public records and 
union contact lists, finding that contact in days immediately preceding the election 
increased voter turnout substantially.  His work is the most methodologically sound 
and empirical study thus far on union mobilization efforts.  Although this chapter uses 
an approach similar to the Zullo study, substantial differences exist.  While Zullo’s 
study controlled for age, marital status, and workplace variables, it failed to account 
for vote propensity of the contacted individuals, which creates a significant limitation, 
and likely leads to a problem when determining the influence of mediated variables.  It 
used less precise measurements of factors influential on vote turnout, relying on the 
employment setting (grocery workers) and work-related variables (wages, seniority, 
and full- or part-time status) to act as proxies for all the demographic and 
socioeconomic influences on turnout.  In addition, Zullo’s study depended on broad 
assumptions regarding the homogeneity of the individuals within the data and 
measured only the effects of individual phone calls and workplace-wide political 
education efforts on turnout.   
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This study offers a more precise set of control factors known to be influential 
on voting, accounts for an individual’s prior vote record, and provides an analysis of 
door-to-door personal visits in addition to live phone calls.  Finally, this study differs 
from Zullo’s in that Zullo looked at a unique population; Zullo admits that his findings 
cannot be generalized in any way – as such, they have no real bearing on the Los 
Angeles situation. 
 
The Data 
This dissertation uses a data set comprising a total of 188,551 individuals in 
the broad geographic area known as South Los Angeles.  The region was for many 
years called South Central, but the stigma attached to the name (high crime, urban 
decay, poverty, etc.) caused the city of Los Angeles to rename the region South Los 
Angeles in 2003.  Though several communities can definitively be incorporated into 
the region (e.g. Watts, Crenshaw, Baldwin Hills), other neighborhoods are included or 
excluded in the region dependent on whether their characteristics match those of the 
South Los Angeles region as a whole.   
Contextualizing this murky geographic definition is important when 
considering the data sources.  The data come from two separate sources, which have 
been merged together to create one set.  The first data source is a list of all the 
registered voters in the South Los Angeles region as of fall 2004.  Strategists 
interested in mobilizing the population of South L.A. asked a third-party organization 
(a group called Political Data) to provide a list of the registered voters in the region, 
along with several characteristics of the individuals.  From this list of individuals, a 
substantial number of people were contacted by union groups either acting alone or in 
conjunction with community organizations.  The contacting agents were either paid or 
voluntary union members and staff, and, when labor and community groups both 
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mobilized individuals, some agents were active members of the various community 
organizations.   
The murkiness of the geographic area is slightly problematic, in that the data 
set, which provides registered voters in “South Los Angeles,” cannot be precisely tied 
to an exact political boundary.  That is, the elections in which the Federation contacted 
individuals alone (that is, not in conjunction with other mobilization groups) 
correspond to specific political identifiers – District 10 of the City Council and District 
47 of the State Assembly.  Specifically, the Federation made identifiable contacts as 
an independent organization in the March 2003 Los Angeles City Council District 10 
(or CD 10) Primary election, the May 2003 Los Angeles CD 10 Runoff race, and the 
March 2004 California State Assembly District 47 (or SA 47) Democratic Primary 
campaign.  Yet the available data counts all the registered voters in one region – South 
L.A. – and not in one particular political boundary.  As such, the data set contains 
some individuals eligible to vote in CD 10, some individuals eligible to vote in SA 47, 
and a large number of people who were situated in both of the political boundaries, 
and could thus vote in either of the elections.   
Fortunately, one category within the data set notes the various political districts 
in which the potential voter is located.  As such, the data has been divided, dependent 
on the election for which analysis occurs, into individuals only eligible to vote in any 
given race, given the political boundary of the election.  In essence, this creates two 
separate data sets to analyze – one for CD 10 and one for SA 47.  When the non-
eligible (by way of location) voters are removed from each set, there exist 62,676 
possible voters in CD 10, and 71,226 possible voters in SA 47.  Consider also that 
many of the voters in one data set also exist in the other – that is, they were eligible to 
vote in both elections given their location.  Fully 50,802 individuals lived in both CD 
10 and SA 47.  However, the broadly defined “South Los Angeles” area consisted of 
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thousands of voters in State Assembly Districts 46, 48, 51 and 52, and City Council 
Districts 8, 9, and 15.  These voters must be excluded from analysis for the three 
boundary-specific elections targeted by the Federation alone. 
   Further refinement is necessary for the SA 47 race in particular.  The March 
2004 election for which mobilization occurred was a Democratic Primary campaign.  
That is, those not identified as Democrats were ineligible to vote due to their party 
affiliation.  Fortunately again, the data allow for this discrimination, in that individuals 
not affiliated with the Democratic Party have been removed from the SA 47 set.  This 
leaves 53,648 possible voters in SA 47 over the three elections. 
Several variables are included in the data set obtained by contacting agents, the 
most important of which (for this dissertation) is vote turnout, which constitutes the 
dependent variable.  The data set provides each individual’s voting record for every 
election from the 1990s through the March 2004 race.  This vote history must be 
coupled with a second variable in the data, which gives the voter registration date of 
each individual.  Looking at turnout without accounting for whether the individual was 
registered or not would provide artificially low voting results.  All the nonregistered 
(and thus ineligible) potential voters were regarded as “missing” in any given election. 
From these vote histories, a critical independent variable can be gleaned – the vote 
propensity of each individual in South Los Angeles.  Looking at the five elections 
prior to the particular studied campaign, individuals have been divided into frequent, 
occasional, and never voters for each separate election.  Individuals who voted in four 
or all five of the previous five elections are considered frequent voters.  Those who 
voted in one to three of the past five elections are deemed occasional voters, while any 
individual who either did not vote or was not registered to vote in each of the past five 
elections (but was eligible to vote in the given election) is called a never voter. 
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The data set used by mobilization groups also gives several demographic 
variables for each person in the population.  These include measurements of age, 
gender, party affiliation, ethnicity, and birthplace.  These variables are extremely 
useful in that they provide characteristics predicted by the political science literature to 
have an influence on voting behavior.  As such, they can be employed as controls in 
the data, wherein the effects of contact on turnout can be measured independently 
from these known influences on voting.   
In terms of specific categorizations within these control variables, age and 
gender are clearly defined.  Party affiliation has been divided into three groups: 
Democratic Party affiliation, Republican Party affiliation, and Minor Party 
affiliation.25  Ethnicities have been grouped into Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Jewish, 
European, Middle Eastern/Asian/Pacific Islander, Spanish/Latino, and generic.  These 
ethnic distinctions have been determined based on the last names of each individual.  
This presents some inaccuracies, given that ethnic identity cannot always be tied to 
last name.  Further, the technique does not allow for discrimination of “generic” 
names – that is, a name like Smith or Johnson does not relay any type of ethnic 
identity.  This is unfortunate in that there is no discernible African-American ethnic 
group, given that it is difficult to separate the African-American ethnicity based off 
last name alone.  One way to rectify this is to consider the overall known 
demographics of the region.  Roughly 40 percent of South Los Angeles residents 
consider themselves African-American; as such, there can be some level of 
assumption made regarding the ethnic identity of those grouped into the “generic” 
category – it is likely that the majority of these individuals are African-Americans, 
though a definitive number cannot be determined.  However, it is critical to remember 
                                                 
25
 About three-fourths of the population identified themselves as Democrats, according to their voter 
registration records.  
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that the only known way to determine ethnicity without directly contacting all 188,551 
individuals is to use their last names as a close proxy for ethnic identity.  A tradeoff 
exists between recording objective, third-party information (which eliminates the 
response bias problem), and losing some accuracy in terms of characteristic 
identification.  Given the large size of the data set, it is unlikely that any errors in 
coding ethnicity are so large as to invalidate the use of the variable. 
The final characteristic variable in the data is birthplace.  This variable has 
been divided into eight groups, consisting of those born in: California, the West (but 
not California), the South, the Midwest, the Mountain States, the Middle States, the 
Northeast, and foreign born individuals.  The majority of individuals in the data were 
born in California, though individuals born in a foreign country make up a substantial 
number of people as well (not surprising given the geographic area studied). 
From this list of potential voters, each containing the above-described characteristics, 
mobilizing groups contacted individuals across five separate elections.  The groups 
recorded each contact into their own data set.  When a potential voter was contacted, 
the mobilizing agents noted the person’s identification number (which aligns with the 
identification provided in the data set from which the groups worked).  The type of 
contact and organization performing the contact were also recorded.  In terms of 
contact types, the mobilizing groups used either personal visits (door-to-door walks) 
or live phone calls to send out their message.  If a potential voter was targeted via a 
personal visit in any given election, he or she was not contacted over the phone, and 
vice versa.  Unfortunately, the type of contact was not provided for Federation 
mobilization efforts in the CD 10 Runoff; however, for the CD 10 Primary and the SA 
47 Primary, a discernment by type has been included.  The variable showing the 
organization that performed the contact allows for discrimination between contacts 
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made by the County Federation acting alone, versus contacts made as part of a labor-
community alliance. 
 
Qualitative Contextualization of Elections 
As mentioned, this chapter focuses on three elections in particular – the March 
2003 CD 10 Primary, the May 2003 CD 10 Runoff, and the March 2004 SA 47 
Democratic Primary.  The three elections were chosen, quite simply, because there 
were appropriate data available for them.  The data set provides a total of five 
elections wherein contacts occurred (the aforementioned three, the November 2002 
general election, and the October 2003 recall election).  However, the County 
Federation contact of potential voters can be distinguished from the other groups in 
only three of those elections, which form the basis for this chapter.   
It so happens that the three chosen elections are suitable for analysis in their 
own right.  The same general geographic area was used for each campaign.  The 
elections were all local races, with local candidates.  The timeframe spanned only one 
year, allowing little chance for the makeup of the population to change significantly.  
Yet the elections were unique enough to be measured independently; in the March and 
May CD 10 races, the major difference was the push made by the labor movement on 
behalf of the candidate (clearly a meaningful distinction for this paper).  In the SA 47 
Primary, the election occurred for an entirely different seat, the candidate was not the 
same as in 2003, only Democratic voters were included in the analysis, and the 
geographic area studied had some variation from the other races.  For these reasons, 
each of the elections is distinctly independent and worth its own analysis, while the 
three races are similar enough to be used as acceptable comparators. 
In the March 2003 City Council Primary election, two candidates friendly to 
organized labor ran for offices -- these candidates were Martin Ludlow in District 10 
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and Antonio Villaraigosa in District 14.  When both Villaraigosa and Ludlow chose to 
run for City Council in 2003, the County Federation faced a difficult dilemma in terms 
of how to allocate its resources.26    Ludlow had been the political director of the 
Federation, while Villaraigosa held a long association with labor, having come out of 
the United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA) ranks.  In the end, local labor analysts 
maintain that the County Federation decided to split its resources between the two 
candidates; acting under the assumption that Villaraigosa could win his seat outright 
but that Ludlow would likely need a runoff election to win, the Federation chose to 
most heavily back Villaraigosa in the March Primary, while Ludlow would obtain the 
full Federation support in the anticipated May runoff campaign (Meyerson 2006).  
However, there was still a concerted mobilization effort in support of Ludlow’s 
Primary efforts in South Los Angeles, for which recorded data are available.   
The SA 47 Primary campaign from March 2004 provides the final election in 
the data.  In this campaign, labor’s candidate was Karen Bass, a South Los Angeles 
community activist.  The County Federation claims to have made a strenuous 
mobilization push as part of a broad coalition with progressive community groups 
(though the Federation acted as a singular entity in terms of recorded vote-getting).  
Bass was less associated with the labor movement than Ludlow had been -- her work 
had largely involved community based support programs for South L.A.  However, 
labor was a significant contributor to the coalition pushing to increase turnout for her 
election. 
In each of these elections, it is critical to consider also the role that labor 
played in pushing to increase Latino voting in the area.  Many of the labor leaders 
orchestrating these mobilization drives were Latinos, and due to the changing 
                                                 
26
 The contextual information surrounding these elections comes from interviews conducted with 
mobilizing strategists, County Federation staff, and verified in articles written by Larry Frank and Kent 
Wong (2004) and Harold Meyerson (2006). 
  105 
demographics of the region, the majority of residents in the political districts were also 
Hispanic.  A large part of the labor-Latino alliance in Los Angeles involves 
mobilization campaigns in Spanish-speaking neighborhoods -- Latinos are typically 
unlikely voters, and a strong effort has been made by labor to bring this group into the 
political fold, matching the ethnic makeup of both the city as a whole and much of the 
local union movement in particular.    
 
Determining the Hypotheses 
 The key dependent variable in this study is vote turnout in each of the studied 
elections.  The political science literature maintains that voting behavior depends on a 
number of factors, including a vast array of long-term characteristics specific to each 
individual voter (e.g. age, ethnicity, birthplace, party affiliation, etc.) and short-term 
factors related to the particular election (e.g. the expected closeness of the race, the 
charisma of the candidate, the level of advertising for the election, etc.).  A 
mobilization effort can be considered a short-term factor, in that it almost exclusively 
covers one particular campaign. 
 The data set provides several (though not all) of the long-term characteristics 
influential on voting likelihood.  In terms of the short-term factors, it can be 
reasonably assumed that most, if not all, of these influences are constant per each 
studied election.  To expand on this, the closeness of the CD 10 and SA 47 races are 
irrelevant for the purposes of this section, considering that there is no between-person 
variation amongst these factors.  Election closeness, for example, is unlikely to change 
from individual to individual when looking at a single campaign, unless the 
fundamental perceptions of “closeness” differ amongst individuals.  However, it is 
unlikely that a substantial portion of the population differed in its perception of 
closeness in any of the races; besides, the quantification of this any change in 
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perceptions is impossible given the available data.  As another example, every 
individual in the data was asked to pick between the same candidates for each election, 
thus nullifying any real variation in the charisma of the candidate (again, while 
individuals’ perceptions of charisma may differ, it is highly unlikely that the variance 
in these perceptions would present a problem in assuming near-identical influences of 
charisma across the population as a whole).  Thus, the only short-term factor that truly 
varies per election is the occurrence of mobilization for each individual (and, within 
this mobilization occurrence, the type of contact that occurred). 
 Three hypotheses can be drawn from this perspective regarding factors related 
to voting behavior.  The third hypothesis is also influenced by the aforementioned 
relationship between the labor movement and the local Spanish/Latino community. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Political mobilization efforts of any type by the County 
Federation successfully increased the overall voting levels of the contacted 
individuals, with cross-election changes in influence levels dependent on the 
priority of each campaign for the Federation.   
 
Hypothesis 2: The relative differences in the success of the County 
Federation’s mobilization efforts within each election depended on the type of 
contact employed by the organization.  
 
Hypothesis 3: County Federation contacts of those with Spanish last names led 
to a substantial increase in the turnout rates of this particular ethnic group.. 
 
 
Models and Suitability Tests 
 In order to test each of the three hypotheses using the data at hand, it is 
necessary to create models wherein the determinants of voter turnout are measured by 
a set of independent variables.  In this work, the key independent variable is whether 
an eligible potential voter was contacted by the County Federation in each studied 
election.  In terms of the offered hypotheses, the key independent variables consist of: 
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any contact (testing Hypothesis 1), contact by personal visits versus contact by live 
phone calls (testing Hypothesis 2), and contact of the Spanish/Latino ethnic group, 
compared to non-contacted Spanish last names (testing Hypothesis 3).  Also included 
in each model are the other factors suggested by the literature to meaningfully 
influence turnout (e.g. age, birthplace, vote propensity, etc.).  The models offer that 
voter turnout in any particular race depends on all of the demographic variables, on 
prior vote history, and, critically, on the County Federation contact measurements, 
which serve as tests of the chapter’s three hypotheses. 
 It is critical at this point to firmly establish whether the models can validly 
measure the outcomes that will be attributed to each variable.  One concern within a 
study of this type lies in the nature of the data collection itself.  This study uses 
observational data in its analyses.  To expand, individuals in South Los Angeles were 
not intentionally divided into groups at random before being contacted by the 
Federation.  This could, theoretically, lead to a problem of cause and effect between 
the independent variables – for instance, if the Federation chose to contact only the 
likely voters, then the influences on voting behavior attributed to contact alone would 
be overstated and tenuous at best.  There are two steps that must be taken to test for 
this potential effect. 
 The first is to test for collinearity between any of the independent variables in 
order to assess whether the variables will provide truly independent measurements 
within each model.  Though there are several methods that can be used to test for 
independence of the variables, the most appropriate collinearity diagnostic used here is 
to run a condition index for each of the variables included in the models, which tests 
for any associations found between all of the variables used in a given model.  
Accordingly, across all three elections and within each of the three separate models 
per election, condition indexes were run.  As a rule of thumb, if any condition index 
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offers a number above 30, the model has a collinearity problem; if there is a condition 
index above 15, this suggests the possibility of a problem.   
Table 2 shows the highest condition index found amongst all the independent 
variables, across each model and election.  In none of the models did the condition 
index reach 15, let alone 30.  As such, it can be argued with certainty that the each 
model is methodologically sound in terms of the independence of all the variables 
included in the models.   
Additionally, the table provides the tolerance of contact in each model.  A 
tolerance test regresses any given independent variable on all the other independent 
variables in the data; as the variable’s tolerance moves closer to 0, it becomes more 
likely that collinearity is a problem and the variable cannot not be included in the final 
model without confounding its attributed outcomes – the general rule is that a 
tolerance of less than .200 presents a problem.  In this case, the lowest tolerance of 
contact was .887, demonstrating that union mobilization was not aligned in any way 
whatsoever with the other independent variables included in the data.  Other tests for 
collinearity were also run, each of which upheld these findings.27   
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 In addition to contact, all of the other variables easily passed their tolerance tests in each model for all 
elections.  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measurements were also run, as was a standard correlation 
matrix.  No problems or potential issues were demonstrated in any of these tests. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Highest Condition Index of Each Model and Tolerance of Contacts 
CD 10 Primary 
(March 2003) 
CD 10 Runoff 
(May 2003) 
SA 47 Primary 
(March 2004) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Largest 
Condition 
Index 
 
11.277 
 
11.277 
 
9.549 
 
11.387 
 
N/A 
 
9.591 
 
10.516 
 
10.516 
 
9.472 
Tolerance of 
Contact 
 
.972 
.989; 
.973^ 
 
.995 
 
.887 
 
N/A 
 
.999 
 
.889 
.913; 
955^ 
 
.966 
^: The two numbers provide the different tolerance levels of personal visits and phone calls in the model. 
Model Explanation: Model 1 = Any contact 
Model 2 = Contact divided into personal visits and phone calls 
Model 3 = Latino ethnicity only 
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Given that the variables have been deemed acceptable measurements within 
each model, the second step is to incorporate as many relevant independent variables 
as possible into the analysis (relevant meaning likely connected in some way to 
turnout, as suggested by the literature).  While it remains possible that there existed 
some influence on contact that the data could not measure (which would bias the 
selection of individuals into the two groups and perhaps overstate the results attributed 
to contact), this work has mitigated the problem by accounting for a substantial 
number of influences on turnout and establishing their independence from Federation 
contact. 
In fact, it is highly unlikely that the nature of the data causes any meaningful 
problems.  Consider again that the mobilizing strategists received practically the same 
list of voters as has been incorporated into the data.  As such, it is unlikely that the 
contacting agents were aware of any additional variables, external to the data set they 
received, that would have caused them to target individuals with specific 
characteristics unmeasured in the data.  It is far more likely that the County Federation 
and others took the list of potential voters and contacted as many people as possible, 
regardless of any particular demographic tendencies.  Further, given that the data 
account for vote propensity, and that collinearity tests have established propensity’s 
independence from contact, it cannot be that the voters most likely to answer the door 
or pick up the phone were the most inclined to vote – after all, the prior vote histories 
indicate no meaningful connection between vote propensity and contact rate.  Finally, 
it can be offered that even the mobilizing agents associated with the contacting efforts 
admitted that they were not selective in their targeting patterns.  One contacting agent, 
who mobilized voters in 2005 with an organization closely aligned to the County 
Federation, maintained that all the vote-getting groups were “just trying to knock on as 
many doors as possible” in any particular election (Alexander 2005). 
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Considering the statistical tests, the logical explanations, and the actual quotes 
from contacting agents, we interpret the empirical findings with the view that the 
individuals targeted in each election had no obvious features that distinguished them 
from the non-contacted group.  As such, this chapter asserts that, though the data were 
not intentionally randomized before mobilization occurred, an essentially identical 
effect has been achieved, given the tests of available characteristics of both the 
contacted and non-contacted groups.  In terms of the suitability of each model, it is 
clear that no problems exist that would require amendments to the inclusion of the 
given variables in the data. 
 
Percentage Point Differences in Voter Turnout 
Having established with confidence that each of the models is 
methodologically sound in its inclusion of independent variables, the chapter can now 
test the hypotheses.  The effectiveness of mobilization drives on vote turnout within 
each election can be first tested by looking at the percentage point difference in voter 
turnout by those contacted versus those not contacted.  Table 3 gives these percentage 
point differences across the three elections, comparing the change in turnout for those 
contacted by the County Federation with the non-contacted group in terms of any 
contact type, personal visits only, live phone calls only, and only Latino ethnicity 
contacts.  Looking at contact overall, in the CD 10 Primary there was a difference of 
13.6 percentage points in turnout amongst those contacted in any way by the County 
Federation relative to those not contacted.  Similarly, in the CD 10 Runoff, turnout 
increased by 20.5 percentage points amongst those contacted compared with those not 
contacted.  Finally, in the State Assembly 47 race, all Federation contacts showed 
increased turnout of 8.6 percentage points. 
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Looking at personal visits only, the results differ somewhat.  In the CD 10 
Primary, County Federation personal visits were associated with a 13.1 percentage 
point increase, while personal visits in the 2004 State Assembly 47 race offered a 
turnout increase of 6.3 percentage points.  Individuals contacted via live phone calls 
had turnout increases of 13.1 percentage points in the CD 10 Primary, and 9.9 
percentage points in the State Assembly 47 election.  Comparing the effectiveness of 
personal visits to phone calls, the data demonstrate literally no difference in the 
turnout rates between both contact types in the CD 10 Primary.  In the SA 47 race, 
looking at the percentage point differences, it is surprising that County Federation 
phone calls appear to have been more successful in increasing the vote than in-house 
visits.  Finally, taking the measure of labor contact on Latinos, the results indicate that 
the Federation was successful in increasing turnout compared to the relative voting 
behavior of non-contacted Latino individuals.   
 
Table 3: Percentage Point Difference in Vote Turnout between Individuals 
Contacted and Not Contacted by the Federation 
Type of Contact CD 10 Primary 
(March 2003) 
CD 10 Runoff 
 (May 2003) 
SA 47 Primary 
 (March 2004) 
Any Contact Type +13.6 +20.5 +8.6 
Personal Visits +13.1 N/A +6.3 
Live Phone Calls +13.1 N/A +9.9 
Any Latino Contact +9.9 +28.8 +21.1 
Note: No information was given for the contact types in the CD 10 Runoff election. 
 
Yet it would be inaccurate to imply that each of these increases in turnout was 
directly caused by organized labor’s mobilization efforts.  Other factors may have 
been more, or even exclusively, influential on turnout; for instance, vote propensity, 
age, party affiliation, and several of the ethnicities and birthplaces may have a 
substantial role in determining the likelihood of voting.  To separate out these other 
factors and look only at the effect of contact on voting behavior, logistic regressions 
must be used. 
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Logistic Regressions 
This chapter uses logistic regressions to isolate the critical independent 
variable from all of the other possible factors that could contribute to turnout in each 
election.  Given that the dependent variable in each model is dichotomous, logistic 
regressions are the suitable method of analysis.  Omitted reference categories were 
accorded to the measurements of vote propensity, party affiliation, ethnicity, and 
birthplace, so that the there would be a base point for the comparisons of these 
categorical variables.  The omitted variables were occasional vote propensity, 
Democratic Party affiliation (except in the case of SA 47, which was solely 
Democratic), female gender, generic ethnicity (except for Latinos), and California 
birthplace. 
 
The City Council District 10 Primary (March 2003) 
The March 2003 CD 10 Primary was the lowest priority election in the data in 
terms of union contacts.   However, potential voters were still approached by 
mobilizing agents in South Los Angeles, and the results of the regressions prove 
interesting (see Table 4).  In the CD 10 Primary, individuals contacted in any form by 
the County Federation of Labor (Model 1) were 1.376 times (37.6 percent) more likely 
to turn out than those not contacted (p < .01).  Those contacted by personal visits 
(Model 2) had a 1.331 likelihood of turning out (a 33.1 percent increase), while 
individuals contacted over the phone were 1.427 (or 42.7 percent) times more likely to 
vote – surprisingly, phone calls appeared to be more successful than in-house visits in 
getting out the vote (p < .01 for both).  Finally, contacts of Latinos (Model 3) provided 
an increase in likelihood of 1.465 (46.5 percent) relative to non-contacted Latinos (p < 
.10). 
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In terms of the other variables included in the logistic regressions, age, 
Republican and Minor Party affiliations, vote propensities, and almost all of the 
ethnicities (for Models 1 and 2) of the individual voters proved statistically significant, 
though with varying strength relative to their reference points.28  Given that age is a 
continuous variable, its odds ratio shows a substantial positive influence on voting – 
each yearly increase in age provided a 1.021 (2.1 percent) increase (1.015 for the 
Latino model) in the likelihood of turnout (p < .01 for all models).  Individuals 
affiliated with Republican and Minor parties were significantly less likely to vote than 
Democrats in the first two models (though Minor Party members were not 
significantly different from Democrats when looking at Latinos).  Also in the first two 
models, ethnicity variables each (aside from Korean) provided a decreased likelihood 
of turnout relative to the generic ethnicity reference point, while those born in foreign 
countries were more likely to turn out than those born in California (p < .01) for all the 
models.  When assessing Latinos only, those born in the middle states or the Midwest 
were less likely to vote than Californians (p < .10).  Finally, an individual’s vote 
propensity appeared to be the most substantial indicator of turnout across all three 
models, with a frequent voter being about four times more likely to vote than an 
occasional voter.  Conversely, those who had never voted were substantially less 
likely to go to the polls.   
Looking at the role of contact relative to the control variables, it would appear 
that in the 2003 CD 10 Primary, County Federation approaches to voters were a 
significant influence on the likelihood of turnout.  All measured contacts, including 
personal visits, live phone calls, and contact of Latinos only, provided for turnout 
increases between 33.1 and 46.5 percent, which trailed only vote propensity in overall 
                                                 
28
 Due to the size of the data, significance tests should be considered generally less important in these 
regressions than the magnitude of the effect (particularly the odds ratio) attributed to each variable. 
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influence on turnout odds.  In an election to which the County Federation apparently 
did not give a high priority, the results come as something of a surprise.  This increase 
in vote likelihood in a low priority election begs the question: how would the results 
differ for an election in which labor engaged in a concerted mobilization effort while 
essentially all of the external political factors influencing the population (i.e. the 
candidates, the geography, the year, etc.) remained the same?  The answer to this 
question comes in the analysis of the May 2003 CD 10 Runoff, which was heavily 
targeted by labor. 
 
The City Council District 10 Runoff (May 2003) 
The May 2003 City Council District 10 Runoff election, according to those 
familiar with the campaign, was heavily targeted by the County Federation.  Looking 
at the results (see Table 5), any contact by the County Federation (Model 1) almost 
doubled a potential voter’s likelihood of turning out in the May election, with an odds 
ratio of 1.887 (p < .01).  Though no information is given regarding the relative 
effectiveness of personal visits and phone calls, Federation contacts increased the odds 
of a person with a Spanish last name voting by 2.806 times (Model 2) relative to non-
contacted Latinos (p < .05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Logistic Regressions for CD 10 Primary (March 2003) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
N = 62,676 N = 62,676 N = 15,196 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .319*** .057 1.376 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contact (Visit) --- --- --- .286*** .078 1.331 --- --- --- 
Contact (Phone) --- --- --- .355*** .080 1.427 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- --- --- --- .382* .214 1.465 
Age .021*** .001 1.021 .021*** .001 1.021 .015*** .002 1.015 
Republican -.342*** .055 .711 -.340*** .055 .712 -.384*** .083 .681 
Minor -.182** .076 .834 -.182** .076 .834 -.221 .147 .802 
Male .026 .030 1.027 .027 .030 1.027 .045 .055 1.046 
Latino -.343*** .048 .710 -.341*** .048 .711 --- --- --- 
Chinese -.595*** .213 .552 -.594*** .213 .552 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.791*** .138 .453 -.789*** .138 .454 --- --- --- 
European -.416** .189 .660 -.415** .189 .660 --- --- --- 
Jewish -.455*** .092 .634 -.453*** .092 .635 --- --- --- 
Korean .217** .094 1.232 .218** .094 1.244 --- --- --- 
Japanese -.258* .135 .773 -.255* .135 .775 --- --- --- 
M.East./Asia/Pacif. -.318* .163 .728 -.317* .163 .729 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) -.173 .118 .841 -.173 .118 .841 .097 .307 1.102 
South .049 .046 1.050 .048 .046 1.049 -.324 .233 .723 
Middle States -.029 .075 .972 -.028 .075 .973 -.604* .362 .547 
Mountain. States -.047 .185 .954 -.045 .185 .956 .597 .622 1.817 
Northeast -.063 .122 .939 -.062 .122 .940 .950 .589 2.586 
Midwest -.048 .056 .953 -.047 .056 .954 -.730* .379 .482 
Foreign Born .163*** .050 1.177 .162** .050 1.176 .403*** .075 1.496 
Frequent Voter 1.426*** .031 4.160 1.426** .031 4.161 1.362*** .059 3.904 
Never Voter -.829*** .048 .437 -.829*** .048 .436 -.952*** .088 .386 
Constant -2.089*** .058 .124 -2.089*** .058 .124 -2.295*** .097 .101 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level.
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As with the March contacts, the other variables influential on vote turnout were 
age, party affiliations, vote propensity foreign birthplace, and the majority of the 
ethnicities (for Model 1).  A one-year increase in age led to a 1.6 percent increase in 
turnout for the entire population and a .9 percent increase for Latinos only.  Looking at 
ethnicities, the European, Japanese, and Middle Eastern ethnicities mattered in March 
but not May (for the non-Latino model, of course).  Similar to the CD 10 Primary, no 
birthplaces aside from foreign born were found to be significantly different from being 
born in California (although being from the South mattered when looking at only 
Latinos).  An individual’s propensity as a frequent voter again mattered the most in the 
May election, increasing turnout likelihood by about five times when compared with 
occasional voters.  Never voters were substantially less likely to turn out than the 
reference category as well for both of the models. 
When comparing the May contact results with those of the March election, it 
would appear that the concerted effort by labor to turn out the vote paid off.  The 
March contacts resulted in about a 1.4 times increase in turnout odds, while the May 
effort nearly doubled the likelihood of turning out.  Contact of Latinos resulted in 
vastly higher odds of turnout in May than in March.  Though these results are helpful 
in answering the question of whether union mobilization efforts increase voter turnout, 
there are some limitations; for one, both sets of results focus on a single campaign.  
Both involved the same endorsed candidate, which may have contributed to the similar 
voting patterns across the control variables.  In addition, the contacts were performed 
very near each other in time.  It would be interesting to see whether the same patterns 
of labor influence on turnout existed when looking at an entirely different election in a 
different year; for an answer to this, the chapter will turn to the March 2004 SA 47 
Primary. 
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Table 5: Logistic Regressions for CD 10 Runoff (May 2003) 
Model 1 Model 2  
N = 62,676 N = 15,196 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .635*** .043 1.887 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- 1.032** .409 2.806 
Age .016*** .001 1.016 .009*** .002 1.009 
Republican -.274*** .055 .760 -.138 .089 .871 
Minor -.167** .077 .846 -.362** .145 .696 
Male -.007 .031 .993 -.115** .054 .892 
Latino .203*** .049 1.225 --- --- --- 
Chinese -.454** .215 .635 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.373*** .138 .689 --- --- --- 
European -.101 .182 .904 --- --- --- 
Jewish -.224** .095 .799 --- --- --- 
Korean .397*** .099 1.488 --- --- --- 
Japanese -.071 .141 .932 --- --- --- 
M.East/Asia/Pacif. -.203 .172 .816 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) -.190 .124 .827 .039 .302 1.040 
South .028 .049 1.028 -.553** .243 .575 
Middle States .060 .078 1.062 -.500 .331 .606 
Mountain States -.166 .194 .847 -698 .733 .497 
Northeast .025 .127 1.026 .561 .616 1.753 
Midwest -.025 .059 .975 -.276 .336 .759 
Foreign Born .221*** .050 1.247 .404*** .072 1.497 
Frequent Voter 1.655*** .035 5.234 1.580*** .065 4.855 
Never Voter -1.463*** .048 .231 -1.552*** .076 .212 
Constant -1.809*** .060 .164 -1.379*** .092 .252 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level;  
* = Significant at the .10 level.
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The State Assembly 47 Primary (March 2004) 
The 2004 State Assembly race was considered a high priority by the County 
Federation (falling between the March and May 2003 elections in terms of total 
contacts).  While SA 47 and CD 10 overlap geographically to a degree, the 
populations are not identical. 
Turning to the results (found in Table 6), any County Federation contact 
(Model 1) led to a substantial increase in the likelihood of voting, with the odds ratio 
at 1.629 (p < .01).  Contact by personal visits (Model 2) resulted in a 1.691 likelihood 
of turnout, while live phone calls led to a 1.584 odds of voting (p < .01 for both).  
Consider the relatively small gap in odds ratios between the two types of contact in 
this campaign -- while both types resulted in successful turnout likelihoods, personal 
visits did not have the expected higher effect that this type of contact, according to the 
literature, is supposed to offer.  Finally, contacts of Latino individuals increased the 
odds of turnout by 1.603 compared with non-contacted Latinos (p < .01). 
The other measured variables in the data follow some, but not all, of the results 
set forth in the 2003 outcomes for each model.  Age and vote propensity played a 
statistically significant and positive role in influencing turnout, while gender was 
statistically insignificant, as with most of the 2003 models.  However, fewer of the 
ethnicity variables were statistically significant than in the 2003 elections (for Models 
1 and 2), while there was more differentiation in the geographic birthplaces than in the 
other campaigns for Models 1 and 2, though the converse held true (with none of the 
birthplaces showing influences on turnout statistically different from the reference 
point) in Model 3. 
Comparing across elections, any contact in 2004 resulted in voting likelihood 
slightly lower than that found in the May 2003 campaign, though the result was 
markedly higher than that found in March 2003.  Latino turnout of contacted 
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individuals in 2004 also fell in between the results for the March and May 2003 
elections. Though personal visits and live phone calls were not measured in May 2003, 
the March 2003 and March 2004 elections are useful comparators.  Both in-house 
visits and phone calls yielded more turnout success amongst those contacted in 2004 
than in 2003, which follows from the results of all contacts.  Looking at one contact 
type relative to the other, phone calls appeared to increase turnout more strongly than 
personal visits in March 2003.  However, in March 2004, there was a higher likelihood 
of turnout when an individual was approached in person rather than over the phone, 
which stands in contrast to results of the percentage point differences for this election.   
 
Implications and Discussion 
The results of the data offer considerable implications for the study of 
mobilization efforts on turnout and are particularly important in terms of the 
effectiveness of labor-run voting drives.  The results of the logistic regressions offer a 
strong confirmation of the opinions promulgated by labor experts studying Los 
Angeles.  It would appear that any contact by the County Federation substantially 
increased voter turnout amongst the population in the three measured elections, 
confirming Hypothesis 1.  Though the effects of County Federation contact fluctuate 
across the elections, this likely occurs due to the weight placed on each mobilization 
effort by the Federation itself (also confirming the first hypothesis).  Although many 
authors have stated this to be the case, none has empirically supported the position 
with objective research.  The effects of contact stand firm across three unique 
elections, remain strong when broken into measurements of contact type, and stay 
statistically significant even when controlling for critical influences such as age, party 
affiliation, ethnicity, and vote propensity.   
 
  
Table 6: Logistic Regressions for SA 47 Primary (March 2004) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
N = 53,648 N = 53,648 N = 9,350 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .488*** .053 1.629 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contact (Visit) --- --- --- .525*** .077 1.691 --- --- --- 
Contact (Phone) --- --- --- .460*** .067 1.584 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- --- --- --- .472*** .065 1.603 
Age .016*** .001 1.016 .016*** .001 1.016 .017*** .002 1.017 
Male .031 .026 1.032 .031 .026 1.032 -.011 .056 .989 
Latino -.613*** .044 .542 -.615*** .044 .541 --- --- --- 
Chinese .037 .195 1.038 .037 .195 1.038 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.775*** .157 .461 -.774*** .157 .461 --- --- --- 
European -.053 .158 .948 -.053 .158 .948 --- --- --- 
Jewish .468*** .079 1.597 .467*** .079 1.596 --- --- --- 
Korean -.627*** .148 .534 -.627*** .148 .534 --- --- --- 
Japanese .139 .155 1.149 .139 .155 1.149 --- --- --- 
M.East/Asia/Pacif. -.154 .148 .857 -.154 .148 .857 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) .068 .102 1.071 .068 .102 1.071 .149 .332 1.160 
South .050 .038 1.051 .050 .038 1.051 .149 .195 1.161 
Middle States .194*** .065 1.214 .194*** .065 1.215 .266 .270 1.305 
Mountain States .104 .172 1.110 .105 .172 1.111 -.492 .737 .612 
Northeast .278*** .104 1.320 .278*** .104 1.320 .210 .683 1.234 
Midwest .050 .046 1.051 .050 .046 1.051 -.142 .329 .868 
Foreign Born .028 .046 1.029 .029 .046 1.029 .045 .073 1.046 
Frequent Voter 1.764*** .038 5.838 1.764*** .038 5.837 1.519*** .075 4.569 
Never Voter -.829*** .033 .436 -.829*** .033 .436 -1.503*** .065 .223 
Constant -.983*** .046 .374 -.983*** .046 .374 -1.434*** .093 .238 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level.
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Addressing specific types of contact, Federation efforts found more success 
when the potential voters were contacted in person rather than over the phone in 2004, 
though the opposite held true for the 2003 Primary, confirming Hypothesis 2, which 
argued that relative (or within-election) turnout likelihoods would vary by contact 
type.  The findings both mesh with and run contrary to the literature on mobilization, 
which suggests that personal contact most effectively galvanizes potential voters.  The 
results are quite surprising and might suggest that the unmeasured characteristics of 
the contacting agents could have played a role in causing less turnout likelihood 
amongst individuals visited personally in the 2003 Primary.  Perhaps those running the 
live phone banks were better trained or more persuasive than those contacting via 
door-to-door methods.  Unfortunately, any differentiation between the contacting 
agents has not been measured; as such, mere speculation is all that can be offered to 
explain this result.  However, when considering the results at hand, and given the time 
and resource-intensive nature of door-to-door campaigns and the relative ease of 
contacting potential voters via phone banks, the outcomes would suggest that union 
mobilizing groups strongly consider using phone calls in some instances.  It is up to 
the prerogative of the individual mobilizing agent to decide whether the possible bump 
in turnout accorded to personal visits is worth the extra resources when phone calls 
appear to be highly successful means of increasing the vote. 
Looking at contact of Latinos only, the County Federation found much success 
in increasing the relative turnout rates of this ethnic group, confirming Hypothesis 3 of 
the chapter.  It has been theorized that the labor-Latino alliance in Los Angeles allows 
unions to influence Latino individuals substantially, both in terms of organizing 
campaigns and political mobilization drives.  The results of this work support with 
confidence this assertion.  Considering that many of the mobilizing agents were 
Latinos, the success of the Federation in harnessing the Latino vote may be connected 
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to the notion that (ethnic) similarity breeds affinity when it comes to mobilizing 
potential voters. The differences between labor’s magnitude of influence on Latino 
voting across the elections likely follow the explanation offered in terms of the 
population as a whole, which ties higher voting patterns to election prioritization by 
the Federation.   
Overall, the results indicate that the labor movement would be wise to continue 
investing significant resources in political mobilization campaigns, especially those 
wherein the populations mirror that found in this data set.  The logistic regression 
outcomes show that any union contact dramatically increased turnout levels of 
potential voters.  If the differences between the across-election contact effects can be 
explained by the Federation’s prioritization of each election, this would imply that 
pushing more resources into the non-prioritized elections would have led to stronger 
vote turnout increases, though such an occurrence may be impossible given that 
resources (e.g. time, money, mobilizing agents) are scarce.   
It would not be unreasonable to assume that the success enjoyed by the 
Federation in its mobilization efforts could occur for other unions looking to increase 
turnout in cities with similar demographic and social characteristics.  Though South 
L.A. constitutes a significantly different population from, for instance, Beverly Hills, 
it shares many characteristics with other urban areas.  While there are some 
circumstantial elements to consider (e.g. the unique ties between the Latino 
community and the local labor movement), it would appear, given the results of 
objective statistical analysis, that the labor movement as a whole ought to devote 
substantial resources to mobilization efforts for political campaigns if the 
circumstances match those found in this study.  The use of these results in a more 
generalized way will be discussed at length in the concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
EXPANSION OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Thus far, the empirical analysis has focused on one identifiable group of 
mobilizing agents – the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor – and its efforts in 
three elections.  However, the data provide information on more than just this group, 
and more than just these elections.  Potential voters were also targeted in the 
November 2002 General Election and the October 2003 Special Election.  Though the 
County Federation cannot be identified as a unique contacting unit, the labor-
community alliance working throughout all the campaigns can be studied as a singular 
entity in not only the three discussed elections, but also in the two races yet to be 
analyzed. 
This chapter expands the empirical analysis to include all the elections and 
mobilization efforts given in the data (as opposed to only the County Federation 
contacts and elections).  There are both positives and negatives to looking at the 
mobilization effort as a whole, rather than choosing a single group, as occurred in the 
previous chapter.  One benefit to this approach is that more contacts can be 
incorporated into the analysis.  Only 17.9 percent of the total contacts in the data were 
performed by the County Federation as a separate group.  The vast majority of 
mobilization efforts included a combination of union members and community 
activists, working under the umbrella of various organizations.  As such, bringing all 
the contacts into the analysis allows for immense accuracy in depicting the success of 
the various groups in their mobilization campaigns. 
A second reason for this expansion is that it offers a chance to compare results, 
which allows for the formation of hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of adding 
more contacts to a mobilization effort.  It becomes possible, by expanding the data, to 
compare the effectiveness of all groups working in alliance with the success rates of 
one group acting alone.  This expansion also allows for the comparison of multiple 
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contacts of the same individual across five unique elections.  Finally, expanding the 
data to include all groups and elections offers a chance to develop more clearly a 
hypothesis related to election priority.  Upon assessing the priority level of each 
election, this expanded data allows for a robust comparison between election priority 
and turnout. 
As such, this chapter has been divided into several sections, which constitute 
the remainder of the data analysis.  All portions of the chapter use the expanded 
version of the data, inclusive of all mobilizing groups and all five elections.  The 
differences between the sections can be identified by their hypotheses: section one 
measures whether election priority influences turnout success rates across all five 
campaigns.  The second section tests the effects of adding substantially more contacts 
(and groups) to the three previously tested elections, comparing the results to those 
found for the County Federation alone.  Section three tests the argument that multiple 
contacts of the same individual will lead to increased turnout rates, using the March 
2004 election as its setting. 
 One drawback of this expansion is that it is impossible to differentiate between 
the separate organizations when including them all under one analysis.  That is, there 
is no indication of the exact percent of the contacting agents who were union members 
in any of the labor-community coalitions; nor is there any notable characteristic of one 
single group that would offer an expectation of relative success when compared with 
the others.  The only organization for which separation is clearly possible is the 
Federation, given that its identity as a unit is unambiguous.  The remaining 
organizations include diverse pockets of individuals, some of whom are union 
members and others of whom are progressive community activists.  Thus, it becomes 
extremely difficult to explain mobilization success on any level other than the 
cumulative efforts of the organizations as a whole, which is not particularly 
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problematic, given that they were all working for the same goal and, to some extent 
(though how much is, again, debatable) were conscious of and interwoven with each 
other’s efforts. 
 
The Data 
 As with the previous chapter, the data here consist of 188,551 potential voters 
in South Los Angeles, this time broken into three clusters of individuals.  The first 
includes all the registered voters in Los Angeles City Council District 10 (62,676 
people).  The second looks at the registered Democratic voters in California State 
Assembly District 47 (53,648 individuals).  The third cluster is new for this chapter, 
and includes simply the entire data set (all 188,551 potential voters).  It is necessary to 
include the entire population when looking at the November 2002 General Election 
and the October 2003 Special Election, as all the people in the state (and thus 
everyone in South Los Angeles) were geographically eligible to vote, negating any 
necessary subdivision by location. 
 The same measurements of vote propensity, ethnicity, birthplace, party 
affiliation, age, and gender are all recorded in the data again, as is the type of contact.  
The major difference in the data, aside from the expansion by two elections, is of 
course the inclusion of several additional mobilization groups, all of which deserve 
some mention. 
 One such organization is called the Alliance of Local Leaders for Education, 
Registration and Turnout, or ALLERT.  This group consists of largely a combination 
of union members and community activists.  ALLERT mounted a significant 
mobilization drive in the November 2002 General Election and the October 2003 
Special Election; in fact, Table 7 demonstrates that all the recorded contacts for 
November 2002 came from members of ALLERT.  The organization is considered 
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non-partisan in its vote-getting efforts, though it has taken stances on some ballot 
initiatives in the past (notably Propositions 66 and 72 in the November 2004 election, 
which is not studied here).  Generally speaking, however, it can be considered a non-
partisan organization. 
 The three other groups of labor-community activists performing contacts in the 
five elections were called Angelenos, CCPP, and Neighborhood.  Very little 
(practically nothing) is known about these organizations, other than they were part of 
the labor-community alliance and they had some substantial contact numbers in the 
elections (for more information, see Table 7).  For instance, the Neighborhood group 
provided 23,022 contacts (more than any other organization) in the SA 47 Democratic 
Primary in March 2004.  CCPP made several thousand contacts in October 2003, 
while Angelenos contacted a substantial number of people (over 7,000) in the CD 10 
Runoff.  However, there is nothing available to suggest that these groups were 
anything but a partnership between labor unions and community organizations – even 
the contact data collectors and mobilization strategists, when interviewed about the 
makeup of the groups, could not remember any defining features of one of these units 
relative to the others.  However, by its title, the group called Neighborhood could be 
inferred to be quite heavily involved in community activism, although likely inclusive 
of some labor influence as well. 
 The final two contacting groups are considered definitely partisan – these are 
called Campaign and IE, or Independent Expenditure.  Campaign can be identified as 
contacts made by each individual politician’s campaign workers – again, these were 
likely combinations of union members and community activists, though the work is far 
more likely to have been of a partisan nature.  Additionally, IE was set up largely by 
labor unions in the CD 10 Primary; here, the contacting agents specifically advocated 
on behalf of one candidate (in this case, Martin Ludlow).  These partisan groups can 
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be analyzed in the same group as the non-partisan organizations given that the 
literature suggests that partisanship of the mobilization effort does not markedly 
change the turnout likelihoods of the individual voters, and also because it is unclear 
precisely whether the groups were partisan about particular issues and non-partisan 
about others.  It is critical to emphasize that the literature has found no clear 
distinction in turnout levels when studying partisanship; these findings, discussed in 
the political science literature review, allow for an aggregation of the contacts in the 
data regardless of the political positions of the contacting groups.  
 Looking at the relative efforts of the groups across the elections and the total 
contacts made in each campaign, the results (see Table 7) indicate that substantial 
mobilization pushes were made in each of the five races.  As mentioned, contacts in 
the November 2002 campaign were solely the work of ALLERT.  This election also 
offers the lowest total number of contacts of the five, at 18,000.  The other ALLERT-
based race, in October 2003, is second from last in terms of total contacts, at 26,109.  
The CD 10 Primary follows, with its 27,477 mobilized individuals -- 19.5 percent 
were contacted by the Federation alone and 80.5 percent were targeted by the 
campaign or (in most of the cases) IE.  The CD 10 Runoff held the second most 
contacts, at 27,485 – 43.5 percent came from the Federation alone, 25.9 percent were 
in the form of a labor-community alliance, and 30.6 percent were part of the Martin 
Ludlow mobilization campaign.  Finally, the State Assembly 47 race enjoyed the 
highest total mobilization, with 38,149 total contacts – 22.9 percent of the contacts 
were performed by the Federation, 16.8 percent came from the Karen Bass campaign, 
and 60.3 percent were provided by the Neighborhood organization.  Each election had 
a level of contacts substantial enough for data analysis to be performed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Mobilization Groups and Number of Contacts in the Five Elections 
 Gen. Elect. 
(Nov. 2002) 
CD 10 Prim. 
(Mar. 2003) 
CD 10 Runoff 
(May 2003) 
Spec. Elect. 
(Oct. 2003) 
SA 47 Prim. 
(Mar. 2004) 
Total 
 
ALLERT 18,000   21,121  44,469 
Angelenos   7,108   7,108 
CCPP    4,988  4,988 
Campaign  986 8,409  6,407 15,802 
County Fed  5,360 11,968  8,720 26,048 
Ind. Expend  21,131    21,131 
Neighborhood     23,022 23,022 
Total 18,000 27,477 27,485 26,109 38,149 142,568 
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Determining the Hypotheses 
 The hypothesis determination of this chapter follows some, but not all, of the 
characteristics of the preceding chapter on the Federation alone.  Here again, the 
dependent variable is the vote turnout of each individual in the data, while contact 
remains the key independent variable.  However, there are substantial differences to be 
discussed, which provide an explanation for the necessity of including this data 
analysis in the first place. 
 Consider first the argument that an election of higher priority will increase the 
likelihood that voters will be successfully galvanized to vote.  This argument is based 
on the assumption that mobilizing agents will be more persuasive in their efforts if 
they put particular emphasis on a vote-getting drive.  The theory also assumes that 
larger numbers of volunteers will be channeled into a high priority race, which should 
increase turnout rates.  The basis for this assumption is related to the concept of social 
network mobilization, discussed in the political science literature.  If more 
mobilization agents are contacting more individuals in a particular setting (which is 
likely to occur in a high priority race), there is more social pressure created on 
potential voters, which should, in turn, increase the vote likelihoods of contacted 
individuals.  
In this case, election priority is harder to measure than in the County 
Federation’s mobilizations alone.  It is unclear whether any of the elections were, as a 
whole, more important to the mobilizing groups than any of the others.  To determine 
priority, we are left to consider three elements: the total number of contacts made, the 
total number of groups performing mobilization drives, and the priority level known 
for the elections in which the County Federation targeted voters. 
 Using these criteria, it would appear that the 2002 November General Election 
was the least targeted, or in other words, of the least priority (Table 8 gives the 
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prioritization breakdowns).  It held the lowest total number of contacts and the fewest 
groups (with only ALLERT running a mobilizing drive).  The October 2003 Special 
Election would come second to last in priority under these criteria, with two 
mobilization groups and the second-lowest number of contacts.  Following the 
October election would be the CD 10 Primary, given what we know about the County 
Federation’s favoring Antonio Villaraigosa’s race in the same election, and also 
considering the total number of contacts.  The CD 10 Runoff can be considered the 
election with the second highest priority, after accounting for the Federation’s 
prioritization of this race in particular.  The election with the highest priority would 
appear to be the SA 47 campaign, with the largest number of contacts, including a 
massive Neighborhood effort and a substantial push by the County Federation in a 
race it indicated was a high priority. 
 
Table 8: Priority Rankings of the Five Elections Based on Known Criteria 
 Gen. Elect. 
(Nov. 2002) 
CD 10 Prim. 
(Mar. 2003) 
CD 10 Runoff 
(May 2003) 
Spec. Elect. 
(Oct. 2003) 
SA 47 Prim. 
(Mar. 2004) 
# of Contacts 5 3 2 4 1 
# of Groups 5 T-1 T-1 4 T-1 
C. Fed. Priority N/A 3 1 N/A 2 
Overall Ranking 5 3 2 4 1 
 
It is also important to consider the possibility that voters may be more likely to 
respond to a mobilization effort if the contacting agents are familiar to them.  This 
argument is predicated on the theory that potential voters are able to relate more 
closely to those with whom they have some shared characteristics.  Vote-getting 
agents are theoretically more likely to be listened to by potential voters if they offer a 
perspective that is shared by the targeted individuals, fueled by a common interest and 
shared identity.  This familiarity can come, for instance, in the form of ethnic 
sameness (e.g. Latinos contacting fellow Latinos), or in terms of geographical 
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similarity (e.g. South Los Angeles residents contacting others from South L.A.).  
Looking specifically at these data, it could be theorized that voters contacted by both 
labor groups and community activists would be more likely to turn out than those 
contacted by unions alone, in that the shared location of both the mobilizing groups 
and contacted individuals might lead to increased vote likelihoods.  That is, if both the 
vote-getters and the potential voters share a common geographic location, the targeted 
individuals may be more receptive to mobilization, as the mobilizing agents can offer, 
for instance, a shared concern over issues specific to the neighborhood.  Similarly, it 
could be argued that an increased occurrence of ethnic matches between the 
mobilizing agents and the potential voters, which would also take place when 
individuals from the community mobilize within their own neighborhoods, would 
increase the chances of turnout. 
Finally, it is possible to test the argument that multiple contacts will lead to 
increased turnout.  The argument in this case is that individuals will be more receptive 
to repeated mobilization efforts and will thus be more likely to vote as total contacts 
increase.  This argument is based on the theory that voters who are targeted more often 
will feel more pressure to vote, especially if the mobilizing agents are from the 
particular neighborhood.  The social pressure created by contacting a potential voter 
might become more intense with each additional contact; if an individual is contacted 
only once, there may be no perceived social consequence to not voting.  Yet if 
additional contacts are performed, the potential voter might believe that, by not casting 
a ballot, he or she is failing to partake in a community-wide voting movement.   
The data offer five elections for analysis, and as such, individuals could have 
been contacted from zero to five times by the time of the March 2004 race.  One 
difficulty that must be noted in testing this theory is that potential voters may have 
been contacted at some point prior to the first election provided in the data.  It is 
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highly unlikely that the November 2002 race constituted the first ever mobilization 
efforts in South Los Angeles.  However, the relative success rates of each additional 
contact within the five elections can still be approximated, even though potential 
voters may well have been contacted far more than the maximum five times allowed 
by the data. 
Given the theories discussed here, three new hypotheses can be tested in this 
chapter, in addition to re-testing the three hypotheses tested in the previous chapter 
(analyzing the role of any contact, personal visits versus live phone calls, and Latino 
contacts).  The new hypotheses are as follows: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relative differences in the success of the labor-community 
alliance’s mobilization efforts within each of the five elections depended on the 
priority of each election by the vote-getting groups.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The political mobilization efforts of the alliance will 
demonstrate higher turnout success rates than those found for the County 
Federation acting alone. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Multiple contacts of individuals will result in higher turnout 
rates, with each additional contact increasing the odds that a potential voter 
will go to the polls. 
 
Testing the Hypotheses 
It is imperative again to perform methodological tests on the variables to 
establish their suitability for inclusion in the three models used in the regression 
analysis.  As with the previous chapter, the key independent variables consist of: any 
contact, contact by personal visits versus contact by live phone calls, and contact of 
the Spanish/Latino ethnic group, compared to non-contacted Spanish last names.  The 
results of these various models can then be analyzed and discussed to either affirm or 
nullify the three hypotheses posed in this chapter.   
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 Table 9 demonstrates that each of the three models is perfectly acceptable in its 
inclusion of all the given variables.  Again, at no point does the condition index hit 15, 
let alone 30.  Further, the tolerance of contact does not fall below .886, whereas the 
cutoff is .200.  The same logical reasoning applies in this regard as well – that is, the 
labor-community alliance actively sought to contact as many people as possible from 
the list of potential voters, and as such, gave no substantial weight to any particular 
characteristic of the individuals aside from those required by the election (i.e. political 
boundary or, in the case of SA 47, party affiliation). 
 
Table 9: Highest Condition Index and Tolerance of Contact 
Largest Condition Index Tolerance of Contact  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
General Election  
(November 2002) 
12.737 12.740 10.982 .994 .995; 
.992^ 
.997 
CD 10 Primary 
(March 2003) 
12.806 12.821 11.560 .940 .886; 
.907^ 
.959 
CD 10 Runoff  
(May 2003) 
11.964 11.827 11.313 .911 .959; 
.902^ 
.892 
Recall Election  
(October 2003) 
11.474 11.451 11.264 .945 .981; 
.945^ 
.927 
SA 47 Primary 
(March 2004) 
11.228 11.229 11.120 .917 .899; 
.024^ 
.900 
^: The two numbers provide the different tolerance levels of personal visits and phone calls in the 
model. 
 
Percentage Point Differences in Voter Turnout 
 With the independence of the data established, the first step in testing the 
influence of contact on turnout by all the groups in the data is to look at the change in 
vote levels of those contacted versus those not contacted.  To do so, this chapter 
returns to an analysis of the percentage point differences in turnout levels when 
contact is applied (full results can be found in Table 10). 
In the November 2002 General election, any form of contact by the labor-
community alliance showed vote increases of 11.9 percentage points.  Personal visits 
raised the vote percents less than phone calls, garnering increases of 9.4 percentage 
  135 
points and 14.7 points, respectively.  Latinos appeared to be the most affected by 
contact, upping their aggregate vote levels by 15.1 percentage points.   
The March 2003 CD 10 Primary followed a similar pattern to the November 
2002 election, though the percentage point changes across the board were higher.  Any 
contact appeared to raise overall turnout by 17.8 percentage points.  Again, phone 
calls beat personal contacts in terms of the vote level difference between those 
contacted and the non-contacted, with those called increasing their turnout by 17.5 
percentage points, while individuals personally visited had 11.3-point higher vote 
amounts.  Latinos were not quite as apparently responsive to contact as the overall 
mobilized population, with vote levels raised by 15.7 percentage points. 
The May Runoff election in CD 10 was the most successful of the five in terms 
of overall contact, with potential voters contacted in any form voting at rates 25.1 
percentage points higher than the non-contacted.  Once again, personal visits garnered 
a less-positive vote change than phone calls, with an increase of 14.5, compared with 
16.7 for phone contacts.  Latino voting levels were essentially on par with any contact, 
with mobilized Latino vote raised by 25.3 when compared with the non-mobilized 
Latinos. 
Overall contact percentage points drop somewhat when looking at the October 
2003 Special Election, though the results are higher than those found in November 
2002.  Potential voters contacted in any form upped their vote tallies by 14.4 points.  
For the first time, personal visits led to higher voting records than phone calls, with 
increases of 15.9 and 12.2 percentage points respectively.  Latino voting far 
outweighed the overall contact numbers, and was in fact the highest of all the 
elections, with an increase of 27.5 percentage points. 
Lastly, the SA 47 Democratic Primary rounded out the strong percentage point 
showing for the labor-community alliance.  Individuals contacted at all were 21.6 
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percentage points higher than the non-contacted in their voting levels.  Personal visits 
fared better than phone calls again, with those contacted in person upping their vote 
levels by 18.5 points, while live phone calls led to a 15.0 percentage point increase.  
Finally, Latinos again followed the same pattern as overall contact, with vote levels 
increased by 22.0 percentage points. 
As with the previous chapter, the results are not intended to imply causation on 
behalf of the vote-getting groups.  A more refined statistical technique, which can 
separate out the relative effects of particular influences, must be used to determine 
how much of these increases should be attributed to mobilization, as opposed to other 
factors.  For such a test, this chapter again relies on logistic regressions. 
 
Table 10: Percentage Point Difference in Vote Turnout between Individuals 
Contacted and Not Contacted by the Labor-Community Alliance 
 Gen. Elect. 
(Nov. 2002) 
CD 10 Prim. 
(Mar. 2003) 
CD 10 Runoff 
(May 2003) 
Spec. Elect. 
(Oct. 2003) 
SA 47 Prim. 
(Mar. 2004) 
Any Contact +11.9 +17.8 +25.1 +14.4 +21.6 
Personal Visit +9.4 +11.3 +14.5 +15.9 +18.5 
Phone Call +14.7 +17.5 +16.7 +12.2 +15.0 
Latino Contact +15.1 +15.7 +25.3 +27.5 +22.0 
 
Logistic Regressions 
 After considering the percentage point differences, it is now time to apply 
proper statistical techniques to analyzing the data, once again in the most suitable form 
– logistic regressions.  Several variables are once again left out of analysis to provide 
base levels for the included data; these omitted variables are Democratic Party 
affiliation (except in the case of the SA 47 Primary), female gender, generic ethnicity, 
California birthplace, and occasional voters. 
 This first section of the empirical analysis will focus on a re-testing of the three 
hypotheses offered in the previous chapter, and will add a comparison of election 
prioritization across the five races. 
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General Election (November 2002) 
 The November 2002 General Election has been identified as the least 
prioritized of the five elections.  It is unclear whether there was one particular 
candidate or issue of special interest to the mobilization agents, all of whom came 
from the group known as ALLERT.  Given that ALLERT is largely considered a 
nonpartisan group, it is likely that the mobilization effort was aimed at general turnout 
increase. 
 Contact was found to be quite influential on turnout (see Table 11), with any 
contact (Model 1) increasing voting odds by 1.559, or 55.9 percent (p < .01).  Live 
phone calls (Model 2) proved to be the most successful contact type, upping turnout 
by 65.2 percent, while personal visits led to a 51.3 percent increase in vote likelihood 
(p < .01).  Amongst Latinos (Model 3), contact was extremely successful in raising 
turnout levels, with a 1.747 (74.7 percent) likelihood of turnout (p < .01). 
 Looking at the other included variables, age was found to be statistically 
significant but essentially meaningless in terms of effect across all three models in the 
November 2002 election.  A one-year increase in age led to approximately a one-half 
percent increase in vote likelihood across all three models.  Republican and Minor 
party affiliations were all statistically significant and negative compared to the 
Democratic base in turnout odds.  Several of the ethnicity variables (for models 1 and 
2) were statistically significant, and all were negative in their vote likelihoods when 
compared to the generic reference point.  Only a few of the ethnicity variables proved 
statistically different from being born in California, with foreign birthplace causing a 
substantial increase in turnout odds across all the models.  Finally, prior vote history 
was the strongest indicator of voting likelihood, with frequent voters approximately 
four times more likely to head to the polls than occasional voters in each model. 
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 Contact by ALLERT (a nonpartisan labor-community alliance) proved to have 
much success in raising turnout in November 2002.  The odds ratios of 1.513 to 1.747 
trailed only frequent vote propensity (and, in Model 1, foreign birthplace) in their 
magnitudes of effect on turnout.  In this case, as with all the others, it is most 
important to consider the magnitude of influence, even more so than statistical 
significance, given the size of the data set.  Looking across each type of contact, phone 
calls proved more successful than personal visits, which is somewhat of a surprise 
given the political science literature.  Contact of Latinos garnered the highest vote 
turnout likelihood of all the contacts.   
 The November 2002 election was the least prioritized race, when considering 
the number of groups involved (just one) and the total contacts (18,000).  Yet the 
results were highly positive for the labor-community alliance, influencing turnout in a 
positive and meaningful way.  While the results provide a useful starting point for 
comparing priority level to turnout rates, more tests are needed to determine vote 
behavior versus election importance.  To continue the testing, the chapter turns to the 
CD 10 Primary from March 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 11: Logistic Regressions for General Election (November 2002) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
N = 188,551 N = 188,551 N = 54,284 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .444*** .032 1.559 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contact (Visit) --- --- --- .414*** .039 1.513 --- --- --- 
Contact (Phone) --- --- --- .502*** .054 1.652 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- --- --- --- .558*** .050 1.747 
Age .005*** .001 1.005 .005*** .001 1.005 .006*** .001 1.006 
Republican -.163*** .031 .849 -.164*** .031 .849 -.185*** .044 .832 
Minor -.193*** .037 .825 -.193*** .037 .825 -.320*** .059 .726 
Male -.006 .017 .994 -.006 .017 .994 -.075*** .026 .928 
Latino -1.135*** .024 .321 -1.135*** .024 .321 --- --- --- 
Chinese -.459*** .129 .632 -.458*** .129 .632 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.862*** .098 .422 -.862*** .098 .422 --- --- --- 
European -.268** .128 .765 -.268** .128 .765 --- --- --- 
Jewish -.030 .070 .970 -.031 .070 .970 --- --- --- 
Korean -1.213*** .077 .297 -1.213*** .077 .297 --- --- --- 
Japanese -.344*** .111 .709 -.344*** .111 .709 --- --- --- 
M.East./Asia/Pacif. -.133 .110 .876 -.133 .110 .876 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) .067 .077 1.069 .067 .077 1.069 .085 .159 1.088 
South .109*** .027 1.115 .109*** .027 1.115 .016 .102 1.016 
Middle States .070 .056 1.073 .070 .056 1.073 .216 .170 1.241 
Mountain. States .014 .136 1.014 .013 .136 1.013 -.482 .368 .617 
Northeast .157* .094 1.170 .157* .094 1.170 -.174 .426 .840 
Midwest .042 .037 1.043 .042 .037 1.043 -.034 .173 .967 
Foreign Born .485*** .026 1.625 .485*** .026 1.625 .524*** .033 1.689 
Frequent Voter 1.361*** .022 3.900 1.361*** .022 3.898 1.474*** .035 4.367 
Never Voter -.755*** .020 .470 -.755*** .020 .470 -.815*** .031 .443 
Constant .409*** .033 1.506 .410*** .033 1.507 -.777*** .044 .460 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level. 
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CD 10 Primary (March 2003) 
 The Los Angeles City Council District 10 Primary may have been the least 
heavily prioritized election of the three races in which the County Federation acted 
alone in mobilizing potential voters, but when all the contacting groups are included, it 
lies in the middle of the five campaigns in terms of priority.  The mobilizing groups 
consisted of two partisan groups (Martin Ludlow’s campaign team and a union-led 
independent expenditure effort) and the County Federation, which was acting in 
support of Ludlow but was not necessarily partisan in the message it was delivering to 
potential voters.  The addition of two other groups should, according to the first 
hypothesis, result in turnout increases higher than those found for the Federation 
acting alone. 
 In the CD 10 Primary (see Table 12), any contact by the labor-community 
alliance (Model 1) raised voter turnout likelihood by 1.886, or 88.6 percent (p < .01).  
Personal visits were once again less substantial in their influences on turnout (Model 
2), increasing vote odds by 1.851 (85.1 percent), when compared against phone calls, 
which raised turnout chances by 1.951, or 95.1 percent (p < .01).  Contact of Latinos 
was immensely successful, with mobilized Latinos essentially twice as likely to vote 
as non-contacted Latinos. 
 Turning to the other variables included in the data, the results follow some of 
the outcomes found in the November 2002 election.  Age was found to be quite 
meaningful in determining vote odds, with a one-year increase in age raising turnout 
likelihood by 1.020 (p < .01).  Republican and Minor party affiliations were both less 
likely to lead to voting than Democratic affiliation, while several of the ethnic 
variables mattered (for the first two models), though all except Korean were negative 
when compared with the generic ethnicity.  Gender did not matter in any of the 
models.  Birthplace was largely statistically insignificant compared to California, with 
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the exception of those born in foreign countries, who were approximately one-and-
three-quarters more likely to vote than Californians (about one-and-a-half times more 
likely amongst Latinos).  Lastly, vote propensity was highly associated with turnout, 
both for the never and frequent voters.  Frequent voters were about four times more 
likely than occasional voters to go to the polls in the CD 10 Primary. 
 Contact once again showed itself to be a vital factor in the improvement of an 
individual’s vote chances.  With influence rates ranging from 1.851 to 1.994, the 
mobilization effort by the labor-community alliance proved stronger in March 2003 
than in November 2002.  Again contrary to the literature, phone calls worked better 
than personal visits, with a difference of 10 percent between the two types.  Latino 
contact proved the most successful overall, though the results across all the models 
were quite consistent. 
 According to the prioritization determinants set forth earlier in the chapter, the 
CD 10 Primary effort was the second-least important election for the labor-community 
alliance.  The increase in vote likelihood suggests, so far, that the priority level of the 
mobilization effort may be associated with higher turnout levels.  However, it is 
difficult to fully determine whether high priority leads to larger mobilization influence 
without considering additional elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 12: Logistic Regressions for CD 10 Primary (March 2003) – All Groups 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
N = 62,676 N = 62,676 N = 15,196 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .634*** .030 1.886 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contact (Visit) --- --- --- .616*** .034 1.851 --- --- --- 
Contact (Phone) --- --- --- .668*** .043 1.951 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- --- --- --- .690*** .056 1.994 
Age .019*** .001 1.020 .019*** .001 1.019 .015*** .002 1.015 
Republican -.318*** .055 .728 -.317*** .055 .728 -.382*** .097 .683 
Minor -.171** .077 .843 -.170** .077 .843 -.228 .149 .796 
Male .022 .030 1.022 .022 .030 1.022 .041 .055 1.041 
Latino -.472*** .048 .624 -.466*** .049 .627 --- --- --- 
Chinese -.495** .214 .610 -.492** .214 .611 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.773*** .139 .462 -.769*** .139 .463 --- --- --- 
European -.376** .191 .687 -.378** .191 .685 --- --- --- 
Jewish -.415*** .093 .660 -.415*** .093 .661 --- --- --- 
Korean .351*** .095 1.421 .353*** .095 1.424 --- --- --- 
Japanese -.229* .136 .795 -.223 .136 .800 --- --- --- 
M.East./Asia/Pacif. -.270 .166 .763 -.270 .166 .763 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) -.143 .119 .867 -.145 .119 .865 .179 .310 1.196 
South .044 .047 1.045 .044 .047 1.045 -.258 .237 .772 
Middle States .002 .076 1.002 .002 .076 1.002 -.581 .369 .560 
Mountain. States -.050 .186 .951 -.046 .186 .955 .662 .641 1.939 
Northeast -.032 .123 .968 -.031 .123 .969 1.256** .588 3.511 
Midwest -.033 .056 .968 -.033 .056 .967 -.609 .381 .554 
Foreign Born .163*** .051 1.178 .163*** .051 1.177 .390*** .076 1.477 
Frequent Voter 1.409*** .032 4.092 1.409*** .032 4.092 1.336*** .059 3.803 
Never Voter -.773*** .049 .461 -.774*** .049 .461 -.905*** .089 .404 
Constant -2.230*** .059 .108 -2.226*** .059 .108 -2.658*** .104 .070 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level. 
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CD 10 Runoff (May 2003) 
 The CD 10 Runoff from May 2003 was the second-highest priority election of 
the five, according to the total number of contacts and groups, and the known 
importance placed on the election by the County Federation.  It can also be quite 
easily compared to the CD 10 Primary, which was, overall, the lower priority of the 
two, but otherwise remained identical in terms of external factors to voters (i.e. exact 
geographic location, timeframe, scope of election, etc.).  The County Federation 
provided the most contacts in this race, though the Martin Ludlow campaign again 
made a strong partisan push, while a group called Angelenos, about which little is 
known, put substantial resources into a vote-getting effort. 
 The results (found in Table 13) would indicate that, again, contact was hugely 
successful in turning out the vote in May 2003.  Any contact (Model 1) essentially 
doubled vote likelihood, raising odds by 2.051 (p < .01).  It must be noted that the type 
of contact was not recorded for the approximately 11,000 Federation contacts in May; 
as such, Model 2 reports the success rates subdivided by contact type for only the 
remaining groups.  Amongst these groups, personal visits at last conformed to the 
literature, beating phone calls by almost 20 percent in the relative increase levels 
(1.765 to 1.570, respectively).  Latino contact (Model 3) actually fared less well than 
any contact, though it was still highly meaningful to turnout, raising vote odds by 
1.862 (p < .01). 
 The other variables in the data conform to most of the findings of the previous 
elections, though there are some differences between the Runoff and Primary races in 
terms of important turnout factors.  For instance, fewer of the ethnicity variables 
mattered in the Runoff, using generic ethnicity as the base.  Age again proved 
statistically significant, with a 1.015 increase in vote odds per year.  Individuals 
affiliated with the Republican (except in Model 3) or Minor parties were less likely to 
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vote than Democrats.  Gender was irrelevant to vote odds, though amongst Latinos, 
males were slightly less likely to vote.  Once again, none of the birthplaces aside from 
being born in a foreign country were distinguishable from being born in California.  
Frequent vote propensity again led the pack in terms of vote likelihood, with frequent 
voters being five times (four and a half times for Latinos) more likely to go to the polls 
than occasional voters – a score higher than that found for vote propensity in 
November 2002 or March 2003. 
 Though contact was extremely strong in May 2003, an interesting drop in odds 
ratios occurred between Model 1 and Model 2.  Whereas any contact led to a 2.051 
increase in vote likelihood, personal visits and phone calls increased the odds by only 
76.5 and 57.0 percent.  This difference between the models can be explained by the 
fact that the County Federation did not record its contact types in the CD 10 Runoff.  
While all the groups were counted in the first model, only the Martin Ludlow 
campaign and the Angelenos group contributed to Model 2.  This suggests that the 
Federation was likely the most successful of the three groups in turning out the vote, 
and that without its singular efforts, vote likelihood would have fallen substantially.  
 So far, the three elections studied have conformed to the expected results, 
given their assigned priority levels.  The next race will once again expand the 
population available for mobilization, and should, theoretically, prove more successful 
than the November campaign but less potent than either of the CD 10 campaigns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 13: Logistic Regressions for CD 10 Runoff (May 2003) – All Groups 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
N = 62,676 N = 62,676 N = 15,196 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .718*** .031 2.051 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contact (Visit) --- --- --- .568*** .053 1.765 --- --- --- 
Contact (Phone) --- --- --- .451*** .040 1.570 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- --- --- --- .622*** .055 1.862 
Age .014*** .001 1.015 .016*** .001 1.015 .009*** .002 1.009 
Republican -.238*** .056 .788 -.262*** .055 .788 -.102 .090 .903 
Minor -.152** .077 .859 -.152** .077 .859 -.353** .145 .703 
Male .008 .031 1.008 .007 .031 1.008 -.094* .054 .911 
Latino .045 .048 1.046 -.074 .049 1.046 --- --- --- 
Chinese -.424** .214 .655 -.528** .213 .655 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.428*** .140 .652 -.554*** .139 .652 --- --- --- 
European -.085 .184 .919 -.087 .183 .919 --- --- --- 
Jewish -.228** .096 .796 -.336*** .095 .796 --- --- --- 
Korean .468*** .099 1.597 .312*** .098 1.597 --- --- --- 
Japanese -.074 .141 .929 -.183 .141 .929 --- --- --- 
M.East./Asia/Pacif. -.141 .173 .868 -.230 .170 .868 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) -.170 .125 .843 -.214* .124 .843 .084 .303 1.087 
South .022 .049 1.023 .024 .048 1.023 -.510** .243 .601 
Middle States .083 .079 1.087 .053 .078 1.087 -.458 .334 .633 
Mountain. States -.165 .194 .848 -.148 .191 .848 -.736 .753 .479 
Northeast .050 .128 1.052 .042 .126 1.052 .639 .611 1.895 
Midwest -.019 .059 .982 -.038 .059 .982 -.193 .335 .825 
Foreign Born .224*** .051 1.251 .222*** .050 1.251 .405*** .073 1.499 
Frequent Voter 1.617*** .035 5.037 1.634*** .034 5.037 1.511*** .066 4.530 
Never Voter -1.364*** .048 .256 -1.412*** .048 .256 -1.415*** .077 .243 
Constant -1.936*** .061 .144 -1.747*** .060 .144 -1.650*** .097 .192 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level.
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Special Election (October 2003) 
 The October 2003 Special Election is most commonly identified as the Gray 
Davis recall, wherein voters were asked first whether they supported the recall of the 
governor, and, in the event of a recall, who they would then vote for as governor.  The 
labor-community alliance did make a push to increase turnout in the election, though it 
is not clear there was one particular candidate or proposition of most interest to the 
alliance.  Labor made it known at the time that they were pushing throughout the state 
to increase voting and took an interesting approach to the message it sent to voters: the 
County Federation wanted individuals to vote no to the recall and then to vote yes for 
Cruz Bustamante, the Latino candidate running in opposition to Arnold 
Schwarzenegger.  The Federation’s ambition was essentially twofold: one, it wanted to 
increase voting as a whole.  Two, it expected that more Latinos would vote if they had 
a particular candidate behind whom they could put their support.  The original 
Federation message was simply for members to vote no to the recall; however, in an 
effort to bring Latinos into the political fold as much as possible, Miguel Contreras 
asked voters to support Bustamante in the second part of their ballots.  This election is 
the first of the five studied in this dissertation in which a Latino was on the ballot – as 
such, it may be expected that the Latino vote should be quite strong amongst those 
mobilized by the labor-community alliance.  
 Any contact (see Table 14) by the alliance (Model 1) increased voting odds by 
1.720, or 72.0 percent (p < .01) in October 2003.  This number sits comfortably behind 
the two CD 10 races and in front of the November 2002 effort.  Personal visits (Model 
2) again beat phone calls, upping turnout odds by 1.870, while phone calls increased 
vote likelihood by 1.662 (p < .01).  The Latino vote was again substantial, with an 
increase of 1.869 for mobilized Latinos relative to those not mobilized.  Yet this 
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number is not particularly different from those found in the previous election, even 
though the labor-backed candidate in October 2003 was Latino. 
 The other observed variables show quite a lot of deviation from the results 
found in previous elections.  For instance, age was actually found to be negative 
across the first two models, and statistically insignificant in Model 3.  Minor Party 
affiliation negatively affected vote odds compared to Democratic affiliation, while 
gender was found to be statistically significant across all the models, with males 
slightly less likely to vote than females.  The vast majority of the ethnic variables 
mattered in October 2003 (for Models 1 and 2), though only European ethnicity was 
positively associated with vote odds when compared to the generic reference.  The 
most surprising variable in the Special Election has to be birthplace; fully five of the 
seven birthplaces proved statistically significant in influencing vote odds in this 
election (three of the seven for Latinos), and all of them were found to be more 
successful in increasing vote odds than the California base.  Lastly, vote propensity of 
course mattered, with frequent voters being just over three-times more likely to vote 
than occasional voters. 
 While all contacts proved quite successful in getting voters to the polls in the 
October election, the ethnic characteristic of the endorsed candidate (Bustamante) did 
not appear to drive up Latino vote odds any more than that which had occurred in 
previous elections.  However, the most affirming result comes from the vote odds 
provided by any contact, which fell behind the CD 10 races and in front of the 
November 2002 election, exactly as predicted by the hypothesis.  In terms of contact 
type, the success of personal visits over phone calls yields a dead heat between the 
relative successes of one compared to the other – each type worked best in two of the 
four elections.  To unlock the tie between contact type, and to round out the priority 
factor hypothesis, the chapter now turns to the SA 47 Primary from March 2004. 
  
Table 14: Logistic Regressions for Special Election (October 2003) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
N = 188,551 N = 188,551 N = 54,284 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .542*** .025 1.720 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contact (Visit) --- --- --- .626*** .044 1.870 --- --- --- 
Contact (Phone) --- --- --- .508*** .029 1.662 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- --- --- --- .625*** .035 1.869 
Age -.004*** .001 .996 -.004*** .001 .996 .000 .001 1.000 
Republican -.007 .028 .993 -.009 .028 .992 -.036 .040 .965 
Minor -.213*** .033 .808 -.214*** .033 .807 -.225*** .053 .799 
Male -.066*** .016 .937 -.065*** .016 .937 -.085*** .025 .919 
Latino -1.045*** .022 .352 -1.043*** .022 .352 --- --- --- 
Chinese -.326*** .122 .722 -.325*** .122 .722 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.475*** .097 .622 -.475*** .097 .622 --- --- --- 
European .260** .130 1.298 .261** .131 1.299 --- --- --- 
Jewish .291*** .072 1.338 .291*** .072 1.338 --- --- --- 
Korean -1.046*** .068 .351 -1.044*** .068 .352 --- --- --- 
Japanese -.150 .118 .860 -.151 .118 .860 --- --- --- 
M.East./Asia/Pacif. -.144 .101 .866 -.144 .101 .866 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) .187** .073 1.206 .188** .073 1.207 .125 .152 1.133 
South -.012 .025 .988 -.012 .025 .988 .113 .097 1.119 
Middle States .429*** .056 1.535 .429*** .056 1.536 -.024 .164 .976 
Mountain. States .127 .129 1.135 .127 .129 1.135 -.055 .345 .947 
Northeast .526*** .095 1.692 .526*** .095 1.693 1.002*** .324 2.725 
Midwest .225*** .036 1.253 .226*** .036 1.254 .170 .163 1.185 
Foreign Born .550*** .024 1.733 .550*** .024 1.734 .466*** .032 1.594 
Frequent Voter 1.201*** .031 3.324 1.201*** .031 3.325 1.245*** .063 3.474 
Never Voter -.890*** .017 .411 -.890*** .017 .411 -1.607*** .026 .200 
Constant 1.228*** .031 3.416 1.227*** .031 3.411 .386*** .042 1.471 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level.
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State Assembly 47 Democratic Primary (March 2004) 
 The SA 47 mobilization effort was, given the number of contacts and groups, 
the most heavily prioritized election drive for the labor-community alliance.  The 
groups contacted over 38,000 potential voters, outweighing the next closest election 
by over 10,000 contacts.  The Federation is known to have considered this election to 
be of high priority, though perhaps not so substantially than the May 2003 Ludlow 
race.  It is important to note that the vast majority of the contacts came from a group 
called Neighborhood, about which not much is known.  It is likely that this group 
consisted of a number of community-based social progressives, given that Karen Bass 
was well-known in the community and had strong support from the local residents.  
Though the election might be considered the most prioritized given the criteria set 
earlier in this chapter, it is necessary to consider that the community role in vote-
getting was likely stronger than the labor presence. 
 Any contact, found in Table 15 (Model 1), raised the odds of turnout by 1.621, 
or 62.1 percent (p < .01).  This result is highly surprising, in that it does not fit with 
the hypothesis that high priority elections will lead to larger turnout numbers.  Phone 
calls (Model 2) were more successful than personal visits, increasing turnout 
likelihood by 1.659, compared to 1.598 for door-to-door visits.  Latino contact (Model 
3) raised this ethnicity’s relative vote odds by 1.614, or 61.4 percent (p < .01).  Across 
the board, these results come as quite a surprise.  The 1.621 odds ratio of any contact 
were higher only than the November 2002 election, while the Latino odds of 1.614 
were the lowest of the five elections. 
 The other results follow some of the trends found in the four previous 
elections.  For instance, age was again statistically significant, and positive, with each 
increase in years leading to a 1.4 percent increase in vote likelihood (1.7 percent for 
Latinos).  Gender did not matter, while some of the ethnicities were statistically 
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different from generic.  Two of the birthplace variables were statistically significant, 
though in a break from the other elections, foreign birthplace was not found to matter, 
except in the case of Latinos.  Frequent vote propensity was highly relevant to turnout 
odds, upping vote likelihood by five-and-a-half times (about four-and-a-half times for 
Latinos). 
 Of course, the most intriguing result comes from looking at the effects of 
contact on turnout in the SA 47 election.  The outcomes accorded to contact did not 
match those predicted by the prioritization hypothesis.  It is possible that the 
mobilizing agents themselves were not as persuasive in this election as they had been 
in the others.  By far the most contacts came from the group called Neighborhood, 
about which virtually nothing is known.  Perhaps this group was less well-trained in 
mobilization than either the County Federation, ALLERT, or the partisan IE and 
campaign efforts.  Alternatively, it may have been that the population was suffering 
from being “over-mobilized” in that this was the fifth time in two years that labor and 
community groups attempted to garner votes for an election.  Perhaps this last effort 
proved less successful because voters were less receptive to this additional 
mobilization.  Before discussing this theory too deeply, however, the concept will be 
tested again in the portion of the chapter that covers the effects of increases in 
mobilization attempts on potential voters.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 15: Logistic Regressions for SA 47 Primary (March 2004) – All Groups 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
N = 53,648 N = 53,648 N = 9,350 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Any) .483*** .027 1.621 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contact (Visit) --- --- --- .469 .032 1.598 --- --- --- 
Contact (Phone) --- --- --- .506 .040 1.659 --- --- --- 
Contact (Latinos) --- --- --- --- --- --- .479*** .057 1.614 
Age .014*** .001 1.014 .014*** .001 1.014 .017*** .002 1.017 
Male .034 .026 1.034 .034 .026 1.034 -.013 .056 .987 
Latino -.582*** .043 .559 -.582*** .043 .559 --- --- --- 
Chinese .052 .196 1.053 .052 .196 1.052 --- --- --- 
Filipino -.743*** .156 .476 -.743*** .156 .475 --- --- --- 
European -.068 .159 .935 -.068 .159 .934 --- --- --- 
Jewish .475*** .079 1.608 .475*** .079 1.608 --- --- --- 
Korean -.586*** .147 .557 -.586*** .148 .556 --- --- --- 
Japanese .124 .156 1.132 .124 .156 1.133 --- --- --- 
M.East/Asia/Pacif. -.145 .149 .865 -.145 .149 .865 --- --- --- 
West (Not Calif.) .076 .102 1.079 .076 .102 1.079 .146 .330 1.157 
South .050 .038 1.051 .050 .038 1.051 .129 .197 1.138 
Middle States .204*** .065 1.226 .204*** .065 1.226 .248 .272 1.281 
Mountain States .087 .172 1.091 .087 .172 1.091 -.522 .733 .593 
Northeast .292*** .105 1.339 .292*** .105 1.338 .217 .676 1.243 
Midwest .061 .047 1.063 .061 .047 1.063 -.209 .333 .811 
Foreign Born .044 .046 1.045 .044 .046 1.044 .040*** .073 1.041 
Frequent Voter 1.710*** .038 5.528 1.710*** .038 5.531 1.481*** .075 4.397 
Never Voter -.777*** .033 .460 -.777*** .033 .460 -1.439*** .076 .237 
Constant -1.049*** .047 .350 -1.049*** .047 .351 -1.527*** .095 .217 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level. 
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Comparing the Labor-Community Alliance and the County Federation Alone 
 The second hypothesis of this chapter offered that multiple groups and 
mobilizing agents would lead to higher turnout levels than just one organization.  To 
test this hypothesis, the chapter compares the results found for the County Federation 
alone (given in the previous chapter) with the outcomes of the combined labor-
community alliance effort.  The data that identify the Federation uniquely are given 
for only the CD 10 races and the SA 47 campaign, so only these three elections will be 
used in the comparison (for full results, see Table 16). 
 In the CD 10 Primary, the labor-community alliance was uniformly more 
successful in its vote-getting than the County Federation alone.  Adding the additional 
groups and contacts improved turnout likelihood of mobilized individuals by over 50 
percentage points.  Personal visits and phone calls followed near-identical trends 
across both the Federation and the alliance as a whole, with live phone calls proving 
more successful for both.  Latino contact was far more successful for the alliance than 
for the Federation on its own, with turnout raised by over 50 points again. 
 The CD 10 Runoff provided something of a nearer comparison, though again, 
the alliance proved to be more influential as a group than the Federation on its own.  
The odds ratios of any contact differed by about 20 percentage points.  As the 
Federation did not record the types of contact, it is impossible to compare personal 
visits to phone calls in May 2003.  However, amongst Latinos, the Federation 
appeared to be far stronger at getting out the vote than did the alliance as a whole.  In 
fact, the 2.806 odds ratio is the highest of all the contact likelihoods in any of the 
studied elections and groups. 
 Of the three elections, the closest comparison can be found in the SA 47 
Primary.  There was essentially no difference between the alliance and the Federation 
in terms of any contact, with the Federation just edging the alliance in influence by 0.8 
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percentage points.  Perhaps most interesting is that the effects of relative contact types 
were reversed when comparing the County Federation and the entire alliance.  While 
the alliance as a whole was more successful in using phone calls as opposed to 
personal visits, the converse held true for the Federation.  Amongst Latinos, the 
closeness of the comparison continues, with the alliance being slightly more effective 
(given a difference of 1.1 percentage points). 
 
Table 16: Comparing the Odds Rations for Mobilization Efforts of the 
Labor-Community Alliance and the County Federation 
Labor-Community Alliance County Federation  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CD 10 Primary 
(March 2003) 
1.886 1.851; 
1.951 
1.994 1.376 1.331; 
1.427 
1.465 
CD 10 Runoff 
(May 2003) 
2.051 1.765; 
1.570 
1.862 1.887 --- 2.806 
SA 47 Primary 
(March 2004) 
1.621 1.598; 
1.659 
1.614 1.629 1.691; 
1.584 
1.603 
 
Effectiveness of Multiple Contacts 
 This chapter’s third and final hypothesis suggested that multiple contacts (i.e., 
contacts in previous elections) would prove more successful than a single contact (i.e., 
contact in that election alone) and offered further that each additional contact in a 
previous election would increase the likelihood of voting by an individual in one 
particular election.  That is, if the contact for a specific election is the potential voter’s 
first, he or she would be less likely to vote than an individual who had been contacted 
once previously, who, in turn, would be less likely to vote than a person contacted in 
two prior elections, and so forth.  To test this hypothesis, the chapter will look at the 
final election in the data – the SA 47 Primary from March 2004.  This election was 
chosen because it maximized the possibility of contacts given in the data; individuals 
could have been contacted anywhere between zero and five times when voting in this 
particular race.  One limitation must be noted at this point, given the comparative 
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nature of this hypothesis test.  Since five elections are recorded in the data, individuals 
could have been contacted one to five times between 2002 and 2004.  However, no 
information is provided regarding the mobilization of potential voters before 2002.  It 
may have been that some individuals were contacted in races prior to those for which 
data are available. 
 To test the hypothesis, a logistic regression has been run that is virtually 
identical to that found for the previous March 2004 analysis, with one key exception.  
Rather than using any contact and its variants as a dichotomous key independent 
variable, this regression looks at the total contacts in one variable, measured from one 
to five.  The output of the regression on this variable will indicate the change in vote 
odds for each movement of contact across the scale; that is, from zero to one to two 
contacts, all the way through five.  A positive and statistically significant odds ratio 
would indicate that movement across the scale (or, in other words, adding additional 
contacts) leads to increased turnout likelihood. 
 Turning to the regression itself (found in Table 17), total contacts increased 
vote odds by 1.089 (p < .01).  In other words, each additional contact raised vote 
likelihood for a potential voter by 8.9 percent.  The positive and statistically 
significant result demonstrates that, to some degree, additional contacts do appear to 
play a role in upping relative turnout chances for voters. 
 The other variables included in this model mirror those found for the previous 
iteration of the March 2004 model.  That is, age, four of the ethnicities, two of the 
birthplaces and vote propensity all proved to be statistically significant influences on 
vote turnout levels.  These results are not surprising, given that the only change in the 
model centers on adjusting contact from a dummy variable to a scaled test. 
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Table 17: Logistic Regressions for Total Contacts  
in the SA 47 Primary (March 2004) 
 N = 53,648 
Variable Beta S.E. Odds 
Contact (Total) .086*** .011 1.089 
Age .015*** .001 1.015 
Male .033 .026 1.034 
Latino -.572*** .043 .564 
Chinese .032 .195 1.033 
Filipino .767*** .156 .464 
European -.067 .159 .936 
Jewish .470*** .079 1.600 
Korean -.625*** .148 .535 
Japanese .116 .155 1.123 
M.East/Asia/Pacif. -.152 .148 .859 
West (Not Calif.) .074 .102 1.076 
South .050 .038 1.051 
Middle States .195*** .065 1.215 
Mountain States .098 .172 1.103 
Northeast .272*** .104 1.312 
Midwest .048 .046 1.050 
Foreign Born .039 .046 1.040 
Frequent Voter 1.718*** .038 5.572 
Never Voter -.802*** .033 .448 
Constant -1.004*** .046 .366 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level;  
* = Significant at the .10 level. 
 
 
Implications and Discussion 
 This chapter began by offering an expansion of the data set to include two 
additional elections and several other contacting groups, all of which formed a labor-
community alliance pushing to up turnout rates throughout South Los Angeles.  It also 
tested new hypotheses, which added more than a simple regurgitation of quantitative 
analyses across additional elections and groups.  These hypotheses offered a 
demonstrable comparative element to the data set. 
 The first hypothesis suggested that election prioritization, or the effort made by 
the contacting groups, influenced turnout rates of potential voters, with higher priority 
elections showing more successful results.  Though it is not entirely possible to 
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determine the full extent to which the relative elections were more or less prioritized, 
three criteria could be applied to the campaigns to provide a general sense of the 
importance of the elections to the labor-community alliance.  The results of the 
quantitative analyses indicated that the hypothesis was generally correct.  That is, in 
four of the five elections, the identified priority level corresponded exactly to the vote 
likelihood results across the three models.  However, the one exception was perhaps 
the most surprising of the results – in March 2004, identified as the most highly 
prioritized race, the results were far less substantial than expected.   
There are several possible explanations for why this may have occurred.  Most 
notably, it is important to consider the concept of “over-mobilization.”  The SA 47 
race constituted the fifth mobilized election in a very short timeframe, approximately 
one and a half years.  Perhaps it was the case that the residents of South Los Angeles 
were so inundated with mobilization efforts that the effects on the general population 
waned by the fifth election.  This would, however, run quite contrary to the notion that 
increased mobilization should exert community pressure on potential voters, who in 
turn will vote as part of a wider social group.  In explaining these seemingly 
incongruent theories, consider the metaphor of a person blowing air into a balloon.  As 
more air is pushed in, the balloon enlarges, creating the desired effect of the air-
blower.  Yet eventually, at some critical point, too much air is forced into the balloon, 
and it proceeds to burst.   
In the South Los Angeles case, it may be that the mobilizing agents, the “air-
blowers,” forced vote pressure on the same set of individuals again and again, which 
in turn raised the vote likelihoods of potential voters up to a certain point.  At a critical 
moment, perhaps in this case the SA 47 election, the mobilization balloon may have 
popped – the potential voters could have become less responsive to this continued 
exertion of social pressure.  The high priority of the election may well have had 
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something of an adverse effect on turnout levels; given the tremendous number of 
contacts, made largely by those within the potential voters’ communities, the strong 
exertion of social pressure might have caused targeted voters to in some ways rebel, in 
a rejection of continued vote pressure by the community.   
A further explanation might consider that, although the total contacts were by 
far the highest of the five campaigns, the vast majority of the mobilization efforts in 
SA 47 were performed by one community organization, known as Neighborhood.  It is 
possible that some characteristic of this group, or its mobilizing agents, was less 
successful in galvanizing the population than the other organizations working in 
conjunction to up the vote. 
 However, in the remainder of the elections, it appears that priority was 
connected to electoral mobilization effects.  Though the priority identifications are not 
infallible, they are the best approximations available to determine the effort level put 
into each of the campaigns.  It is encouraging that the hypothesis was confirmed in 80 
percent of the elections, which does indicate that priority level can be associated with 
mobilization success. 
 The second hypothesis maintained that, overall, the labor-community alliance 
would be more successful in increasing turnout than the County Federation acting 
alone.  The results, comparing the logistic regressions in this and the previous 
chapters, appear to confirm this hypothesis to a large degree.  The most notable 
evidence that this hypothesis was correct comes from the March 2003 race, wherein 
the alliance fared far better than the Federation alone.  However, in March 2004, the 
Federation actually achieved more success as a singular unit than it did when it was 
grouped with the other contacting teams.  Again, it is important to remember the role 
that electoral prioritization might have played here.  In March 2003, the Federation 
made some effort on behalf of Ludlow, but was not as fully engaged in the 
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mobilization process as in the other two races.  As such, it is possible that the variation 
in the results across the three elections could be tied to the overall effort factor of the 
individual groups and the alliance as a whole.  Yet generally, the hypothesis did 
appear to be accurate, with some qualifications. 
 The final hypothesis added a new variable, which turned contact from a 
dichotomous variable into a scale, based on the number of prior contacts that had 
occurred with potential voters in March 2004.  The hypothesis asserted that multiple 
contacts would produce stronger vote likelihoods, and that the voting odds would 
continue to improve with each additional contact.  This proved to be quite an accurate 
assertion.  The results of the logistic regression suggested that total contacts did play a 
meaningful role in determining turnout, with each additional contact upping vote 
likelihood by about 9 percent.  Yet it is necessary to note that the increase was not 
particularly large amongst voters contacted multiple times.  While a 9 percent increase 
demonstrates that there was an effect of multiple contacts, it is not clear whether the 
bump in turnout provided by these contacts warrants returning to previously mobilized 
voters.  Consider, for instance, that in each election, moving from no contact to 
contact led to anywhere between a 1.4 to 3.0 times increase in turnout.  Yet moving 
from zero to five contacts did not produce nearly as high an increase in vote odds.  It 
would appear that the effect of mobilization does, in fact, begin to wear somewhat as 
the total number of individual contacts increase.  However, it is still critical to 
consider that additional mobilizations of a single person do produce stronger turnout 
results, though it is quite possible that, were these contacts to continue across future 
elections, the marginal vote benefit associated with contact would fall to zero. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation provides an empirical evaluation of the role unions have 
played in increasing voter turnout.  Los Angeles was chosen as the setting for the 
study given that the County Federation of Labor has risen to such prominence as a 
political entity in recent years.  In order to perform quantitative analysis, it was vital to 
understand three elements influencing the answers to original question.  The first 
element relies on political science literature on the determinants of voter turnout.  The 
second element involves understanding the role labor has traditionally played in 
politics.  The third element provides the context in which labor rose to prominence in 
Los Angeles politics.  
 
Summary of Qualitative Chapters 
This dissertation develops a model of voter turnout by relying heavily on the 
political science literature regarding voting behavior.  The discussion of vote turnout 
provided a model from which the theoretical basis of the dissertation could be built.  
This model essentially argues that voting acted as the endpoint following an 
interaction between a multitude of short-term stimuli, some of which were particularly 
important to an individual voter, and as such were considered “triggers,” and certain 
long-term dispositions, largely considered immutable to an individual.  Mobilization 
efforts enter the model by acting as a trigger for particular stimuli, and also by 
working to offset many of the costs associated with voting.  A second theory of voter 
turnout, known as rational choice theory, wherein voting is based on a cost/benefit 
analysis, can be used to extend the discussion of voter turnout.  Mobilization efforts 
offer a way to overcome the “paradox of participation” in politics, by serving as a 
form of social pressure on potential voters.   
  160 
Though all of this information is tremendously useful in creating a framework 
for future data analysis, it is critical also to address two other factors that influence the 
analysis provided in this thesis.  These two factors are the historical role labor has 
played in politics and the rise of the County Federation of Labor in Los Angeles. 
 The third chapter provides a historical account of labor’s role in politics.  Its 
goal is to create an understanding of the typical role the labor movement has played 
within the national-level political scene.  It is important to understand the logic behind 
the current local trends in politics by couching them within the historic political 
approaches taken by labor.  As such, this chapter traces the pluralism of Gompers, the 
Great Depression and the associated alignment of labor with the Democratic Party, 
and the political unrest of the labor movement in the 1960s.  It ends by tracing labor’s 
decline in political influence following Taft-Hartley and culminating under the Reagan 
administration, and concludes with a discussion of the political ramifications of the 
recent AFL-CIO split and the perceived labor success in the 2006 mid-term elections 
and the 2008 Presidential primaries.  Although the chapter is useful in understanding 
the historical roots of the labor movement’s political psychology, a more local 
discussion of labor in politics is necessary, given the particular and unique setting for 
the data analysis. 
 The next chapter explores the explosive rise to political prominence enjoyed by 
the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor beginning in the latter years of the 
twentieth-century.  It highlights the Federation’s traditional role as a check-writing 
organization acting within the local Democratic Party, and offers the hypothesis that 
the Federation grew as a result of changing leadership trends, both amongst unions in 
the city and within the organization itself.  These leadership trends tended to mirror 
the shifting demographics of the city as a whole – that is, the city, its unions, and the 
Federation all became increasingly Latino.  The new Latino leadership brought a new 
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approach to political participation, and, largely through the leadership of Miguel 
Contreras, turned the Federation into a political machine, capable of exerting its power 
on the local governmental landscape almost at will.  The difficulty with previous 
accounts of this story of labor’s progress in Los Angeles is that it has lacked the 
necessary empirical foundation to be considered objectively verified. 
 
Summary of Quantitative Chapters 
 The fifth chapter begins the quantitative section of the dissertation.  It fills the 
empirical void in terms of research into the County Federation’s efforts.  It also 
became increasingly clear that empirical work was necessary when looking at union-
led political mobilization efforts in general.  Only one study (Zullo 2004) has 
addressed individual-based union mobilization, and it was more statistically limited 
than this dissertation.  As such, in addressing the County Federation’s role in politics, 
this chapter also helps fill a void in the general industrial relations literature.  
 This chapter offers three hypotheses, based on the political science models for 
voter turnout discussed previously.  The first holds that any contact by the County 
Federation played a role in influencing an individual’s turnout chances.  The second 
claims that the relative success of the Federation’s mobilization efforts depended on 
the type of contact employed (either personal visits or live phone calls).  The third 
maintains that the Federation would find substantial success in targeting Latinos, 
given the connection between the Latino ethnic group and the labor movement. 
 The first and third hypotheses were strongly confirmed by the logistic 
regressions run on the three elections (two City Council races and one State Assembly 
campaign).  In each race, any contact proved both statistically significant and positive 
in its effect on turnout.  The differences in influence levels across each election were 
attributed to the priority level of the election by the Federation.  However, a more in-
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depth test of election priority versus turnout levels would be performed in the 
following chapter.  Contact of Latinos proved to have a substantial effect on their 
turnout likelihoods, again with any differences likely reliant on electoral priority.    
 Perhaps the most surprising results came from the second hypothesis.  Though 
the hypothesis was confirmed (given that turnout odds were not consistent across both 
contact types), the more intriguing aspect of the outcomes was that personal visits did 
not uniformly increase turnout levels more substantially than did live phone calls, as 
the political science literature on the subject would suggest.  In the two elections for 
which data were available on contact type, the results were split.  It is difficult to 
explain this outcome.  However, it may well have been the case that the mobilizing 
agents were more persuasive over the phone than in person for one of the elections.  It 
is possible also that the phone calls offered potential voters a stronger sense of 
empowerment than did the personal visits – that is, individuals had the option of 
hanging up on the caller, so those who chose not to were perhaps more interested in 
hearing the message provided by the Federation.  The potential voters who agreed to 
invite the mobilizing agents into their homes may have simply wanted to be courteous 
to the vote-getters; several of these individuals seeking to harness the vote were from 
the same community as the potential voters.  It may have been that the mobilized 
population did not want to be rude by slamming the door on one of their neighbors, 
but were not in fact particularly interested in the message.  The less personal phone 
calls offered individuals a chance to truly decide whether they were willing to proceed 
with the mobilization, which may have given them more of a choice as to whether the 
message was meaningful.   
Of course, one other possibility as an explanation for this result lies with the 
data itself.  It is entirely possible that the actual data were coded incorrectly or were 
not indicative of the correct measurement for contact – for instance, perhaps the 
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mobilizing agents recorded contact whenever an individual answered the phone, 
regardless of whether the conversation was substantial or whether the message was 
received by the potential voter.  However, this is not particularly likely, though there 
may have been other coding problems with the data that could have resulted in this 
outcome.  Considering that the data were provided by mobilization strategists in Los 
Angeles, and were not collected in person, a number of unidentifiable problems may 
have arisen between the actual contact and the recording of this mobilization into a 
data set, and also in terms of the subsequent coding and interpretation of the data.  In 
general, given that the results are inconsistent across the elections, it is extremely 
difficult to provide a definitive explanation for this outcome. 
Chapter four builds on the earlier quantitative work, but aims to expand the 
data to include more elections, contacts, and groups.  This chapter measures contact in 
the form of a “labor-community alliance,” which can be considered the combination of 
unions and community activists uniting to raise turnout in any particular campaign by 
exerting increased social pressure on potential voters.  This expansion allows for the 
development of new hypotheses, in addition to a chance to re-test the hypotheses 
stated in the previous chapter.  The new hypotheses add something of a comparative 
element to the study, with the assertion that election priority would dictate the relative 
turnout success across the five included races.  Another hypothesis offers that the 
expansion of contacts per race would lead to higher turnout rates for alliance contacts, 
when compared with County Federation contacts in the three elections for which 
union-only mobilization could be identified.  The final hypothesis argues that multiple 
contacts of the same individual would prove beneficial to turnout odds in the particular 
race of interest, and that each additional contact prior to the election of interest would 
up the turnout odds of the potential voter for the “current” election. 
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The results strongly confirmed the hypotheses.  As with the previous chapter’s 
outcomes, contact in any form proved to be statistically significant and positive in its 
influence on turnout odds across all the elections.  Once again, the relative success 
rates of the mobilizing agents depended on the type of contact employed.  Phone calls 
were more meaningful in producing voters than personal visits in three of the five 
races, again confounding the expectation levied by the literature.  Latinos were again 
particularly susceptible to mobilization. 
In terms of the new hypotheses set forth in the chapter, the outcomes of the 
logistic regressions largely confirmed each.  With one quite critical exception, the 
effects of contact mirrored precisely the established priority levels for each election.  
Essentially, the first hypothesis proved to be correct in four of five elections, though 
the exceptional case (the election held in March 2004) is quite difficult to explain, 
given that it was clearly the most heavily targeted race in terms of total contacts. 
The second hypothesis was also supported, in that generally the alliance fared 
better in its overall contact success than did the County Federation alone.  However, 
the results were again not entirely uniform, especially when considering the two most 
heavily prioritized Federation efforts, in May 2003 and March 2004.  In fact, the Mach 
2004 effort showed larger turnout odds for Federation contacts alone than for contacts 
by the entire coalition, which perhaps offers some explanation in terms of the failure 
of this election to produce a turnout odds rate in line with its overall priority level (that 
is, the vast number of contacts by the labor-community groups were not massively 
successful in their vote increases, as should have occurred given the priority level).   
The final hypothesis of the chapter, regarding multiple contacts, was again 
supported when looking at one election in particular.  The March 2004 SA 47 Primary 
was chosen as the election for study, given that it was the last of the five, which 
allowed for the maximum contact numbers per individual (i.e. up to five).  Though 
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each additional contact did improve a potential voter’s turnout odds, the near-ten 
percent increase in vote likelihood was not perhaps the huge rise in odds expected for 
additional contacts.  Rather than contacting the same people over and over, campaigns 
might find more use in contacting a number of people one time, given that the turnout 
odds of going from zero to one contacts are so much higher than the odds of going 
incrementally from zero to five times contacted.  Yet there is still a positive and 
statistically significant connection between number of times contacted and turnout 
odds, thus providing support for the final hypothesis. 
 
Connection between Qualitative and Quantitative Work 
 It was necessary to extensively develop the three distinct streams of literature 
before performing the empirical analysis because the empirical work of this 
dissertation should contribute to all three literatures.  In what ways have this 
dissertation’s empirical findings meaningfully contributed to the general literature? 
 
Contribution to the Vote Mobilization/Political Science Literature 
 This literature stream brought forth the key model of determining voter turnout 
(the Campbell, et. al. model).  The model suggests that mobilization efforts play a role 
in interacting with short-term stimuli and long-term dispositions of potential voters.  
The first way in which this dissertation contributes to the model is by validating the 
general idea that mobilization efforts do play a role in increasing turnout.  That, it 
would seem, should be quite obvious, though recent literature on the subject suggests 
that one must not simply accept that all mobilization works. 
 Probing more deeply, this work indicates that mobilization efforts do play an 
interactive role with at least long-term dispositions, although the focus of the 
dissertation was not necessarily to study exactly how strong this association might be.  
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However, it is clear from the empirical analysis that the combination of Latino 
ethnicity (a long-term disposition) and union contact (an immediate trigger) managed 
to interact in a very strong way.  As such, the notion of mobilization as a trigger that 
activates certain psychological dispositions appears, from the empirical analysis, to 
have been validated. 
 A further contribution to this literature comes from looking at the details of the 
findings.  Consider mobilization type – phone calls, found in the literature to increase 
voter turnout by three percent at best, were clearly much more meaningful to turnout 
in the elections studied here.  Personal visits were also substantial in upping vote 
levels; though this finding fits with the literature, the magnitude of success again 
indicates a far higher success rate than previously measured.  What does not fit with 
the literature, and what serves as perhaps the most useful finding, was that phone calls 
were often more successful than personal visits.  If there are no flaws in the data (and 
given the methodological soundness of the model we must assume this to be the case), 
this result is both immensely exciting and quite challenging.  Given the costs 
associated with door-to-door efforts, and the uncertainty of the payoff relative to 
phone calls, it would be advisable for mobilization groups to seriously consider 
investing in phone-based operations. 
 
Contribution to the General Literature on Unions in Politics 
 Much of the literature on unions in politics is not strongly developed in an 
empirical sense.  There are very few studies connecting unions to turnout – any studies 
incorporating this connection consider only the role of union membership status, 
rather than the function of the union as the agent of mobilization.  First and foremost, 
this dissertation provides the strongest contribution to an essentially undeveloped 
literature, and offers a number of expansions on the work performed by Zullo (2004). 
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 Looking more broadly, does this study have any relevance to the national-level 
labor movement in its efforts to regain political clout?  It is difficult to give an answer 
to this question – it would, however, be remiss to assume that the study’s results can 
be generalized across any population.  The characteristics of the population in Los 
Angeles are not representative of the general population of the United States.  Yet, 
they are quite similar to other pockets of individuals.  As such, the study may in fact 
have some relevance to locally-oriented, labor-led mobilization efforts, especially in 
urban centers of large cities.  Given that most union-led voter mobilization is 
performed as a coordinated effort focused on upping turnout amongst key potential 
voters in specific regions, the national-level labor movement might find the results 
encouraging to their efforts.  For instance, during the 2008 election, labor at the 
national level would be wise to consider targeting typically unlikely voters (ethnic 
minorities, young people, etc.) in coordinated city-by-city efforts, if the union 
movement wishes to replicate the results found here.  It would not be beneficial to use 
this study’s findings to enact a sweeping mobilization strategy targeting, say, any 
potential voter in the country – a mobilization effort in Beverly Hills may not yield the 
same results found in this work. 
 
Contributions to the Literature on Labor in Los Angeles Politics 
 This dissertation was premised on the notion that the Los Angeles labor 
movement has recently been perceived as immensely successful in mobilizing voters 
for pro-union candidates, yet virtually no empirical evidence tested whether this 
perception was accurate.  The goal was to use quantitative methods to test this idea; 
clearly, the empirical evidence offers a strong confirmation that labor unions have 
played a substantial role in increasing turnout levels of potential voters through 
various mobilization strategies. 
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 This validation of labor’s efforts, spearheaded by the Los Angeles County 
Federation of Labor, most obviously implies that the union movement ought to 
continue channeling as many resources as possible into vote-getting efforts in the city.  
The results suggest that one-time mobilization efforts provide a stronger magnitude of 
influence on turnout than multiple contacts (that is, while additional contacts are more 
likely to raise turnout than a single contact, they do not increase vote odds as strongly 
as going from no contacts to one contact does).  Given the scarcity of resources, the 
County Federation would thus be better off targeting voters who have not previously 
been mobilized.  The analysis also suggests that the Federation should continue 
teaming with community coalitions, given that the increased size of the mobilization 
effort does not negatively influence turnout rates.  Additionally, returning to the 
analysis of contact type, it is recommended that the Federation pour the bulk of its 
resources into phone banks, as this less personal (and less costly) mobilization type 
works essentially just as well as door-to-door efforts. 
 The strongest contribution this dissertation offers to the literature on unions in 
Los Angeles politics is that, using objective data and empirical methods, it can be 
strongly argued that the Federation is, in fact, a major player in the mobilization of 
potential voters.  Although this perception has existed for a number of years, it has at 
last been validated by statistical methods. 
 
Methodological Contribution 
 The dissertation has contributed methodologically to the study of vote behavior 
as well.  It is clear from the results that the best approach to use in empirically 
studying turnout levels is logistic regressions, as they allow for an explanation of a 
dichotomous dependent variable (which turnout will always be) and present likelihood 
estimates for the influences of the independent variables on the dependent.  The other 
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important facet of the methodology is the use of a condition index and tolerance tests 
to determine model suitability.  In vote turnout studies (or any study for that matter), it 
is crucial to demonstrate that the independent variables are not interrelated.  Previous 
work in the union literature has been unable to account for individuals’ propensities to 
vote, which leads to a challenging question regarding cause and effect.  This 
dissertation suggests that researchers incorporate a methodology based on logistic 
regressions, wherein vote propensity must be included and condition indexes are run 
on this and the other variables, to firmly establish that likely voters were not targeted 
more highly than other voters by the mobilizing groups. 
 The dissertation contributes to the literature by offering that the methodology 
used in this study is the best way to establish whether union-led mobilization efforts 
do, in fact, galvanize voters independent of other factors.  While it turns out that the 
perception of labor’s dominance in Los Angeles politics is justified, this perception 
could have been found to be statistically unfounded had the results of this study found 
no empirical link between labor efforts and increased voting.  The critical argument is 
that an association between two objects does not imply a causal relationship (in other 
words, if A occurs, and B occurs, then A caused B to occur).  It is not enough to say, 
for instance, that because labor backed a candidate and that candidate won, labor’s 
support caused the candidate to win.  Nor is it necessarily correct to say that, if labor 
mobilizes voters and turnout increases, labor caused the turnout to increase.  It would 
be inappropriate to make such sweeping conclusions regarding any assertions without 
first testing these assertions empirically.   
Consider the 2006 Congressional election; several sources maintain that unions 
were responsible for increasing member turnout on behalf of pro-labor candidates (see 
Kelber 2006 amongst others).  These sources cite the fact that massive mobilization 
efforts were orchestrated by the AFL-CIO, and that union voters backed the 
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Democratic candidate 74 percent of the time and that 79 percent of union drop-off 
voters (those who cast ballots during presidential races but not for mid-term elections) 
voted in battleground states.  It has been argued, therefore, that the mobilization effort 
caused this high Democratic turnout, and that targeting drop-off voters was a 
successful strategy.  Yet this conclusion is premised on an inaccurate methodology; 
for instance, how do we know if the voters cast ballots because the union mobilized 
them, or if they were going to cast ballots anyway regardless of mobilization?  If a 
large number of drop-off voters turned out, this could just as likely been due to the 
high national-level interest in the election at hand, rather than the union effort to get 
these voters to the polls. 
 If scholars wish to claim, for instance, that the labor movement is politically 
viable nationally based on the 2006 elections, or that unions in Los Angeles can up 
turnout for labor-friendly politicians almost at will, it is important that they support 
their arguments by using objective statistical techniques, based on sound 
methodologies, as evidentiary proof.  It is not enough to simply point to a favorable 
association between events and maintain a causal relationship.  This dissertation 
contributes methodologically by offering all the techniques that need to be used to 
empirically answer questions of labor’s role in increasing turnout and of influences on 
voter behavior in general. 
 It is not, however, the intention of this dissertation to denigrate the concept of 
qualitative research in any way.  Posing arguments and theories based on qualitative 
methods is immensely beneficial, especially in laying a strong foundation for 
developing assertions that can be tested using statistical analysis; the first several 
chapters of this dissertation demonstrate the benefits of a qualitative approach.  I am 
simply arguing that, before making a sweeping claim about a causal relationship 
between labor mobilization and voter turnout levels, scholars should first run 
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empirical tests using the methodological techniques set forth in this dissertation and 
the political science literature in general. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
 While this dissertation has contributed to the political science and industrial 
relations literatures and offered new methodological techniques for testing 
mobilization efforts, it is important to clearly explain the work’s theoretical 
contributions.  Which theories does this work support, and which does it challenge?  
Where does the dissertation fit in the historical development of voter turnout theory?  
Answering these questions requires a brief recounting of the previous voting behavior 
theories, and then an explanation as to the ways in which this work improves on 
previous studies. 
 
Twentieth Century Literature 
 The American Voter (1960) in many ways set the standard for understanding 
the determinants of voting behavior – this work was the first to attempt a conceptual 
model for explaining vote choice (and turnout), although it was by no means the first 
attempt by scholars to analyze political participation.  Authors like Gosnell (1927) and 
Lazarsfeld (throughout the 1940s and 1950s), amongst many others, looked at voting 
behavior (and, in Gosnell’s case, mobilization efforts).  However, in terms of defining 
determinants of vote turnout, the work of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 
provided key insights into the interactions between individuals’ psychological 
characteristics and environmental factors.   
 The notion that vote behavior (i.e. the decision to vote or not) relies on a series 
of psychological-environmental factors (such as an individual’s age, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, party affiliation, and other characteristics, combined with 
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specific short-term influences) has been generally accepted by political scientists.  Yet 
progress has been made since the 1960s in the field of voter turnout.  Often this 
progress has come in the form of refinements to the determinants of voter turnout – 
that is, challenges to the particular characteristics that interact to determine whether an 
individual will vote.  For instance, Campbell, et. al. were said to have overstated the 
role of party identification as the key factor in influencing vote behavior.  Other 
authors have challenged and refined the socioeconomic characteristics that might play 
a role in turnout, with some scholars favoring income (i.e. Milbrath and Goel 1977) 
and others arguing that education is a more accurate predictor (i.e. Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980).  The effects of religion, marital status, occupational choice, gender, 
and a whole host of other individual characteristics have been tested, often with 
compelling evidence both for and against their influences on potential voters.  But the 
fundamental assertion that voting is the final product of psychological and 
environmental interactions remains embedded in even the most current analyses of 
turnout explanations. 
 A second perspective on turnout developed by Downs (1957) and adapted by 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) views voting from an economic outlook.  In answering 
the question of why some individuals vote and others do not, this approach focuses not 
on psychological interactions, but rather on the costs and benefits of voting.  The 
theory concludes that the act of voting represents a paradox, as benefits of turnout, if 
measured in terms of the opportunity to influence an election outcome, always equal 
zero given that a single vote has never determined a major election.  The authors 
presented a question to the political science community, which was termed the 
paradox of participation: if utility always equals zero, why do individuals vote?  This 
approach to turnout became known as rational choice theory. 
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 Political scientists have since built upon these two approaches to turnout, often 
integrating the theories.  Two key contributions to turnout literature in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century came from Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) and Rosenstone 
and Hansen (1993).  Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s work provided critical demographic 
distinctions between voters and nonvoters, significantly improving our understanding 
of the determinants of vote behavior.  The authors established that age and education 
were key factors in influencing turnout, and debunked several notions about other 
turnout contributors.   
 Perhaps the most critical late-twentieth century work on turnout was 
Rosenstone and Hansen’s Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America 
(1993).  In this book, the authors built on the Downs and Campbell, et. al. theories 
when discussing the roles of education, experience, gender, efficacy, and other known 
determinants of voting behavior.  But the authors further developed their analysis of 
turnout determinants to incorporate an understanding of the role of political 
mobilization in influencing turnout.  Rosenstone and Hansen argued that mobilization 
efforts could overcome the paradox of participation.  Further, the authors highlighted 
the importance of individual voters’ social networks, and the tapping into these 
networks by mobilization groups, through direct and indirect mobilization.  They 
maintained that the lack of political mobilization in the 1970s and 1980s was the key 
cause for declining turnout during this time.       
 
Twenty-First Century Literature 
 Following Rosenstone and Hansen’s groundbreaking work on political 
mobilization, a number of recent studies have tested the effects of mobilization on 
turnout.  The key authors of these studies, Alan Gerber and Donald Green, who lead a 
cohort of new scholars in the field, have established what one might call a new 
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paradigm for measuring voter turnout.  While noting the significance of classical vote 
turnout studies, the two authors have challenged the methodological techniques 
employed, arguing that previous work (including that of Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 
Rosenstone and Hansen, and others) is fundamentally flawed in its approach for three 
key reasons.  For one, these previous studies relied on self-reporting of turnout levels 
through surveys (without public record verification).  Gerber and Green maintain that 
this technique leads to a significant overstatement of turnout levels by the surveyed 
individuals, which substantially biases the dependent variable.  For another, the 
sample sizes of these studies were often small, which is likely to have led to unreliable 
results.  Finally, the prior studies were unable to tell whether mobilization groups were 
focusing on likely voters, which again is likely to have biased the results.  Gerber and 
Green, and their colleagues, have asserted that the best way to analyze the role of 
mobilization efforts is to use an experimental approach, wherein a large sample of 
potential voters is randomly assigned into control and treatment groups. 
 Perhaps the key work highlighting this new approach to studying turnout came 
in the authors’ 2000 piece, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct 
Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.”  In this work, the authors used their 
“methodologically defensible” experimental approach, and were able to separate 
mobilization into specific types.  Critically, the authors were able to build a reliable 
sample size for their work, unlike previous attempts to experimentally test 
mobilization (e.g. Gosnell 1927, Eldersveld 1956, Adams and Smith 1980, and Miller, 
Bositis and Baer 1981), which, for lack of a large sample, failed to develop reliable 
results. 
 The authors found that personal mobilization techniques (i.e. face-to-face 
contact) were statistically influential on turnout, while less personal approaches like 
direct mailings and phone calls were essentially meaningless in upping turnout levels.  
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More recent studies by the authors and others associated with their work have found 
results that are often supportive but sometimes in competition with these results – 
while personal visits remain strong indicators of turnout in the newest studies, live 
phone calls have been found in some pieces to slightly raise turnout (e.g. Ramirez 
2005).   
 
This Dissertation’s Contribution 
The Gerber and Green approach to studying mobilization, using verifiable 
public records and large sample sizes, and controlling for vote likelihood, sits at the 
forefront of the mobilization literature.  This dissertation’s methodological techniques 
generally followed the Gerber and Green approach, in using an extremely large sample 
to answer reliability concerns, harnessing verifiable public records to record turnout 
information, and accounting for prior vote behaviors of the population. 
Yet the dissertation did not simply replicate the Gerber and Green approach.  
In many ways, it offered something of a hybrid model of the observational and 
experimental approaches.  While I did not randomly assign the voters into treatment 
and control groups (something that Gerber and Green would likely have wanted), I 
accounted for the theoretical necessity of this random assignment by testing whether 
vote propensity (and all other known characteristics of potential targets) had any 
influence on the decision to contact the voters.  Given the confirmation that contact 
was independent of any known characteristics of the population, and also given 
anecdotal evidence on the matter, I determined that the contacted and non-contacted 
groups were essentially random in their characteristics.  Of course, Gerber and Green 
would possibly argue that there may be underlying variables for which I simply could 
not account, as I did not perform the experiment myself. 
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Yet this lack of hands-on experimentation with the population of potential 
voters leads to the greatest distinction of this dissertation from the Gerber and Green 
work, and what I consider perhaps the most significant contribution to and expansion 
on the political science mobilization literature.  In this work, I am able to study an 
actual mobilization campaign, rather than one simply organized as a political science 
experiment.  Gerber and Green, and their colleagues, set out to experimentally test 
mobilization efforts, and as such were forced to build a campaign that would meet all 
the criteria given their criteria for a “methodologically defensible” analysis.  
Consequently, in their seminal 2000 piece, they employed paid graduate students to 
contact voters face-to-face.  Most critically, they relied on “a large out-of-state 
telemarketing firm” to conduct thirty-second phone calls to potential voters.  Other 
works by the authors and their colleagues have used essentially the same methods.  In 
a 2001 follow-up piece, which focused specifically on telephone efforts and their lack 
of success in mobilization, the authors confess: 
 
It should be noted, however, that professionalism in campaigning manifests 
itself not only in the quantity of calls that can be made but also in the quality of 
those calls.  Having monitored several hours of phone calls, it is our 
impression that the calls were delivered in a routinized and at times rushed 
manner.  In other words, the calls sounded as though they were made by a 
professional firm rather than local volunteers or neighbors.  The telephone 
scripts were generally delivered competently, but sometimes hastily or 
mechanically (Gerber and Green 2001). 
 
 The problem with this approach, manifested most clearly in the study’s phone 
calls but also in the personal contacts, is that paid graduate students and telemarketing 
firms lack any actual investment in the election outcome.  If the mobilizing agents are 
not fully committed to upping turnout – and I argue that a paid graduate student and/or 
a telemarketing firm, especially from out-of-state, holds no fundamental commitment 
to influencing the outcome of the election – the results of the experiment will be 
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negatively biased.  The influence of less personal (or less committed) mobilization 
should not be underestimated.  Putnam (2000) argues that mobilization as a whole is 
far more professionalized and commercialized than it was in the past.  Gerber and 
Green themselves speculate (2000) that a lack of quality, personal contacts – in this 
case meaning contacts by local mobilizing agents committed to raising turnout – may 
explain falling vote levels. 
 My study tested a real mobilization campaign, orchestrated by local union and 
community groups, relying on contacting agents largely from the same community as 
the potential voters.  The contacting agents had an immense commitment to the 
election outcome, as they were fighting to mobilize voters for candidates with close 
ties to their organizations.  The phone banks were not out-of-state telemarketers, but 
were local union and community workers, looking to up the vote in critical elections 
and for candidates in which they believed.  As such, those who mobilized voters in my 
study felt an essential pressure to convince the targeted individuals to cast ballots, 
much more so than a mobilizing agent without any vested interest in the results of his 
or her efforts. 
 All of this speaks to the key difference between my results and those of Gerber 
and Green – the magnitude of the outcomes.  I found a higher likelihood of turnout for 
voters contacted personally than the previous authors, but most importantly, I found 
that telephone calls not only worked, but worked incredibly well.  This result stands in 
direct contrast to the Gerber and Green findings.  I assert that the magnitude of my 
outcomes, and the tremendous success of phone calls in all the elections, can be 
largely attributed to the commitment of the contacting agents to actually convincing 
their targeted voters to cast ballots, which relates back to the fact that my study was 
not designed as an experiment, but as a methodologically suitable observation of a real 
vote-getting effort.  In cases such as mine, when the election results genuinely matter 
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to those contacting potential voters, the message is far more likely to convince the 
individuals to vote.  My results are also buoyed by the fact that these mobilizing 
agents were likely known to the targeted voters (given that they were often part of the 
same community) and could exert a strong sense of social pressure on the contacted 
voters.  The Gerber and Green cohort was unable in their previous studies to consider 
the possibility of social pressure by contacting agents, as their mobilization teams 
were paid graduate students or out-of-state phone banks and, as such, were often not 
members of the same community. 
 Thus, the most recognizable theoretical contribution of this work lies in its 
suggestion the Gerber and Green approach is in some ways correct in its methods, but 
that it is impossible to grasp the true effects of mobilization efforts without studying 
actual campaigns in a less intrusive manner.  Although such an approach loses its pre-
election randomization of voters, it gains the substantial benefit of relying on sincerely 
committed contacting agents, carrying with them a message that they genuinely wish 
to impart on potential voters.  This message, I argue, is much more convincing than 
one read from a script.   
 A further theoretical contribution can be found when considering the 
contextual circumstances of the study and the assertion that unions and community 
groups have forged a bond with their potential voters that leads to a high likelihood of 
mobilization success.  This contribution also speaks to the idea that the results might 
be generalized more broadly than just the Los Angeles setting or just the union 
mobilization effort.  While on the surface it might appear that, given the context 
discussed, Los Angeles is an exceptional case for the study, I argue that the 
circumstances surrounding the tested vote-getting efforts are not fundamentally 
different from other situations.  The bond between the County Federation and the local 
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community is not particularly different from a bond between, for instance, a church 
and its environs.   
While the rise of Latino organizers to positions of power in the Federation 
coupled with increasing numbers of Latino workers and a politically awakened 
ethnicity following Proposition 187 might be used to argue for Los Angeles 
exceptionality, I maintain that these forces simply created a political bond between 
unions and Latinos.  How the bond was created (the unique L.A. circumstances) does 
not influence the likelihood that this bond can be created elsewhere, under a different 
series of events.  That is, the bond itself is not dependent on one particular set of 
circumstances, but can be found in any number of settings.  Consider the turnout 
levels of highly religious voters in the 2004 presidential election, after Karl Rove 
orchestrated the development of a bond between George Bush and the highly 
religious.  The massive mobilization of this voting bloc on behalf of the Republican 
Party is not fundamentally dissimilar to the contacting of community members by a 
labor-community alliance for which there is a strong local affinity.  As such, I 
maintain that any these results should not be considered exceptional, but rather that 
outcomes of a similar magnitude would likely be found when any political bond has 
been developed and is supported by a large mobilization effort that employs 
contacting agents with a vested interest in influencing the election. 
 
Possible Improvements and Final Thoughts 
 Although the results of the various quantitative analyses are quite consistent, 
there is some room for improvement in the study, which should be noted.  The largest 
concern with this work’s methodological approach, discussed often in this final 
chapter, involves the use of observational data, rather than first-hand experimental 
analysis.  While this data set offers a multitude of positive aspects (e.g. its unique 
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comparative features, its inclusion of a number of controls, its size, etc.), it has been of 
vital importance to demonstrate that the non-random nature of the data does not 
indicate any biases that may have skewed the results.  I took a number of steps in this 
dissertation to ensure the methodological soundness of each model used, thus 
validating the outcomes offered.  However, were an absolutely experimental test to be 
run, with pre-contact randomization and all the usual scientific processes, the results 
would be even more immune from this methodological challenge; however, the 
drawbacks of this purely experimental approach (which is essentially a replication of 
Gerber and Green’s work) have been discussed at length in this chapter as well.   
 Following from this concern over the use of observational data is a similar 
consideration, in that it is difficult not to question whether any errors might have been 
made at some point between the contact itself, the recording of the contact, the coding 
into data, the combination of the data sets, and finally the analysis.  More particularly, 
without first-hand data recording, it is hard to know whether the information provided 
is entirely accurate in its representation of the actual mobilization effort.  There are 
certain pieces of information that are missing from the data set – such as some 
differentiating characteristics of the mobilization agents (other that what is broadly 
known about the contacting groups) or the accuracy of the registered voters list 
provided by Political Data.  Were this information available, it would be useful in 
explaining some of the more intriguing aspects of the results. 
 The outcomes found in this dissertation validate the strategy adopted by 
organized labor in Los Angeles, especially that of the Los Angeles County Federation 
of Labor.  The magnitude of influence, especially for the Federation but also in terms 
of the labor-community partnership, indicates that the positive reputation gained by 
the labor organization over the last several years is entirely justified. 
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 There is room for further theoretical development of this topic, especially 
when considering the concept of social pressure as a political tactic.  The notion of 
“over-mobilization” of a community based on constant turnout pressure by vote-
getting groups would be interesting to study.  The theory is that after a certain number 
of mobilization efforts over a period of time, potential voters will reject the idea that 
they must vote to be accepted by the community.  I argue in this dissertation that such 
an event occurred in March 2004, wherein the high election priority, combined with 
the nearness of this race to four other campaigns in which mobilization occurred, led 
to a turnout increase that did not match the level anticipated by the vote-getting effort.  
However, it would be interesting to develop this concept further – is there one precise 
point where mobilization efforts begin to lose their effectiveness?  This notion of over-
mobilization could also be connected to the economic literature on diminishing 
marginal utility, and tests could be performed that might contribute to this literature. 
 It would also be interesting to attempt to understand the extent to which the 
particular context of the study played a role in the results.  Although I argue that the 
bond forged between Los Angeles unions and the local community should not be 
considered totally exceptional (nor the results unrepeatable), a further step would be to 
perform a study across different contexts.  It would be useful, for instance, to analyze 
populations with similar demographic characteristics but different geographic 
locations – this might provide some empirical test of the uniqueness of Los Angeles as 
an environment. 
It would also be interesting to test the idea that external conditions do not play 
an important role when looking at one particular set of individuals over several 
elections.  I argue in this dissertation that the factors external to the population being 
analyzed (for instance, the closeness of the race) are irrelevant, given that the studied 
individuals are all subject to the same external pressures (although I admit that 
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individual perceptions of external factors like race closeness may differ to some 
degree).  As such, the model includes no external conditions.  A future study might 
incorporate these external factors in a measurable fashion, or test whether these 
conditions are statistically meaningless when studying one particular group of people.  
It is critical to consider that the analysis in this dissertation compared only relative 
vote levels (that is, turnout patterns of contacted individuals versus non-contacted 
individuals).  Any study looking to analyze absolute vote turnout rates would need to 
control for external factors, which will influence blocks of voters differently. 
In many ways, the number of future projects that could stem from this study 
serves as both a compliment to the worth of this type of analysis and a statement on 
the paucity of literature on this topic.  With the political science literature not entirely 
speaking in the same voice on mobilization determinants and the literature on the role 
of union efforts to mobilize voters very much in its infancy, there is much room for 
additional studies.  Considering the time and money spent by unions to perform vote-
getting drives in recent political campaigns at the national and local levels, research of 
this type is certainly worthwhile and should prove quite useful for the labor 
movement.  I recommend that those interested in studying this topic perform empirical 
analyses based on sound methodological structures, which add the benefit of statistical 
objectivity to the research.  However, it is vital first for future researchers to explore 
the context in which they are working, and to determine hypotheses worth testing 
within these contexts.  As such, I recommend a dual-methods approach as most useful 
for future studies.
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